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CHILE
AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

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THE UNITED STATES

BY

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MY FATHER




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PREFACE

Considerable attention has been devoted in recent years to American diplomacy in its relations with the Hispanic-American republics grouped around the Caribbean Sea. Fairly familiar themes, also, are the policy of the United States toward Mexico, the expansion of American commerce and finance in the Caribbean islands, American intervention in Central American politics, and the Panama Canal affair. But apart from discussion of the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism, comparatively little has yet been written concerning the relations of the United States with the stronger nations in the southern part of South America. Here European influence was dominant during the whole of the nineteenth century; and only just before the period of the World War did American commercial and financial interests begin to rival those of England, France, and Germany. Yet the attitude of the larger South American nations toward the United States has an important bearing on the success of its policies in the western world. This treatise, accordingly, has been prepared to give a fairly detailed account of American dealings with one of the three outstanding countries of the South American continent, the republic of Chile.

Chile has been chosen as the particular field for study for several reasons. Few countries have had more occasions to regard the United States with un-

friendliness and to resent its policies. The independent spirit shown by this Hispanic-American republic cannot but attract the attention of students of world politics, and possibly no better field could be chosen to illustrate the difficulties that beset the path of American diplomats when they attempt to assert a leadership for their own country in its relations with the sensitive and proud people of smaller nations.

In the second place, the domestic history of Chile is an unusual one in Hispanic-American annals. In the eighteenth century its rank among the poorer and more backward of the Spanish dominions appeared to furnish scant promise of future greatness. Yet after independence was attained, the new republic enjoyed for almost a hundred years a peaceful development broken by only three revolutions of serious moment, of which the longest lasted eight months. In this respect it has a history unlike that of any other among the former colonies of Spain, and one which compares favorably with that of the United States. In Chile the great landed proprietors have been able to retain their hold upon the reins of government substantially down to the present day. Its history thus has a significant place in Hispanic America, in that it shows how a republic of Spanish origin can make a record of virtually unbroken progress, and the extent to which a nation may prosper under the rule of an agrarian aristocracy.

Furthermore, the history of American relations with Chile includes the narrative of one of the most

ambitious undertakings ever attempted by the United States on this continent—that of mediation in the Tacna-Arica dispute. The outcome of the enterprise may mean much to the prestige of the northern republic in the New World. One of the chief factors in a possible success would have been the measure in which past blunders in Chilean relations were overcome. The signal failure of the Tacna-Arica arbitration proceedings up to the present (December 1926) is anything but gratifying.

In fact, many of the obstacles to general Pan-American accord, so little understood by citizens of the United States, have had their origin in events similar to those related in the present work. It is hoped then that this book may serve as a basis for a more intelligent study of all our inter-American relations. Chile may be little known in this country, but is has loomed large in South America for half a century and must be taken into account in all our dealings with the other nations of the western world.

Acknowledgment is due particularly to Professor William R. Shepherd, of Columbia University, for his invaluable assistance, not only in making suggestions as to sources and arrangement of material, but likewise in the careful revision which he made of the entire work. I am also indebted to Dr. Talcott Williams, of Columbia University, for the use of his large library, which he kindly placed at my disposal. I wish to thank Mr. Tyler Dennett, Chief of the Division of Publications and Editor of the Department of State for making it possible for me to use

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HENRY CLAY EVANS, JR.

CONTENTS

CHILE
AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

Chapter I

THE END OF A COLONY

An autumn festival, the most elaborate and impressive that the residents of Santiago had ever seen, marked the closing months of the year 1789 in the capital city of the Spanish colony of Chile. There were banquets at the palace of the captain-general, dances at the homes of the colonial aristocracy, bonfires in the streets of the poorer sections, bullfights for the populace. For the loyal subjects of the King of Spain were celebrating the coronation of His Majesty Charles IV. For four days the festivities lasted while masses were chanted in the twenty-six churches of the town. The opening day had been marked by a parade that was headed by Captain General Ambrosio O'Higgins, an Irishman who had risen high in the favor of the Spanish monarchy. Four Indian chieftains had been brought from the frontiers to proclaim allegiance to the new king. This was colonial Chile at its best.[1]

The year had witnessed far different scenes in other parts of the globe. The young king of France, with his Austrian wife, had been forced to leave his palace at Versailles and ride to Paris in a mock procession formed by the rabble of the French capital. In the United States George Washington had taken the oath of office as president of the first republic in the new world. A triumphant period for republi-

[1] Diego Barros Arana, *Historia jeneral de Chile,* VII. 39.

canism was opening which was to make many a monarch uneasy. But apart from an Indian uprising in Peru, the Spanish king had not heard even so much as a threat of rebellion from his dominion overseas.

The colony of Spain at the southwestern part of South America had been founded more than half a century before the Atlantic shores of North America were occupied by Englishmen. Pedro de Valdivia came from Peru to the southwestern valleys of the Andes in 1540. There he started the colonization of Chile sixty odd years before the *Susan Constant* brought to Virginia the hardy band of men from Britain who laid the foundation of what was later to be the United States. But the Virginians and their neighbors had established a nation more than thirty years before the Chileans made their first attempt toward independence.

During its two centuries and a half as a colony, Chile was practically isolated from the rest of the world. The great Andes mountains cut off intercourse from the east, while the deserts in the north where copper and silver were mined formed a second barrier. The western coastline extended toward the southern end of South America, but Spain closed the sea. Until nearly the middle of the eighteenth century only two regular voyages a year brought goods to Spanish America from the motherland, and the nearest port of landing for Chile was in the northern end of the continent. Even when Spanish trading vessels were allowed to come to Chile, foreigners were forbidden to barter there under penalty

of six months labor in the mines.[2] Thus did the Spanish king keep his colonial subjects separated from a restless world.

The basic racial element in the colony was the mestizo, a mixture of white and Indian. Most of the mestizos were illiterate, rural workingmen who, until the time of O'Higgins, lived on the big landed estates of central Chile under a system of serfdom wherein they were forbidden to change their home and master.[3] When this system was abolished, the rural laborer was given a field of his own to till, or else was allowed to work for wages on the big estates. Even then he barely made a subsistence. A few of the mestizos became skilled artisans in the towns, whereupon they tried to throw a veil over their origin and deny that any Indian blood flowed in their veins.[4]

The proprietors of landed estates were the descendants of the men who had come to the colony in its early days. They often owned city homes as well as their spacious country dwellings. In Santiago, particularly, they formed an aristocracy of proud families who still furnish leaders for the Chilean people. During the colonial period, these held themselves aloof from the great mass of people, who numbered

[2] A. S. M. Chisholm, *The Independence of Chile,* p. 12.

[3] This system was known as the *encomienda.* A grant of land together with the Indians to work on it was made to the white settler, who was supposed to care faithfully for the natives.

[4] José Victorino Lastarria, *Investigaciones sobre la influencia social de la conquista y del sistema colonial de los Españoles en Chile,* p. 62.

all told about four hundred thousand toward the close of the eighteenth century.[5]

All important officials in Chile were appointed by the King of Spain. There was a governor and captain-general, who represented the royal authority. In theory, the governor was under the Viceroy of Peru, but in later colonial times he was almost independent of the government at Lima. Besides the chief executive there was the audiencia, which acted as a council for the governor and also as a supreme court for the colony. The only bodies in any way representative of the people were the cabildos, or town councils, that operated under the strict supervision of the governor and his subordinates. Membership in the cabildos was obtained sometimes by appointment, sometimes by election, and often by purchase. These town councils discussed local taxation and other affairs of municipal government, but their chief function was to register the royal decrees that formed part of the laws framed for the colony.

The Chileans were devout Roman Catholics, and a familiar figure in the country was the priest, who had tremendous influence, especially with the country people.[6] The church received tithes from the income of each communicant and first fruits from the products of every farm, so that by the close of the

[5] José Victorino Lastarria, *Investigaciones sobre la influencia social de la conquista y del sistema colonial de los Españoles en Chile*, p. 69.

[6] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, undated report of Joel R. Poinsett to President James Madison, which declares that, after the overthrow of Spanish rule, the rural priests were the real rulers in country districts.

eighteenth century its income was greater than that of the Colony. With foreigners barred and all books censored before the colonials could read them, Roman Catholicism was firmly entrenched in Chile before independence came.

But in spite of all outward signs of continued loyalty to the mother country, there was restlessness beneath the surface in 1789. As Spain clung stubbornly to its monopoly of the colonial trade all through the revolutionary eighteenth century, the forbidden foreigner with his cheaper goods became a welcome smuggler in many ports. The coasts were too long to be guarded well against British and American traders. Extensive whale fishing was carried on in the waters of the lower Pacific by adventurers from England and the United States, and many ships came to Chilean waters nominally to obtain whale oil but chiefly to barter contraband wares. One member of an American expedition reported that a merchant had bribed soldiers sent to arrest him so that they helped him land his goods.[7] "Piracy and contraband are common things now," wrote the Viceroy of Peru in 1790. "It has been made thus by the English and Bostonians."[8]

When wide-awake Chileans saw what open ports would mean to them, the restrictive Spanish trade-system became an odious thing. Even a more grievous cause of complaint was the appointive plan that Spain followed. Though the kings had often ex-

[7] William Moulton, *A Concise Extract from the Sea Journal*, p. 78.

[8] Barros Arana, *op. cit.*, VII. 414.

pressed their intention to recognize children of early settlers when they chose colonial officials,[9] few American-born Spaniards received appointments. Men from Spain were sent to govern, men who held themselves to be above the natives and were in turn disliked by the colonials. Ambrosio O'Higgins, one of the most progressive captains-general placed over Chile, was afraid to proclaim as his wife the woman he loved, even though she belonged to one of the proudest native families, since marriage with a colonial might damage his career. "The condition of being a native of Chile is there regarded as something worse than original sin," wrote José Antonio Rojas while journeying in Europe. "For baptism will free us from the latter while there is no escape from the former."[10]

Through underground channels the philosophies of the French revolution found their way slowly into the homes of the wealthier Chileans. Those who travelled in Europe learned that Spain was becoming a decadent nation. They brought back this news to Chile and circulated the French books that they had smuggled into the country. Many Chileans made a study of the teachings of Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Voltaire. By 1800 small secret societies that talked of revolution were to be found in most of the larger towns,[11] and it needed only an impetus from Europe to bring to the surface these fires that were smouldering in the hearts of so many colonial leaders.

[9] *Recopilación de leyes de los reinos de las Indias,* book 3, title 2, law 14.
[10] Chisholm, *op. cit.,* p. 55.
[11] Moulton, *op. cit.,* p. 80.

This impulse was given by Napoleon Bonaparte, when in 1808 his French army overran Spain. Charles IV was induced to abdicate, and Ferdinand, the heir apparent, to renounce his right to succession, while Joseph Bonaparte was placed on the throne and command was sent to Spanish America that allegiance be sworn to the usurper. To offset this, a junta formed by Spaniards at Seville entreated the overseas colonies to remain loyal to Ferdinand VII as rightful king. In face of such danger, the Spaniards became more solicitous than they ever had been for colonial goodwill and even offered representation in the Cortes, the legislative assembly of the mother country.

José García Carrasco was governor of Chile at this time, a timid man who was incapable of taking decisive action in such a crisis, as he feared the Santiago aristocracy, who refused to consider the demands of Napoleon. He first had correspondence with the sister of Ferdinand and wife of the prince regent of Portugal, then resident in Brazil, who desired to unite the Spanish-American colonies to the Braganza dynasty, but he could make no satisfactory arrangement with her.[12] Finally, when because of a warning from the neighboring viceroy of La Plata that revolution was threatening, he suspended elections for a representative to the Spanish assembly, the Chileans resolved to displace their captain-general and set up a government for themselves.

[12] Barros Arana, *op. cit.*, VIII. 92.

The crucial step was taken on September 18, 1810. García Carrasco had imprisoned three of the leading colonials whom he feared. Loud protests from the Santiago cabildo caused him to promise that he would free them, but instead he deported them secretly to Peru. When the news reached Santiago, the royal audiencia joined the cabildo in requiring him to resign. A provisional junta was formed to govern in the name of Ferdinand VII until that unfortunate prince could regain his throne, but it was a shadowy allegiance proclaimed to a monarch who had an even more shadowy claim to a kingdom. The junta made immediate plans to call a congress elected by the people of the colony. Chilean colonial life was nearing an end and a nation was emerging.

Chapter II

THE BEGINNINGS OF A NATION

The provisional junta that assumed control of Chile while elections were being held for the first Congress was well representative of the leading interests and sections of the country. Its guiding spirit was Dr. Juan Martínez de Rozas, a lawyer of Concepción, the second city of the colony, and in it were relatives of the Larrains, the large family whose numerous branches caused it to be known as the "eight hundred." Heartily behind the new government was the cabildo of Santiago that spoke for the aristocracy of the capital city. All omens were favorable for the success of the new project.

The energy of the junta was seen immediately in the liberal decrees that were passed. A fixed system of taxation was established that stopped the farming out of revenues; slavery was abolished; restrictions on commerce were largely removed; provision was even made for elementary schools in each center of population.[1] These were popular measures with men who were interested in Chile's progress, and all through the country the new movement was accepted gladly. As long as Chileans were allowed to act for themselves there was little chance of returning to the old régime. Self-government seemed to have come to stay.

[1] M. A. Tocornal, *Memoria sobre el primer gobierno nacional*, pp. 210-212.

The part played by the United States in this sudden change in Chilean history was not so great as it seemingly should have been. Outside of contributing their share to contraband commerce, the citizens of the northern republic did little toward urging the colony to be rid of European control. American traders sold watches and charms that bore the picture of a woman wearing an arm-band inscribed with the words, "American Liberty."[2] A few colonials in Chile had French versions of the American Declaration of Independence. "But sympathy for the American revolution could only have come to a very few hearts," according to Barros Arana, the Chilean historian.[3]

As the work of the junta progressed, however, the United States became more concerned in affairs along the west coast of South America. When the text of a decree opening Chilean ports to the commerce of friendly foreign nations was sent to the Congress of the northern republic, it was accompanied by a manifesto that asked for a "cordial alliance."[4] But President Madison and the American Congress were disposed to proceed with caution, and although a resolution was presented in the House of Representatives in December, 1810, to recognize as belligerents the South Americans who were in revolt, no action on it was taken.[5]

[3] Barros Arana, VII. 44.
[4] Barros Arana, VII. 478.
[4] F. J. de Urrutia, *Páginas de historia diplomática,* p. 60.
[5] *American State Papers,* I. 538.

Madison then dispatched Joel Robert Poinsett, of Charleston, as his personal agent to Buenos Aires and Chile, who was to inform the President as to conditions there, and if the junta seemed permanent, was to negotiate commercial treaties. British merchants were very anxious to prevent Americans from sharing in the new trade advantages, as both Madison and Poinsett well understood.

The American agent was a world traveller and adventurer who had shortly prior to this South American expedition taken part in the Greek revolution against Turkey.[6] He revelled in surroundings such as he found in the southern end of the new world. After negotiating a commercial treaty at Buenos Aires in the face of violent British opposition, he left for Santiago, arriving there on the 14th of February, 1812.

The situation was not so favorable here as he found it east of the Andes. The viceroy of Peru was not at all satisfied with affairs in his captaincy-general. Though Chile had indeed been made almost independent of him by the Spanish crown, he now dispatched a force by water to Valdivia to subdue the upstart colony. The new Congress had hardly assembled before the invasion from Peru became the absorbing problem to be solved.

At Santiago a new leader, who belonged to one of the old families in the capital, had come to the fore. This was José Miguel Carrera, just recently

[6] Martín García Merou, *Historia de la diplomacia americana*, p. 260.

returned from the peninsular campaigns in Spain, and the idol of the troops now gathering to fight the invaders. By a series of military coups, he became the directing genius of the executive committee that was organized by the Congress; and by the time of Poinsett's arrival, he had dissolved the legislative body, because he believed that some of its members plotted to assassinate him.[7] In this way a military dictatorship had been established two years after the last royal governor had been expelled.

Poinsett's position was not entirely clear. The United States had no intention of recognizing the rebels until after he made his reports. Yet he was called by the State Department at Washington a consul-general as well as a confidential agent. His first instructions read that he should explain to the Chileans the mutual commercial advantages in trading with his country. He was to let them understand that the United States had no desire to intervene in any struggle between the colonies and Spain, but if separation did occur, the northern republic would desire to cultivate the closest relations.[8]

It was not at all certain that the revolutionary junta would officially receive Poinsett as consul-general, and the *tribunal del consulado*[9] did not care to accept his credentials when he came to Santiago.

[7] Barros Arana, *Historia jeneral de la independencia de Chile,* p. 406.

[8] Martín García Merou, *op. cit.,* p. 261.

[9] This was an association of merchants resembling a modern chamber of commerce. Many Spanish colonial towns had them. For Poinsett's conflict with the one at Santiago, see Barros Arana, *Historia jeneral de Chile,* VIII. 555.

The members of the tribunal were Spanish merchants who were not entirely pleased with the length to which the new Chilean government had gone in making itself virtually independent of Spain. One argument advanced by them was that Poinsett had never been confirmed by the United States Senate. Only the interposition of Agustín Vial, secretary of Carrera's latest junta, brought about a change.

Although the position of the American agent seemed to be a delicate one, its difficulties gave him scant worry. He had been told on leaving Washington to take all measures possible for aiding Chile that would not be incompatible with the position of neutrality, but the latitude which he gave to the interpretation of these instructions was nothing short of astonishing.

His experiences in Greece had not accustomed him to the position of neutral observer, and he quickly became an open partisan of Carrera. One of his first steps was to promise military supplies from the United States. The promise was not kept, because even had American manufacturers been so disposed, the new war with England demanded all their attention. But lively hope was aroused among Chileans that the United States would soon join them in their struggle.

Poinsett did not stop here, but accepted the position of authorized councillor for the Chilean government. At his home in Santiago, a provisional constitution was drafted wherein the political theory of a compact between king and people was set forth,

although allegiance was sworn to Ferdinand VII.[10] Following this, he was offered a position as commander of a division in the army fighting the Peruvian royalists, and though he could find nothing in his instructions to warrant it, he accepted promptly. When the invaders captured eleven American whalers and were on the point of sending them as prisoners to Callao, Commander Poinsett led his division against them and rescued the whalers.[11]

One of the greatest factors in furthering the influence of the United States at this time was the *Aurora de Chile,* the first newspaper in the country. Its editor was Camilo Henríquez, a gifted renegade priest, who had imbibed the doctrines of Rousseau and was a confirmed admirer of the United States. News from the northern republic appeared in almost every issue of the *Aurora* and quotations from Boston papers, for New England was the only part of the United States known to any degree in Chile. The Declaration of Independence was now printed and spread abroad along with the inaugural address of Thomas Jefferson.

"The United States," wrote Henríquez on April 30, 1812, "possesses a great people who have been freed from tyranny and are now offering refuge to many of our peninsular brothers who flee from French vandalism. They lag behind in painting and sculpture, but have abounded in material welfare,

[10] Alberto Cummins, "El reglamento constitucional de 1812," in *La Revista Chilena,* V (1913), 225.

[11] Charles J. Stillé, *Life and Service of Joel R. Poinsett,* pp. 27-29.

in farming and manufacturing. Their greatest achievement is their marvelous advancement in schools. Their constitution has made their land an asylum for the oppressed."[12]

Henríquez was not the type, however, to agree long with any governing body, and by the spring of 1813 differences were rumored between him and the governing junta. The last issue of the paper appeared on the first of April in that year. No good reason was given for its demise, but five days afterwards an official newspaper, *El Monitor Araucano,* appeared. The *Aurora* made one lasting contribution at any rate: the United States was better known and the utterances of American statesmen had been published abroad in Chile.[13]

The *Aurora* was printed on a press brought from New York City by Matthew Hoevel, a prominent and interesting American of the early revolutionary period in Chile. According to report, his past record had not been above reproach. He came to South America as a clerk on an American ship owned by J. R. Livingston. When this vessel was seized by the Spaniards and illegally condemned, the young clerk saved the ship's papers and went to Spain for Livingston, where he obtained judgment. He then returned to Santiago with an order on the treasury of Chile from the Council of the Indies; but later, when ports were opened in the colony and Livingston sent

[12] Julio Vicuña Cinfuentes, *Aurora de Chile; reimpresión,* pp. 93-101.

[13] The four statesmen most frequently mentioned were Franklin, Washington, Jefferson, and Madison.

for his money, he received only a small sum. He found to his astonishment that Hoevel had spent most of it for his own use.[14]

Whatever his past might have been, the former ship's clerk was esteemed sufficiently in Chile to obtain a contract for the importation of a printing press, which arrived from New York early in 1812 with three American printers. Poinsett received such good reports of Hoevel that he made him vice-consul to act under him. Together they planned to influence Carrera to convert the government into a republic and break off all connection with Spain.

The date set for this important change was the fourth of July, 1812, when Carrera decreed that Santiago should hold a celebration for the signing of the American Declaration of Independence. The Chilean leader was undecided how far he should go. Then, unfortunately, the printers of the *Aurora* took a hand. At home, Fourth of July celebrations meant drinking freely of all liquor within reach. That they might compromise themselves and their country in Chile did not occur to them. Coming to the palace, they insulted Poinsett and the latter had to be protected by the police.[15] The printers were imprisoned and Carrera declined to follow the American example. Poinsett severed relations with Hoevel and wrote home that he had discovered his former assist-

[14] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, undated report of Joel R. Poinsett.

[15] Cinfuentes, *op. cit.*, p. 14. The diary of William Johnstone, one of the printers, reports only that the occasion was celebrated properly.

ant to have been working secretly against the United States.

Moreover, Captain Porter arrived at Valparaiso with the American warship, *Essex,* bringing with him certain British prizes captured at sea. The Chilean people were thoroughly sympathetic with the cause of the captain in the war of his country against England. For, in order to discourage further movements toward revolution, the royalist government in Peru had represented that England's alliance with Spain would never permit British statesmen to back any Chilean resistance to the mother country. This was generally believed in Chile, whereas hope of American intervention had not been abandoned. Porter thus was allowed to sell his captured cargo and fit out his newly acquired ships to prey further on British commerce.[16]

But warnings came to Santiago from Buenos Aires that it was impolitic to vex the English too far by espousing the American cause. The authorities grew more cautious, and when Porter returned in 1814 his official reception was cooler. He was trapped by British ships in Valparaiso harbor, "not a cable length from shore," according to Poinsett. From the heights of the town, the Chilean populace applauded the game fight the American commodore was making against overwhelming odds, but Poinsett pleaded in vain with the Chilean commander of the fort at Valparaiso to fire on the British and save his countrymen. The

[16] Barros Arana, *Historia jeneral,* IX. 220-222.

Chilean officer stayed neutral, and after three days of uneven combat, Porter surrendered.[17]

Meanwhile, a new leader was steadily gaining popularity in Chile and was threatening to replace Carrera in the affections of the army. Bernardo O'Higgins, son of the captain-general of 1789, had espoused the revolutionary cause. Backed by Martínez de Rozas, who detested Carrera, O'Higgins also received the support of the jealous Larrain family. At first he and Carrera coöperated and won several signal victories over the royalists. But in 1814 the rivalry between them had grown intense.

The time had come for Poinsett to leave. As soon as Porter surrendered and his captive crew returned to the United States, Captain Hillyer of the British navy proceeded to Santiago on a mission of mediation between Chile and Spain. At his instance the Carrera government was forced to ask Poinsett to make immediate use of his passport and leave the country.[18] On his return to Washington, he was publicly congratulated by Madison for the skill and zeal he had shown in his mission.

Shortly after his departure from Chile, the revolutionary forces were crushed in the battle of Rancagua, and both Carrera and O'Higgins fled eastward across the Andes, while Chile once more submitted to the iron rule of Spain. The triumph of the Allies in Europe restored Ferdinand VII, who insisted upon all the old laws and restrictions in his colonies. To

[17] Stillé, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

[18] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Poinsett to Monroe, June 14, 1814.

interested observers, among them the government at Washington, it appeared that Chilean independence would likely be deferred for some time.

On the other side of the Andes the shattered remnants of the Chilean patriot army found a welcome at the headquarters of José de San Martín, who was acting for the provinces of Rio de La Plata in a vain effort to wrest Upper Peru from the viceroy at Lima. Three years after Rancagua he conceived the idea of striking at Peru from the south by way of Chile. It was the turn in the tide for the little captaincy-general, helpless under the renewed control of Spain.

San Martín also disposed of the internal Chilean disputes in a peremptory way. As he admired O'Higgins and distrusted Carrera, the latter was sent to Buenos Aires under a guard of dragoons, while O'Higgins helped plan the invasion of his native country. In 1817, the two generals made an unexpected entrance into Chile over the Andean pass of Uspallata—a remarkable military exploit which took the royalists completely by surprise. The ensuing battle of Chacabuco placed all but southern Chile in the hands of the patriots and O'Higgins was chosen Supreme Director by a unanimous vote of the Santiago cabildo.

The liberal decrees of the earlier revolutionary period were now revived, but the main interest was the campaign which San Martín was conducting against Peru. For this a navy was needed, and recalling with gratification the mission of Poinsett,

Chile once more turned to the United States for help. Manuel Aguirre, who had been sent thither from Buenos Aires, agreed to act as a Chilean agent too.[19]

The American people were, on the whole, sympathetic with the revolutionary cause. Henry Clay had declared on the floor of the Senate that the battle of Chacabuco showed that Chile had become a nation. But Aguirre found the government at Washington carefully neutral. He had little success in buying ships and once was placed under arrest for violating the neutrality laws. One vessel which, according to Barros Arana, cost Chile more than it ever helped, finally reached Valparaiso in the summer of 1819. Another was delayed at Buenos Aires on account of a dispute over the building contract and the wages for the crew, and in the end was purchased by Brazil.[20]

The same failure was encountered when, encouraged by Clay's speech, Aguirre tried to gain official recognition for Chile. He was told by Secretary John Quincy Adams that the United States was willing to make a commercial treaty, but only the fact of independence combined with a moral right to it could authorize a neutral to give recognition to a new and disputed sovereignty.[21] Monroe, who succeeded Madison as President in 1817, determined to adopt the same policy as his predecessor and send agents to South America to observe before he took

[19] Barros Arana, *Historia jeneral,* XI. 85.
[20] *Ibid.,* XI. 605.
[21] Alejandro Álvarez, *La diplomacia de Chile,* p. 203.

definite action. A commission of three was dispatched to Buenos Aires, of which Theodoric Bland alone crossed the Andes and visited Chile in the summer of 1818.

Other representatives of the northern republic were on the ground before Bland, however. At the opening of the year the United States sent the warship *Ontario* to Chile and Peru to protect the growing American commerce from the depredations of the Spanish fleet. Accompanying Captain Biddle, who was in charge of the vessel, was John B. Prevost, who was to act for the United States in all diplomatic and legal questions that might arise.

American vessels were by this time bringing into Valparaiso alone cargoes valued at more than a million dollars annually. But Prevost found that ships were being seized and officers imprisoned constantly by the Spanish navy for alleged violation of blockading orders. On the ninth of April he enclosed in his letter to Adams a memorial from American merchants expressing their gratitude that the *Ontario* had remained longer in Valparaiso than originally planned. Otherwise, the merchants wrote, their ships in the port would have been confiscated and the seamen impressed into the Spanish service, as had been done before.[22]

O'Higgins approached Prevost soon after the latter arrived to find out the extent of American sympathy. The Director said that England had afforded

[22] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Prevost to Adams, April 9, 1818.

his country considerable assistance up to this time, but he would have preferred to receive it from the United States. Prevost replied cautiously that his country wished to help, but could not be involved in a war when internal strife still disturbed the southern countries so constantly. "I emphasized the benefits which had come from American commerce," he wrote to Adams, "and showed him how Chile would never have won independence without these supplies. He finally admitted that I was right and that Chile must be satisfied with that for a time."[23]

Bland took the same position when he came in the summer after Prevost and Biddle had left for the Oregon country. Chilean independence had been declared by O'Higgins on February 2, 1818. But Bland told the Director that his government had determined to keep strict neutrality during the war; that it regarded the conflict as between equals and not as a rebellion; that though the government was neutral, the people of the United States had ardent desires for Chilean success.

This well represented the attitude of the Monroe administration. On December 2, 1817, the President wrote to Congress that so far the United States had been perfectly neutral. Its ports had been and still were open to both sides, he declared.[24] Bland, however, did not fare as well as Poinsett in Chile, for he became involved in the Carrera quarrels and did not make a good impression on the government.[25]

[23] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Prevost to Adams, February 13, 1818.

[24] *State Papers,* First session, 15th Congress, p. 4.

[25] Barros Arana, *Historia jeneral,* XI. 546, note.

His report, therefore, did not encourage Monroe to recognize the new republic.

When Prevost returned to Chile in the winter of 1819, he reported a complete change in the attitude of the people there toward his country. With the help of ships bought in England, the Chilean navy was making its power felt along the coast of Peru. Lord Cochrane, a former member of the British Parliament, commanded it and he was not inclined to be lenient with any infraction of his blockading orders. Whereas during the previous year Prevost dealt mainly with disagreements with the royalist navy, his countrymen now were constantly in trouble with the victorious Chileans.

He found that American warships paid scant attention to Cochrane's blockade. Captain Biddle was continuously bringing royalists into the besieged ports, at one time carrying a nephew of the viceroy into Callao, who brought military information concerning a projected invasion from Chile. Later on, an American merchant ship seized at Valparaiso was released by force by Captain Downes, of the *Macedonian,* though O'Higgins claimed that the captain had been given ample assurance by him that the vessel would receive fair treatment.[26]

"Our warships are carrying freight for the belligerents," Prevost wrote Adams in March 1819, "and are so interested in making profits that they forget their real purpose in these waters."[27] Again, on the

[26] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Prevost to Adams, May 2, 1821.

[27] *Ibid.,* Prevost to Adams, March 20, 1819.

third of July, he wrote: "The change in a year is remarkable. Now Chile's flag dominates the ocean and all is confidence inland. Cochrane is capturing many American vessels as prizes and bringing them to Valparaiso."[28]

Prevost indeed found it necessary on several occasions to protest against the depredations of Cochrane on the sea. O'Higgins told him that he had to take the testimony of Chilean naval officers in these prize cases and distribute the money among the sailors, or else they might become lax in their efforts. For though the recent battle of Maipo had cleared most of Chile of royalist forces, Peru was still in dispute.

The American agent was inclined to sympathize with the Chilean attitude in these cases. It was true that there was good room for argument as to the legality of Cochrane's seizures and for the actual violation of blockading rules committed by American merchants. But Prevost felt that more consideration should have been given by his countrymen. "I deplore such incidents," he wrote Adams on one occasion, "as they increase the ill will toward the United States. Chile is extremely sensitive to any action which shows us unsympathetic; she thinks that we ought to show partiality for her cause, though we are officially neutral."[29]

Prevost was not sustained by his home government in this loyalty to the Chilean cause. His position that the troubles were natural incidents growing

[28] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Prevost to Adams, July 3, 1819.

[29] *Ibid.*, Prevost to Adams, September 13, 1819.

out of the revolution and that it indicated no hostility toward the United States was not well received at Washington. In the summer of 1824 he was recalled, after charges had been preferred against him by captains of American warships and masters of mercantile vessels. They were chiefly based on his negotiations with the new Peruvian government now finally independent of Spain, but they were all to the same end, namely that he showed no zeal in the protection of American interests.[30]

Monroe's message to Congress in March, 1822, showed that the United States was finally prepared to extend recognition. "When we regard the complete success that has attended the war in favor of the Spanish colonies," the President wrote, "we are compelled to conclude that the provinces which have declared their independence ought to be recognized."[31] Another reason which Monroe did not mention was, that Spain had finally approved a treaty for the sale of Florida. On January 27, 1823, Heman Allen of Vermont was appointed first minister of the United States to Chile.

This step was the first of its kind to be taken by any country outside of South America, and the United States was disposed to make much of the friendliness that was indicated therein. Its representatives for many years took occasion often to remind the Chileans of their debt to the northern republic. But whatever help was afforded the new Spanish-

[30] *Ibid.*, Adams to Allen, November 11, 1823.
[31] *American State Papers,* IV. 818.

American nation by this action of Monroe, claim could hardly be made that the United States had assisted in the cause of Chilean independence. Except for the actions of Joel Poinsett in the earlier period, the Washington government was carefully neutral until the Florida treaty with Spain had been ratified and Chile had been virtually free of royalist troops for four years.[32]

[32] Cf. Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna, *El ostracismo de los Carreras*, p. 47. The Chilean historian says: "With North America, any bare rock around which beat the ocean waves has always been worth more than the fate of foreign nations. The possession of Florida was a matter a thousand times more important to the United States than the redemption of Spanish America."

Chapter III

EARLY DEALINGS WITH THE NORTHERN REPUBLIC

Elaborate ceremonies and military parades, including a salute of "twenty-two guns" *(sic)*, welcomed Heman Allen on his arrival at Santiago. The profuse Chilean cordiality embarrassed the simple Vermont farmer not a little. It seemed to him to savor of Old World trappings, and his natural caution prompted him to decline with thanks the offer which was made to him of a house and a guard of honor, both to be paid for by the Chilean government. He even declined the invitation from O'Higgins to share the executive mansion, unless he were allowed to pay rent.[1]

American prestige was at high water mark in Chile from all indications and the task before Allen seemed comparatively easy. He need only hold that position for his country and his other aims would be accomplished. These were chiefly to gain preferential treatment for American commerce in the harbors of Chile and to secure payment for a few claims for damages that his countrymen had suffered at the hands of Lord Cochrane.

But a troublous period of Chilean national life was about to begin. Though Bernardo O'Higgins had all the power in his hands, clouds of jealousy were gathering as the Spanish menace was removed.

[1] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Allen to Adams, April 29, 1824.

The Director had gradually set up a military despotism in the nation; his army seemed to know no law but its own will. If Allen had given the word, the soldiers would have ousted a peaceable Santiago citizen from his house and converted it forthwith into the American legation.[2] Everyone considered O'Higgins a brave soldier but a poor executive.[3] Petty chiefs in other parts of the country were restless and Santiago was not at all satisfied. His retirement came without bloodshed, after he had made a dramatic appeal to his opponents in the city to remember what he had done for Chile. He went to make his home in Peru, where, for ten years or more, he was the center of plots to restore him.

Anarchy followed that amounted at times to positive chaos. Revolution and counter-revolution became the order of the day. It was not a unique situation; the same thing was happening across the Andes and revolt was brewing in the wide domain of Simón Bolívar to the north. Accordingly Heman Allen and Samuel Larned, his successor, were blocked by the disturbances in all efforts they made for a commercial treaty or the settlement of claims. Eight presidents and nine foreign ministers spoke for Chile during Allen's three years' stay.[4] "My country wants no special favors," he told one of the transitory leaders. "We have recognized Chile as an independent state and simply want to see you stay free and

[2] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, same letter.
[3] *Ibid.*, same letter.
[4] *Ibid.*, Allen to Clay, May 14, 1827.

independent." "I will fight for that with my life," responded the chief with theatrical fervor, and on the following day resigned his office.[5]

If any one figure stood out in the decade of the chaotic twenties, it was General Ramón Freire. He was sometimes president, at other times the power behind the throne. Political lines were obscurely drawn. It was a combat of personalities, rather than principles. In a vague sort of way Freire was a liberal and was generally opposed by the wealthier aristocratic classes. He was always cordial to the envoys from the United States, and on state occasions gave the northern republic precedence in diplomatic honors.[6]

Chileans shared with their neighbors a fondness for making constitutions, and new ones were proposed with every change of government. The two most worthy of note before 1830 were the Freire constitution of 1824 and the one adopted by the Pinto government in 1828. In the preparation of the first one, Freire asked Allen for his help, but the latter with his characteristic caution refused to interfere in domestic matters. He disliked some of its features so much, however, that he determined to give advice on the next one.[7] The opportunity never came, but Larned accepted the invitation to join the constitutional convention of 1826.

At this time Freire again held the upper hand, although other men were nominal heads of the

[5] *Ibid.*, Allen to Adams, August 15, 1824.
[6] *Ibid.*, same letter.
[7] *Ibid.*, Allen to Adams, August 19, 1824.

government. Larned was a member of the subcommittee to draft a document, and the general framework of the one he prepared was adopted. Everyone in the convention was anxious to follow the American model.[8] A federal form of government was provided, with emphasis on local autonomy. This was Larned's chief contribution; every township governed itself. Frequent elections and accountability of all officers to the voters who chose them were other features that showed the ideas of the American minister.[9]

On paper it was admittedly as fine a constitution as an independent state had ever known. But Larned himself confessed later that it would never be suitable to a new country that was filled with military lordlets and bandit soldiery. It presumed a peaceful, law-abiding people who had learned to control themselves. The constitution on an American model brought no peace to Chile.

When Larned was not busy framing fundamental laws, he was usually occupied with the varied tariffs and port regulations. Tariffs were high from the start, and Chile's chief revenue came from import and export duties. These were levied according to a value assessed by a local inspector at Valparaiso, who usually favored the importer on account of the application of "a secret and irresistible influence always

[8] J. Benavente, *Étude critique de la constitution de la République du Chile,* p. 4.

[9] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Larned to Clay, April 11, 1826.

within the latter's means."[10] The Englishman, John Miers, in 1822 reported that on some goods the regular tariff rate was as high as 53 per cent, while the additional bribes made the situation intolerable. Heavy transit duties by mules to Santiago, where most of the goods were sold, made an added item of expense.[11]

Americans who did business in Chile were prevented from being consignees for goods from their country by a law that gave rebates of four per cent to all foreign goods consigned to native merchants. Flour was one of the principal commodities from the United States. A storage duty of twenty-five cents on every barrel was forcing American traders to take their cargoes to Lima.[12] Now the large landowners of Chile moved to exclude the flour entirely by an embargo on all imports that competed with local products.

But the American commodity which fared the worst was tobacco. To obtain the necessary funds to run the government, Chile resorted to the old expedient of farming out the tobacco monopoly. This "estanco," as it was called, was bought by Portales and Company of Valparaiso, who immediately pushed for a law to prohibit the import of estanco goods from other countries.[13] A private monopoly of such a commodity was quite unpopular and within a year

[10] *Ibid.*, Prevost to Adams, February 9, 1818.

[11] John Miers, *Travels in Chile and La Plata*, p. 200.

[12] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Larned to Clay, April 11, 1828.

[13] José Victorino Lastarria, *Don Diego Portales*, p. 7.

the government took it over. But American tobacco profited little from the change, and still had to sell at the price fixed by the government agents, unless the traders resorted to smuggling.

Larned struggled valiantly against these conditions. New claims were coming in from American ships that were being seized and searched for estanco goods. His personal efforts defeated the measure to keep out cargoes that would compete with Chilean farm products.[14] He also obtained the repeal of a decree that would require vessels to give bond not to land estanco goods secretly on the unguarded Chilean coast; but he was hampered by lack of a commercial treaty. It was not until 1828 that a government promised to be sufficiently stable to fulfill any pact of that nature. Larned then presented a draft of one but found too many obstacles. A great stumbling-block was his demand that the tobacco monopoly be discarded. Agreement on this was never reached. In Washington, Juan Campino opened a Chilean legation in 1827, but he resigned his post and was shifted to Mexico when his government instructed him to negotiate a treaty. It would be a one-sided affair, he contended, for Chile sent no exports to the United States.[15]

A religious problem was emerging as well, that would be hard to settle in any treaty of amity and commerce. Many states of the American Union had

[14] Department of State, Bureau of Archives. Larned to Clay, July 17, 1828.

[15] Barros Arana, *Historia jeneral*, XVI, 173.

laws discriminating against Roman Catholics; whereas even the Freire constitution of 1824 made Catholicism the state religion of Chile. Religious tolerance was not the order of the day. Though the archbishop of Santiago was expelled from the country for a time because of his own sympathy for Spain, other leading churchmen had favored the revolution from the outset. "A wicked and abandoned clergy still rule the country," Allen wrote in disappointment. "There are eight hundred of the miserable creatures in Chile and much time is devoted to their ridiculous ceremonies."

Such a spirit of intolerance promised little good for the continuance of friendly relations. Allen made a strong protest against the clause in the Freire constitution that decreed a state religion. It could not fit in with republican government, he told the Chilean leaders. He made this complaint to Campino, as the latter was leaving for the United States, and according to Allen, Campino replied that everyone in the convention had opposed the measure but would not so declare for fear of assassination.[16]

The Pope was slow to recognize the new republic, but his nuncio was received at Santiago in 1824 as a diplomatic representative. Great deference was paid him by most of the consuls and other agents from Catholic countries, even though the representative from Buenos Aires threatened to leave because precedence was given over him to this representative

[16] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Allen to Adams, May 4, 1824.

from Rome.[17] Allen refused to recognize him as a diplomat and would have nothing to do with him.

Opposition of this sort to a faith so deeply rooted in the hearts of the Chilean people foreshadowed trouble, which soon appeared in the question of Protestant cemeteries. As the public burying-grounds were consecrated by the Catholic church, no heretic's body could be interred there. The first man who realized the dangers implied in this was Bernardo O'Higgins, who decreed that Protestant cemeteries be permitted in every important town. This brought criticism from all sides down upon the head of the Director, but he upheld his decree.[18] When the state religion was declared in 1824, it seemed that the Protestants might lose this cherished right. But Freire privately told Allen to ask for its continuance in an official letter. The British government did likewise and an ordinance was passed that granted the request.[19] This did not mean, however, that opposition had died out. Every Chilean government hesitated to include such a provision in a permanent treaty.

High duties hampered American trade; religious differences were a stumbling-block to good understanding. But the greatest danger yet to American prestige was the growth of the influence of England. The United States and Great Britain had many points in common in their relations with Chile. Smugglers

[17] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, April 29, 1824.
[18] Barros Arana, *Historia jeneral*, XII. 407.
[19] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Allen to Adams, October 8, 1824.

from both countries had helped to break down the Spanish trade monopoly; their citizens had the same aims and the same grievances in the new commercial laws that came in the wake of independence; the warships and merchant ships of both had violated blockade rules on the South Pacific coast; both nations were interested in laws that would protect Protestants. But each was jealous of its prestige in Chile and desired to be the power which would lead in giving advice to, and obtaining influence in, the infant republic.

The enmity between them had not died down appreciably with the close of their war in 1815. Commissioner Bland tried to arouse opposition to England when he talked to O'Higgins in 1818. He told the Director that he knew that the British Captain Shirreff was trying to arrange for mediation in Peru that would keep it under Spanish control. He hoped thereby to obtain the Chilean carrying trade for American ships alone, but his methods were criticized sharply by the Chilean press. The official *Gaceta* declared that England wished the expansion of its South American commerce too profoundly to pursue a course of that sort.[20]

Prevost was also concerned with the rise of British influence, but thought the reports of it exaggerated. The markets for Chile, he wrote Adams, were in China and the East Indies. England and the

[20] *Gaceta Ministerial*, May 16, 1818. There were four newspapers in Santiago by the time that Bland came to Chile. This was only six years after the first issue of the *Aurora*. None of them lasted any length of time.

United States shared about equally in supplying vessels for this trade. "There is little room for fear that Chile will give special advantages to England," he added. "They seem to understand her crooked policy here and to regard her with contempt."[21] As late as 1821, furthermore, he wrote that he could see no reason for the statements heard in some quarters about the great British influence on the Pacific coast. He found Chileans naturally well-disposed toward the Americans, but the trouble was that most of his countrymen in those regions were privateers and adventurers. They merited little respect. When they were of a better class, they always received the attention that was due them.[22]

Heman Allen took particular pains to stress the part played by the United States as a friendly power. The reports of the executive message that contained the Monroe Doctrine reached Chile the same month as that in which the first American minister arrived. He found the Chileans under the impression that England and the United States were jointly responsible for averting from them the peril of the Holy Alliance, and he took care to refute this idea in his first conference with Rafael Egaña, the new foreign minister. "I warned him against considering the arrival of British consuls as an act of recognition," he wrote.[23] He then gave Egaña an account of the

[21] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Prevost to Adams, June 10, 1818.

[22] *Ibid.*, July 6, 1821.

[23] British consuls had just come to Chile when Allen arrived. Prior to this they had left all commercial negotiations in the hands of naval officers. Barros Arana relates that the latter often offended the Chileans.

proposal by the British minister, Canning, for joint intervention, and related how Canning had grown cold as soon as Richard Rush had suggested that England recognize the Spanish-American republics. "Egaña replied that he had not heard the true story of the Rush-Canning correspondence, and assured me that the government of Chile uniformly regarded us as its best and most powerful friend; that they would never give special advantages to any power before consulting us; that they were perfectly satisfied in Chile with the American attitude toward their independence; that he was planning soon to propose to the United States a treaty of alliance."[24] This turn to the conversation was more than Allen expected. He let the discussion drop quickly and explained that he simply did not want the British government to gain credit for something it did not do. Later he was careful to point out that the Monroe Doctrine meant merely that the United States reserved the right to act as "its own interest might hereafter require."[25]

But if Allen was assured at the outset that his country was the most influential in Chile, he lost that idea soon. For where the United States relied on friendly diplomacy, England depended on the far more tangible help of loans and merchandise. The first Chilean government loan was floated in London in 1822, after two Americans, William Worthington and Jeremiah Robinson, had made valiant but futile efforts at separate times to interest American capital.

[24] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Allen to Adams, April 29, 1824.

[25] *Ibid.*, June 5, 1824.

Robinson was even commissioned by the Chilean Senate to act as an agent in the United States for a loan of three and a half million pesos at twelve per cent but was unable to find a market.[26] Three British companies exploited the northern Chile copper mines. Native mine-owners customarily borrowed money from British mercantile houses at Santiago, because they could obtain better terms there than could be given them by Chilean merchants.[27] "Our trade with Chile is trifling," Allen wrote soon after his arrival, "but British goods have inundated the market and most of the coin in the country goes in payment for them. Their commercial houses are in all ports and their agents have intermarried with the Chileans."[28]

When the invitation came from Bolívar for Chile to attend his Panamá Congress, Allen made every effort to persuade the government to reject it. It was simply a project of England, he said, to make an alliance with the American confederation that was to be formed. Such a condition would actually result in making the new republics British colonies. But Chile was deaf to his protest and its Congress appointed two delegates. Only lack of money prevented them from attending.[29]

[26] Alcibiades Roldan, *Los desacuerdos entre O'Higgins y el senado conservador,* p. 40.

[27] Basil Hall, *Extracts from a Journal Written on the Coasts of Chile, Peru and Mexico,* p. 75.

[28] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Allen to Adams, May 4, 1825. Seven years before this, Prevost had reported that American commerce was three time more than the British.

[29] *Ibid.,* Allen to Clay, November 24, 1826.

"This new government feels that it has recognition from us," Allen wrote later. "It now gives its favors to England and France so as to obtain recognition from them."[30] This was anything but the proper attitude for the infant republic to take, according to the ideas of all American representatives. It should feel its gratitude to them and show it whenever occasion arose. It would have been hard enough to maintain a favored position on this basis with leaders as friendly as Freire and Pinto. The men who took control of Chile as a result of the revolution of 1830 dealt a death blow to all such hopes.

[30] *Ibid.*, Allen to Clay, September 10, 1825.

Chapter IV

THE CONSERVATIVES IN CHARGE

The dawning of the new year that closed the decade of the turbulent twenties showed slight promise of brighter times in Chile. The constitution of 1828 was simply unworkable, and liberal theories had plunged Chile into more serious warfare than ever. Joaquin Prieto had taken the field in the name of O'Higgins and his following had grown fast. Against him Freire was making a grim, determined resistance. It looked as if a period of petty banditry would be followed by the bloodier era of a real civil war.

But despite the gloomy outlook that greeted the nation in 1830, peace was soon to come. The powerful landowning elements, who had not been attracted to any particular leader before, fell in behind Prieto. The Catholic priesthood found a sympathetic hearing with the new general and threw all of its influence to his cause. The business men wanted a strong hand, which he seemed to promise. As his fortunes advanced, Joaquin Prieto forgot the restless exile in Peru and began to fight on his own account.[1] Freire's desperate stand against this rising tide of conservatism was useless. The two armies met in one final, bloody conflict at the little town of Lircai, not far from the capital city, where Freire suffered a decisive defeat and the conservatives moved into the government positions to stay.[2]

[1] Luís Galdames, *El decenio de Montt*, p. 60.
[2] *Ibid.*

The new party, which was destined to make Chile stand out as a peculiarly peaceful nation in a warring continent, was aristocratic in its leadership. It had little patience with extreme views of local self-government. The proud old families, owners of most of Chile's farming land, had welcomed a separation from Spain but not a pure democracy in a country where the "rich, the well-born, and the able" were so clearly separated from the mass of people. Foreigners called them "The Old Spanish Party," a name used in reproach as signifying those who had not wanted to sever connection with Spain. This was as inaccurate as most political tabs are apt to be, but it was correct enough in indicating that those now in power were that upper stratum of whites to whom the mestizos and Indians were accustomed to give precedence.

The standard of Prieto had rallied the soldiers, and he was the president finally inaugurated in 1833. But the real leader, as political questions began to be more important than military affairs, was Diego Portales, a business man of Valparaiso. His company had owned the estanco, and its failure to conduct business with the mushroom governments of the time had awakened Portales to the fact that he would have to be assured a steady administration before he could prosper in business.[3] He had little interest in politics and had held aloof from the quarrels that followed the downfall of O'Higgins. But he viewed the Prieto movement as Chile's best chance for peace-

[3] José Lastarria, *Don Diego Portales*, p. 30.

ful progress, and when it finally succeeded, he joined the government to insure its permanent triumph. He retired from it as soon as possible to his own business again, but was soon recalled to administer the affairs of state while the military chieftain stood as the glorious figurehead of the new stability in Chile.

The new constitution, adopted in 1833 was modelled after no particular frame of government in any other land. It was written to suit the needs of Chile, and especially to give the country a strong central government that could enforce law and order. It resembled that of the United States in guaranteeing such individual rights as freedom of speech and of the press. It also provided for an electoral college to be used in choosing a president.[4] Its parliamentary system resembled the English, with its ministers responsible to the dominant party in the lower house. In its local administration it followed French principles closely.[5] Some of its features were not to be found in any constitutions outside the South American continent. Noteworthy among them was the provision that a mixed commission from the two houses of Congress should be in session whenever Congress was adjourned.[6] There was no arrangement for a vice-president. If the president died, or was removed, a member of the

[4] *Constitución política de la República de Chile*, p. 30.

[5] Speech of Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna in the Chilean Congress, July 4, 1864, quoted in D. J. Hunter, *Sketch of Chile*, part 2, page 16.

[6] J. Benavente, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

cabinet should succeed him, who would then assume the title of Vice-President.[7] Nor could the president be tried for any offense during his term of office.[8]

The Chilean constitution was a skillful combination of presidential power and congressional checks. In times of stress, the president was empowered to assume extraordinary functions that made him a virtual dictator. The vice-president was omitted for fear such an official might worry the chief executive. Yet the mixed commission to watch him during the adjournments of the legislature, and the responsibility of his minister to the Chamber of Deputies, or lower house of Congress, removed the danger of one-man rule. Diego Portales, who inspired the document, knew that a firm central executive was needed in his country, but he had no intention of allowing him enough power to become a ruler without any checks.

The wildest excitement had prevailed in foreign circles in Santiago the night that it was certain that Freire had lost Lircai. Crowds surrounded Tagle, the puppet president of the time, yelling, "Down with the English, the French, and the Americans; long live religion and Prieto."[9] Many Americans had fought in Freire's army, some of them holding high commissions. His defeat was gloomy tidings for them. The widespread report was that the priesthood had been won to the Prieto cause by a promise

[7] *Constitución política de la República de Chile*, p. 33.
[8] J. Benavente, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
[9] Thomas Sutcliffe, *Sixteen Years in Chile and Peru*, p. 241.

that foreigners would be driven from the country. Imprisonment and exile were confidently expected by most Americans and Englishmen.[10]

"The Old Spanish party is inaugurating a reign of terror," wrote John Hamm, the new American minister. "Ecclesiastical influence restrains the press and suppresses education. It does not even allow trial by jury. Corruption and bribery fill the land. Spaniards exiled from other countries have come to Chile and hold high offices. The old monarchists are returned in full force."[11] This was the manner in which the new order was accepted by most of the Americans in Chile. The land-owners had always been regarded as hostile to that type of democracy for which the United States stood; it was they who had wished to exclude American flour from the country because it competed with their own products. The old estanco men had been fought for five years by American commercial interests. Now a commercial treaty would have to be negotiated with their old opponents. Worst of all was the privileged position of the clergy, which resulted from the sudden turn of the tide. The new government promptly returned to the Church the property which had been sequestered from it during the revolution, with one added provision, that primary schools be maintained on it.[12]

An ugly situation was not long in developing in the Chilean island of Juan Fernández near by, which

[10] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Hamm to Livingston, February 2, 1832.

[11] *Ibid.*, Hamm to Livingston, July 28, 1833.

[12] Barros Arana, *Historia jeneral,* XV. 15.

seemed to bear out the worst fears of the English-speaking population. Captain Paddock, of the American whaler *Catherine,* became violently insane and killed with a jack-knife the governor of the island and four other men. The fury of the Chilean mob was intense, but officers saved him from mob-law. He was given from midnight to five in the morning to prepare a plea of insanity, an impossible demand on a prisoner so stricken. Paddock then was shot in the early morning hours and his body suspended on the mole for six hours.[13]

Not long after the execution of the American captain, a presidential decree appeared ordering all foreigners to make ready for military service. Public protest meetings of British and Americans were of no avail. The government declared its determination to put the law into effect. One Sunday morning foreign residents of Santiago were forced to go to military headquarters to be measured and registered, and then were ordered to appear at military parade. This indignity was not repeated a second time, but it seemed that the reported promise to the clergy was about to be fulfilled.

As the excitement died down, however, Americans found that most of their fears were groundless. Even the clause in the constitution that forbade public worship of any but the Roman Catholic faith did not prevent the erection of private chapels by Protestants.[14] It was soon evident also that the new

[13] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Hamm to Livingston, February 2, 1832.

[14] See chapter ix.

stable government was able to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce with more dispatch and regularity than was true of the régimes of past years, which had seemed to be so much more cordial toward the United States.

Diplomatic interchanges shifted back to Santiago when Campino left Washington for Mexico. Andrés Bello from Venezuela, one of the men whom Hamm had in mind in his letter decrying the new order,[15] was chosen by Portales to represent Chile in the negotiations with Minister Hamm. Bello was one of the greatest of South American jurists, and obtained a treaty for Chile that embodied terms which the United States had refused to grant to other Latin-American nations.

Three bases were suggested by the United States government for the commercial sections of the treaty. The first one, and the one preferred in Washington, was a reciprocity agreement by which Chile and the United States would grant to each other the privilege of importing into, or exporting from, the ports of the other on equal terms. If the latitude of this agreement seemed to be too great, a second suggestion was that the arrangement hold only when vessels of the foreign country carried the products raised in that country itself.[16] Shippers of American flour, for example, would thus receive the same

[15] Bello fled from Venezuela during one of its many revolutions of the period; see Miguel Luís Amunátegui, *Vida de Don Andrés Bello*, p. 362.

[16] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Van Buren to Hamm, October 15, 1830.

privileges in Chile that local traders did who dealt in that commodity. Both of these suggestions were based on the hypothesis that Chile had as important a trade in American ports as the United States had in South American waters. Campino was right; the interest was one-sided because Chile had no merchant marine. The practical effect of either one of the two arrangements would have been to give Americans all the privileges allowed Chileans themselves in the ports of that Latin republic.

Bello, accordingly, turned a deaf ear to any but the third American suggestion, which was simply to agree that the United States would be accorded the treatment of a "most favored nation"; in other words, that no foreign nation would receive commercial favors not granted to the United States. With reluctance Hamm consented. But Bello's next proposition threatened for a time to suspend all further negotiations. For the Chilean spokesman insisted that even on this third basis, it must be understood that Chile would give its sister republics in Spanish America preferential tariff rates not allowed to the United States.[17]

Treaties had already been made by the northern republic with Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, and the Central American Federation. In every case, the Latin-American negotiator had made an attempt similar to that of Bello, but each time the United States had been successful in resisting.[18] The very fact that

[17] Bello did not include Brazil in his exceptions.

[18] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Van Buren to Hamm, October 15, 1830.

such an arrangement had been sought by so many of the southern republics showed that there was not the idea of kinship among all nations of the New World that was being proclaimed so loudly by American statesmen. The Spanish Americans seemed to feel that a peculiar relationship existed among them which was not to be shared by their northern neighbor.

But Chile had an abler negotiator than its fellows. Hamm's protests were of no avail. Clause two of the treaty gave the required exceptions in favor of the other Spanish-American states. The Chilean Congress went even further than this, and provided in an explanatory convention, ratified in 1834, that any republics formed in the future from the colonial dominion of Spain would also receive the exceptional favors.[19]

The theory upon which this was based was unsatisfactory enough for American statesmen. But there was also a practical fear. Of course, the whole clause was useless if the United States had treaties with all the new republics such as Colombia and Mexico had signed. But no agreements of any kind existed between the northern republic and Peru, Bolivia, or the Argentine Confederation. It was Peruvian sugar particularly that might be admitted at lower rates into Chilean ports under some special arrangement foreseen by American merchants.[20] This would have been a serious blow to American sugar-growers, and the developments of the following years proved that

[19] *Treaties and Conventions of the United States*, I. 131.

[20] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, McLane to Hamm, September 5, 1834.

their fears were well-founded. Within a short time negotiations were started by Chile to grant just such special favors to the Peruvian sugar-planters.[21]

Bello succeeded in gaining his point because the United States needed the treaty in order to protect the American community there. Hamm also believed that it would help him considerably to have the matter out of the way so that he might pursue the arduous task of pressing American claims;[22] for none of these had yet been allowed and claimants in the United States were calling for vigorous action.

In the religious sections of the treaty the Chilean negotiator was far more tractable. Liberty of conscience was assured to the citizens of each nation who resided in the country of the other. But it was added that this would be permitted so long as the foreigners obeyed all the laws of the nation. Since the constitution adopted the following year[23] forbade the public worship of any other than the Roman Catholic faith, this clause in the treaty did not grant complete freedom of worship. According to another clause, foreigners were to be allowed their own burial-grounds and these were not to be molested; thus the cemeteries provided for by O'Higgins were secured.

Twelve out of the thirty-one articles dealt with the question of blockade regulations and contraband of war. The latter was defined in a limited way so as to mean only arms and munitions of war. Prize-

[21] *Ibid.*, Pollard to Forsythe, October 14, 1835.
[22] *Ibid.*, Hamm to Livingston, May 28, 1832.
[23] The commercial treaty was drafted in 1832.

courts alone should judge seizures; the principle that free ships make free goods was admitted and the flag of either nation protected the ship, its cargo, and the non-combatants thereon.[24] All of these clauses had for their purpose the protection of American vessels from future Chilean seizures. They showed what the chief interest of American diplomacy was growing to be. Chile was no more a state which might attract a sentimental interest as a sister republic with a similar story of independence won from a tyrannical mother country. It was rather a government that might be made liable for damages to insistent American claimants.

"We have made the error of allowing foreigners to help win independence for us," wrote the correspondent of a Valparaiso newspaper in 1838. "They should be tolerated no longer in government offices but Chileans put in their stead."[25] To which *El Valdiviano Federal* of Santiago replied: "We would show the basest ingratitude if we were to disown our gallant helpers who have done so much for Chile. May more of them come!"[26]

The wish of the Santiago editor was being fulfilled without trouble. More of the foreigners were coming from England, France, and other countries of western Europe, as well as from North America.

[24] It is interesting to compare the provisions here with the *Macedonian* case that originated in 1820 and is described in chapter vi.

[25] Thomas Sutcliffe, *op. cit.*, p. vii, quotes *El Cura Monardes* of Santiago, March 1838.

[26] *Ibid.*

The esteem with which their country was regarded meant a good deal to these immigrants. Chileans were quite sensitive to all attempts by a stronger nation to impose its will on their own small country. Foreign colonies therefore were quick to feel any changes that might occur in diplomatic relations.

As far as Americans were concerned, five years of conservative rule relieved their fears of exile or imprisonment. But they had to accept the permanent triumph of the "Old Spanish Party." It had come to stay and opposition was dying fast. In concluding a treaty of amity and commerce, the United States had again taken a step forward in the course of friendly relations that no other power outside of South America had done. Another link was added to its claim that its friendliness should give it a preferred position in Chile. To what extent such diplomatic effort would counterbalance the commerce and money of England was a question that was to be decided within the coming ten or twelve years.

Chapter V

FACING TOWARD EUROPE

In the year 1831 Charles Folger, of Nantucket Island, loaded the ship *Criterion* with a cargo for South America, part of it being whaling apparatus. Storms drove him into Halifax, where he sold his damaged ship. The cargo, however, was unsalable; and Folger chartered the British ship *Trusty,* which was cleared from Halifax by John Crooks, a British citizen, who sailed on it as master of the vessel. Oil was obtained with the whaling apparatus off the Chilean coast that amounted to ten thousand dollars. A mutiny of the British crew, backed by Crooks, developed at Talcahuano, where the *Trusty* stopped to buy a new anchor. Folger, fearing for his life, appealed to the British consul. This official, on the testimony of Crooks and the crew, seized the vessel on the ground of illegal navigation and command. He claimed that investigation would be made further, but that the decision lay exclusively in his hands.

Excitement ran high in the foreign colonies. The incident had brought to a head the growing rivalry between British and American interests. Hamm protested to the foreign office in Chile that the cargo was American and should not be held by Great Britain, and referred the whole case to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Chilean courts.

This last step was, of course, pleasing to the Chilean government, which was extremely sensitive

on the question of foreign jurisdiction within its territory. It adopted the American view and finally induced the stubborn consul to surrender the ship to the local authorities. The case was decided in favor of Folger and no appeal was made. "It is a great victory for American commerce," wrote Hamm exultantly to his home government.

But Folger still waited to receive his property. Time passed for any appeal to be made and still it was not delivered. On calling at the foreign office, Hamm was informed that a judge at Valparaiso had violated his instructions and the Supreme Court would have to give a decision before anything could be done. To this the American minister replied that Chile would be held responsible for all damages. The following day he was gratified to learn that orders had been given to deliver ship and cargo to Folger.

British resentment had been particularly aroused because the judge had declared that Folger had not violated the navigation laws of Great Britain. Consequently the Portales government issued a proclamation to the effect that it did not sanction the views of the jurist in question. The latter had evidently determined the case on its merits without regard to the countries involved. On account of the pressure brought by British interests, he was finally forced to resign his office.[1]

Such were the difficulties surrounding the government of a small counry whose commercial interests

[1] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Hamm to Van Buren, November 30, 1831.

lay in the hands of men from powerful foreign lands. The case may have been settled in favor of the American, but it was British influence that showed its hands so strongly that a judge was forced to step down from his chair.

England's hold on Chile was becoming more apparent every year. Recognition was extended in 1831. In the following year, a conversion of the Chilean debt was made with Baring Brothers of London that brought an end to unsettled financial conditions in the small republic.[2] In 1836, England's annual trade was valued at four million dollars, whereas the commerce of the United States on the whole western coast of South America totalled no more than twenty-five hundred thousand.[3]

The next step in British commercial control was to acquire a monopoly in the carrying trade to and from Chilean ports. This came as the result of building steamboats and, curiously enough, through the unparalleled vigor of an enterprising citizen of the United States. William Wheelwright, of Newburyport, Massachusetts, was the most famous foreigner of the period in Chile. His name stands there for railways, steamships, city lighting and water plants, and discovery of coal fields. He was one American whom Chile honored, and a large statute in Valparaiso preserves the memory of his work.

Wheelwright moved to Valparaiso from Guaya-

[2] Horace Rumbold, *Le Chile*, p. 37.

[3] Paul Campbell Scarlett, *South America and the Pacific*, p. 300; W. S. Robertson, *Hispanic-American Relations With the United States*, Appendix II.

quil, in Ecuador, when Chile started the deliberate effort of aiding its chief port by favorable legislation. It was made the capital of a province separate from Santiago; special measures to promote its development were devised; nowhere else in South America was such wise legislation framed to favor a commercial city.[4] The American business man arrived in 1829, the same year that Andrés Bello made Chile his home.

Wheelwright was interested at the time in the coastwise trade of Chile, Peru, and Ecuador. His first line of steamboats ran along the mining coast of north Chile. One distinctive mark of his career was his activity in developing all the places where he traded in as many ways as possible. By means of a system of iron water-piping, he brought pure drinking water to Valparaiso and also introduced gas lighting there as well as in Copiapó and Callao. At many desert places he set up machines for distilling drinking water, so that the stations along his shipping route became livable. He explored central Chile and found coal, saltpeter, borax, and lime. The west coast of South America he bettered by means of dikes, ferries, beacons, warehouses, piers, and dredges.[5]

His steamship project, finally achieved, was to extend his line to Panama, where a short railway would connect with an Atlantic port. There European boats could land goods for his ships to carry

[4] Isaac Strain, *Cordillera and Pampa*, p. 17.

[5] Juan Bautista Alberdi, *La vida y los trabajos de William Wheelright en la América del Sud*, p. 38.

along the Pacific coast. After many years of disappointment, during which he was considered insane by many foreign consuls, he obtained from Chile the exclusive privilege of steam navigation along the west coast for a period of ten years. By 1836, Bolivia and Peru had granted him the same concessions. Ecuador finally followed suit, but Colombia was not interested for some time.[6]

As he could not obtain coal at reasonable prices from England, he used the south Chilean coal that had hitherto been considered valueless. Soon no other was used on Chilean railways. A big lighthouse at Valparaiso was his next achievement, and he then turned his attention to improvements in tariff regulations and postal laws.

But the company he formed to give him the financial backing necessary for his steamboat enterprises was a British concern. He sought capital first in his home country, but on account of lack of money or of foresight, no American investors could be interested. England, however, was seeking a shorter route to Australia and instructed its consuls in Peru and Chile to examine the best means of connecting the British Isles with the west coast. English merchants at Callao and Valparaiso approved Wheelwright's plans unanimously and the latter, much encouraged, went to London for money. There, in 1840, the Pacific Steam Navigation Company was formed.[7] All of Wheelwright's ships were built in England

[6] Juan Bautista Alberdi, *La vida y los trabajos de William Wheelright en la América del Sud,* p. 249.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 588.

and flew the British flag. In fact, after a time, complaint was made by South American passengers that both the food and the regulations of the ships were all made for Englishmen who rarely used them.

When the ten-year monopoly granted Wheelwright expired, the Pacific Steam Navigation Company followed the policy of buying out all competitors. Up to 1870 it was the only line that connected Europe or North America with the South American west coast.

Railways began to absorb the attention of Wheelwright as soon as his steamboat line was well established. His first road was opened in 1852 between Caldera and Copiapó in the mining region of the north. Its locomotives were from the United States, and the Campbell Brothers who planned the work as engineers also came from Wheelwright's native land. Another prominent American who was one of the early builders of Chile was Henry Meiggs, whose genius and energy brought to a successful completion the railway between Valparaiso and Santiago, after Wheelwright had started it. When a banquet held at Llai-Llai, in 1863, celebrated the ending of mule travel between Chile's two largest cities, these four Americans were the guests of honor.[8] To their country also Chile sent for bridge models and workmen to construct the bridges over the Chilean rivers. The Maule was the first to be crossed by a wooden bridge made in the United States.[9] Twelve years before the railroad between Santiago and Valparaiso changed the whole mode of travel, the monopoly of

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 588.
[9] *Discursos parlamentarios,* III. 105.

the transit between these two cities was held by the American Stagecoach Company, owned and managed by B. F. Morse from the northern republic.[10]

Manuel Carvallo, one of the Chilean ministers to the United States in the middle of the century, made extensive studies of what had been done there in the way of agriculture. His reports to his home government caused it to send for many agricultural implements from the United States, as well as for a few experts to further the cultivation of wheat in the central part of the country.[11]

In engineering and scientific matters, then, American influence was still strong by the middle of the century. An astronomical mission from the United States came to Chile in 1852 for certain observations, where it was welcomed by the government and sold many of its instruments. Its mission led to the founding of the National Observatory.[12]

In other fields, the impression of the United States was slight. It was the British who introduced new methods in education, when in 1821 James Thomson came from across the seas at the invitation of O'Higgins to start the Lancasterian school system. The country adopted it with enthusiasm at first, but after the Director's removal, interest languished and the whole new system was abolished.[13]

[10] Mrs. G. B. Merwin, *Chile through American Spectacles*, p. 73.

[11] *Memoria del jefe del gabinete 1848*, p. 2.

[12] Diego Barros Arana, *Un decenio de la historia de Chile*, II. 406.

[13] Barros Arana, *Historia jeneral le Chile*, XIII. 601.

Chile was dependent on church schools for most of the instruction for its young men until 1842, when a normal school was opened in Santiago. The University of Chile came into existence the following year. Domingo Fausto Sarmiento, a fugitive from Argentina who became a prominent statesman in Chile, travelled extensively in the United States. There he met Horace Mann and was attracted to the American school system.[14] But his recommendations sent to Santiago were not adopted.

France, Spain, and Italy were the guides in art and literature. Spanish plays were given almost exclusively on the Santiago stage; French novels and French paintings were popular; Italian opera companies began to come to Chile and set the vogue in music.[15] In culture, then, Chile leaned strongly toward the Latin countries of the Old World. Even in its immigration policy this was shown, when special efforts were made by the government to attract European immigrants provided they were of the Roman Catholic faith.

The new Latin-American republic was thus facing toward Europe in commerce, in finance, and in the arts as well. The same trend was noticeable in the realm of diplomacy during the second administration of Prieto, when Chile went to war with Peru and Bolivia.

[14] José Guillermo Guerra, *Sarmiento, su vida y sus obras*, p. 133.

[15] Antonio Iñíquez Vicuña, *Historia del periodo revolucionario de Chile 1848-51*, pp. 212-220.

Andrés Santa Cruz, soldier-president of Bolivia, had taken advantage of revolutions in Peru, and in 1835 made himself head of a confederation between the two countries. He then became interested in Chilean politics and particularly in the schemes of General Freire, who was at that time exiled in Peru. He further alarmed the Prieto government by adopting commercial measures that would advance Peruvian ports at the expense of Valparaiso.[16] In the winter of 1836 Chile declared war on the ambitious chieftain, and Argentina followed the next year.

Threatened by a circle of jealous neighbors, Santa Cruz struck quickly. Argentine armies were stopped at the Bolivian frontier and by 1838 were in retreat. An attempt by Chile to drag Ecuador into the conflict was thwarted; Diego Portales, the prime mover of the whole fight against the Confederation, was slain by mutinous soldiers in the village of Quillota. In the autumn of 1837 an invading army from Chile was surrounded in southern Peru and forced to make peace at the conqueror's terms.[17]

But the Prieto government persisted. The treaty signed by its unsuccessful general was repudiated and a new army was sent into Peru the next year. At the same time Callao was blockaded by the Chilean fleet. This meant renewed trouble with merchant vessels from other nations, but now American ships observed the blockade rules, as they had not

[16] Strain, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

[17] Ramón Sotomayor y Valdes, *Chile bajo el gobierno del jeneral Joaquin Prieto*, II. 188-300.

done in the times of Lord Cochrane. It was England and France that ignored them once more. The British went so far as to seize for a short period one of the Chilean warships in Callao harbor.[18] The war ended suddenly in 1839, when Chile defeated the armies of the Confederation at Yungai and Santa Cruz fled in complete rout. His escape to Ecuador on a British warship further embittered the Chilean government toward England.

All of these occurrences made the history of attempted mediation in the war more difficult to understand from an American viewpoint. Hostilities had not yet begun when Santa Cruz suggested the joint mediation of England, France, and the United States, but Chile rejected it. When news of the death of Portales reached Peru, the Confederation again accepted American mediation to be effected on board a warship of the United States. Once more Chile declined. Then when the Chilean army was captured in southern Peru, it was under the auspices of Great Britain that the treaty was signed. Throughout the whole war Chile and Argentina experienced difficulty in disregarding the insistent appeals of England to make peace.

After Santa Cruz had escaped with the aid of the British navy, England emphasized its disregard for Chilean feelings by making a peremptory demand

[18] *Ibid.*, III. 428; Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Pollard to Forsythe, September 29, 1839. Pollard wrote that the British seized the whole Chilean navy, but Sotomayor y Valdés, who gives a more extended account, mentions the seizure of only one ship.

that Chile withdraw its army from Peru. The matter was mentioned by Foreign Minister Enrique Tocornal to Major Pollard, who followed Hamm at the American legation. The Chilean official was so outraged at the British attitude that he suggested the adoption of a joint policy by American countries with reference to such actions on the part of a European power.[19] Pollard avoided making any definite pledge of united action for his country, and expressed his opposition to an American league such as Tocornal appeared to want. But for the nonce at least his mind was set at rest as to Chile's partiality for European powers.

A few days after this conversation, the celebration of Chilean independence was observed at an official banquet. Upon his arrival Pollard was astonished to find the guest of honor to be the very British captain who had seized the Chilean warship in Callao harbor. He himself was placed at the other end of the table. Pollard sat restlessly during the first course, then walked slowly to the President's chair, turned abruptly on his heel and left the room. He would not accept the profuse apologies offered him the next day. "It confirms what I have said before," he wrote to Washington. "These states have no gratitude. The Chileans fawn on those who kick and cuff them most."[20]

Pollard had made speeches repeatedly in Chile on its debt to his country. He had cited its lead in

[19] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Pollard to Forsythe, April 10, 1839.
[20] *Ibid.*, September 29, 1839.

extending recognition, its determined stand against the Holy Alliance, its commercial treaty, its efforts to induce Spain to accept the results of the revolution.[21] But he left in disgust after a six-year stay. The power of British gold and British goods outweighed all arguments he might adduce for American leadership in the affairs of this particular Latin republic.

The ascendancy of Europe became complete with the election of Manuel Montt, the first civilian president of Chile. General Bulnes, hero of Yungai, was chief executive for ten years after Prieto retired. During his administration the trend toward permanent government by a small ruling clique was evident. Presidential appointees held key positions in the Chamber of Deputies and directed legislation. Montt was head of the Bulnes cabinet. The determination of the latter to make his favorite minister succeed him seemed almost like dynastic succession.

"The love of much power causes those administering the government to turn their sight from the United States and look to European monarchs for political guides," Pollard had observed in 1836. When Montt was inaugurated in 1851, this view could have been taken with even more justice. A landowning oligarchy whose sympathies were thoroughly European was ruling the country. The charge

[21] England was the first government to suggest to Spain that the latter take this step. Then in 1831 and in 1834 the United States made overtures at Madrid on the same matter. Neither country was directly instrumental in the final extension of recognition. The first Chilean minister went to Spain in 1838.

made by Montt's opponents that he would increase the influx of European capital was accepted by him without demur. He welcomed it and wanted it to stay.[22] By the middle of the century in politics as in all else, Chile was facing toward Europe.

[22] Domingo F. Sarmiento, *Don Manuel Montt* (pamphlet).

Chapter VI

DISREGARDING THE UNITED STATES

"Chile is the only country in which I have travelled in Asia, Africa or the two Americas where Americans are not loved and Englishmen despised," wrote Captain Isaac Strain, a United States traveller, in 1849.[1] Disregarding the bias that his patriotism may have caused, his comment on Chile was accurate enough and only partly explained by the influences that England was able to exert on its own behalf.

While a European country was asserting its ascendancy in this Latin republic of the New World, the United States was finding it ever more difficult to preserve the ordinary relations of friendship that exist between most nations. The vexatious subject of American claims was becoming more pressing as each minister failed to make any headway. Long after all other powers had reached satisfactory agreements, the claims of the United States still remained in dispute. Diplomacy of all types known was employed by American ministers, from the mild art of cajolery to the most insolent threats, but the wrong note seems to have been sounded at the wrong time. In some cases the negotiations were prolonged until everyone concerned with the incident had died. The claim of the ship *Good Return,* searched for estanco goods in 1832, was settled by an American minister

[1] *Strain,* op. cit., p. 121.

who was born two years after the search was made.[2] In the famous *Macedonian* case that originated in 1819, a Boston attorney in 1909 was still making inquiries as to the proper persons to receive the fund which he was empowered to distribute to heirs of the claimants.[3]

At the time of the inauguration of Manuel Montt, the principal claims pending were those which had arisen from seizures by Lord Cochrane, and which grew out of searches and detentions in Chilean ports. Concerning the former class, the reasons offered by Chile for the admiral's actions were based usually upon the alleged fact that American captains were acting for Spanish merchants in Lima, or else were engaged in contraband trading. In regard to the other cases, it must be admitted that American merchants were not always careful of the Chilean port laws and the payment of customs duties. On the other hand, Chilean officials were apt to search American ships without cause; and the methods taken in their searches caused delays and depreciation of cargo which proved quite serious to the shipowners.

Two incidents which serve as interesting examples of this were the cases of the *Franklin* and the *Good Return*. A sailor from the latter went ashore at Talcahuano and sold some tobacco, an estanco prod-

[2] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Logan to Frelinghuysen, November 10, 1883.

[3] *Ibid.*, Robert Gardiner to Secretary of State, January 7, 1909.

uct, not listed in the manifest given the customs authorities by the captain. In consequence, both ships were searched and tobacco was found on them, but only in quantities sufficient to supply the needs of the sailors, to whom it was as essential as bread. The ships were dismantled for five months during the search and then released by order of the master of the port, "no charges having been made."[4]

The outstanding claim of all was that of the *Macedonian,* a merchant ship which sailed from Boston in 1818 for a trading voyage to South America with a cargo owned by Ellery, Perkins, and other citizens of the United States. The *Macedonian* reached Peru and disposed of its goods for $145,000. Of this amount sixty thousand dollars was sent by Captain Eliphalet Smith to Guamey, where it was placed temporarily on a French boat, *La Gazelle.* Smith followed with the remainder of the money. Lord Cochrane, who was bombarding Callao at the time, seized Smith and made him sign over his claim for the money in his possession, and sent orders meanwhile for the confiscation of the other part held on the French vessel.

The first American minister to make any headway with this claim was Major Pollard, who through a judicious mixture of blandishments and threats, obtained an agreement from Chile to pay $104,000 in full settlement to the Boston merchants. Both sides were satisfied and by 1840 the dispute seemed to

[4] *Discursos parlamentarios,* VI. 458.

have reached adjustment.[5] Then, in 1841, the Boston company submitted an entirely new claim. Cochrane had seized, through his land forces, another sum of money from Captain Smith in 1821. This occurred in the valley of Sitana, north of the port of Arica, which was not under blockade by the Chilean navy. Smith had landed at Arica a cargo that he had bought in Canton and had made three hundred per-cent profit on all goods sold there. He was going north toward Lima when the money was taken from him by Colonel Balderrama, who turned it over to Cochrane. The latter used it to pay his soldiers. In this matter both parties acted irregularly from the standpoint of law. Neither went to a prize court to place its case there. Cochrane distributed the money to his men without any prior condemnation proceedings. Smith appeared before a magistrate in the town of Arequipa, deposed the testimony of three witnesses, made a few protests to the Chilean government through captains of American men-of-war, and then dropped the matter for twenty-five years.[6]

Even with these complications, the affair appeared to be possible of speedy settlement until Chile obtained from its representative at Lima certain papers purporting to show that Smith had acted as agent for two royalist merchants in the Peruvian capital. This had been the contention of Prevost at the time of the seizure, and it had been based on the report of the

[5] John Bassett Moore, *History and Digest of International Arbitrations to Which the United States Has Been a Party*, p. 1450.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 1468.

fiscal (procurator) for Peru on that occasion.[7] Smith and Ellery had made a vigorous protest at Washington about the commissioner's attitude, a protest with which Secretary Adams sympathized, and Prevost was soon recalled. The report of the fiscal, however, seems to have been forgotten in all the negotiations with Pollard, and was not unearthed until 1842.

Unfortunately the success of the Whigs in the United States brought Mr. Pollard home and sent John Pendleton to Chile when matters reached this crucial stage. Pendleton believed that the whole trouble lay in the fact that the American minister had been too timid. Disregarding a word of caution from Secretary Daniel Webster, he demanded an instant settlement. His tone became so offensive finally that Chile made a vigorous protest and Pendleton went home.[8] William Crump who succeeded him was so excessively polite that nothing whatever was done toward a settlement, though Chile expressed to Secretary Calhoun, his chief, its appreciation of his tact and courtesy.

Administrations again changed in the United States and James K. Polk sent his personal friend, Colonel Seth Barton, to Santiago. This old soldier started a new wrangle over the *Macedonian* case; accused the city administration of Santiago of stealing his carriage horses;[9] tried to arrange for the crew

[7] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Prevost to Adams, June 19, 1824.

[8] *Discursos parlamentarios,* II. 372.

[9] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Barton to Buchanan, August 8, 1848.

of an American warship to come from Valparaiso to his legation for a visit so as to overawe the police; and finally entered into an uproarious quarrel with the archbishop of Santiago over marriage with a Chilean girl. He left Chile abruptly in 1849, claiming his life to be in danger, and the legation was closed for almost a year.[10]

The new minister, Balie Peyton, arrived just before the election of Montt.[11] With the *Macedonian* dispute at its height, his hands seemed full enough; then a revolt started against the new president. The younger politicians had grown restive under the continued dominance of the conservative party directed by a few powerful families. Through their ministers, both Bulnes and Prieto had been able to direct the Chamber of Deputies, and through their tremendous appointive power, they had been able to control the choice of their successors. Even the guarantee of freedom of the press was curbed by giving subsidies to all those newspapers which favored the government. Only one daily, *El Mercurio* of Valparaiso, was able to exist without them.[12]

A similar situation had been broken up in France in 1848 when the Guizot ministry was overthrown by a revolution in Paris. The direct effect of this on Chile was seen in 1851, as soon as it was known that Bulnes had succeeded in securing the election of

[10] See chapter ix.

[11] The United States had wanted to send Pendleton again.

[12] Diego Barros Arana, *Un decenio de la historia de Chile*, II. 248.

Montt.[13] Talcahuano became the center of the revolt, and out of a number of generals, José María de la Cruz became the recognized leader. Bulnes at once assumed command of the government forces and attacked de la Cruz at Longomilla River. A drawn battle was the result, but the revolutionary leader agreed to accept the election of Montt if amnesty were granted to his followers.[14] Thus hostilities ended. They had lasted less than a year.

British and French residents had been divided in the struggle and many had entered both armies. But Americans were almost a unit for de la Cruz, who represented to them a protest against the monarchical trend of Chile's conservative rulers. Two bodies of American volunteers fought in the de la Cruz army without pay. For a time, it seemed that they might forfeit their lives, but the amnesty provisions were extended to include them as well as the natives.[15] The revolution was thus the origin of a batch of new claims, coming just as the old ones were growing more confused.

Suddenly an unexpected change took place in all the relations between the two countries. Gold was discovered in California and the new villages that grew overnight into large towns, even into cities, had to be fed. It proved a golden opportunity for Chilean farmers, who now began to export flour to the new American state. They knew a prosperity that had

[13] Antonio Iñíquez Vicuña, *op. cit.*, p. 290.
[14] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Peyton to Webster, December 22, 1851.
[15] *Ibid.*

never been theirs before. Money was borrowed on the strength of future exports; with it palatial homes were built and speculative enterprises of all kinds were started. By 1852 Chile was feeding California, and exports had reached the high water mark of four million dollars.[16]

The effect on the government's attitude was soon apparent. All bitterness about claims was forgotten; the American participation in the revolution was overlooked. In 1850 Chile gave notice that it wished to terminate the old commercial treaty.[17] In two years, with Andrés Bello as its representative once more, it was considering entrance into a new pact on the basis asked by the United States in 1832, to wit, that the ships of each nation should have the same privileges in the ports of the other as were granted to native vessels. No more exceptions for South American states were demanded.[18] Even a stipulation by Peyton that additional religious privileges be granted Protestants in Chile only retarded negotiations for a short time.

But the mushroom prosperity collapsed within five years. On the eastern seaboard of the United States it was found that kiln-dried flour could pass the equator twice without damage. This enabled American farmers in the east to ship their flour to California. Clipper ships were then built in the northern

[16] *Boletín del ministerio de relaciones exteriores,* 1875, p. 575.

[17] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Barton to Buchanan, April 25, 1848. Barton wrote that Chile had not even asked from Spain the exceptions in favor of other American states that had been wrung from the United States.

[18] *Ibid.,* Peyton to Clayton, May 27, 1850.

republic that could make the trip from New York and Boston to San Francisco more quickly than Chilean boats could go from Valparaiso.[19] Finally, in the west those who failed to find Eldorado turned to agriculture, and by 1855 California and Oregon were practically feeding themselves. The sudden decline of the Chilean trade brought on a serious financial panic. Country homes half-built were not finished. The bitterness toward Americans, though unfounded this time, was more intense than could have been caused by any number of diplomatic mistakes.

But this was only half of the California problem. The western gold-fields had been a lodestar for Chilean boys. One American traveller reported that it seemed to him everyone he met in Valparaiso was going to California.[20] These Latin youths found the pace of the new country too fast and puzzling for them. Few of them succeeded. They were outwitted, cheated by an alien government that knew little of the legalities, and failing to find sudden wealth turned desperadoes. With Mexicans and other Spanish Americans, they formed a considerable colony at Chiletown, where they held up immigrants passing through to the gold fields and planned any number of marauding expeditions. Finally, vigilance committees of Americans took the matter in hand and with a certain degree of right on their side, burned Chiletown.[21]

[19] *Ibid.*, Bigler to Seward, May 17, 1861.

[20] Strain, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[21] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Starkweather to Marcy, May 29, 1855.

The two Chilean consuls in California had no idea how to handle the situation. By the time that they would reach the places of disturbance, injured Chileans had either left or were too intimidated to give testimony. At home the cry was raised to demand large claims from the United States to offset the *Macedonian* and other cases. But data could not be obtained. The best that Chile could do was to furnish facilities for the return of all its wandering youths to the home soil.[22]

These events brought a quick end to negotiations for a new treaty. Bello now wrote into the draft a clause providing for the protection in each country of the citizens from the other who were engaged in mining. When the treaty was submitted to the United States Senate, the mining clause was struck out. On its return thus amended, Montt refused to submit it again to the Chilean Senate and the whole matter dropped.[23] Most European nations now had commercial treaties with Chile, but none could be formed by the United States.

"The press here teems with lampoons against the United States," reported Minister Starkweather in 1855. "The government can hardly restrain a show of hostility. Any politician who says a good word for the United States has his fate sealed forthwith. There is widespread talk of expelling all Americans from Chile."[24] For to bitterness on the part of

[22] *Discursos parlamentarios,* VI. 45.

[23] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Bigler to Cass, June 15, 1858.

[24] *Ibid.,* Starkweather to Marcy, May 29, 1855.

private citizens and misunderstandings in official quarters, a deep-seated fear of the ambitions of the northern colossus was now added. Chile first became impressed with the danger of American expansion when the United States warred with Mexico in 1846. Though an official position of neutrality was carefully kept, the people were loud in sympathy for Mexico and the press denounced the powerful invader of a Spanish-American nation.[25]

A few years afterwards it was discovered that the United States was drafting a treaty with Ecuador that included a cession of the Galápagos Islands to the former. Official Santiago was at once alarmed, for this was much nearer to its boundaries than Mexico. A delegation was sent to Quito to insist upon the exclusion of any such clause. The mission was completely successful and the treaty was changed to omit the cession.[26] Chile felt that its intervention alone had prevented further American expansion.

Nothing provoked such widespread indignation, however, and such determined opposition as the exploits of William Walker. This American adventurer operated from California and descended upon the Central American coast to colonize Nicaragua. He soon became embroiled in the politics of that region and as president of Nicaragua warred with neighboring states. Public opinion in the United States was divided concerning his aims, and he was allowed for a few years to fit out several expeditions from the

[25] *El Ferrocarril,* September 30, 1859; *El Mercurio,* July 28, 1858.

[26] *Discursos parlamentarios,* V. 277.

northern republic for his private ventures. But England fought him consistently, since he interfered with its plans of expansion in British Honduras. Its hostility, joined to that of the Vanderbilt interests, finally broke Walker. He was executed in Nicaragua after surrendering to a British naval officer.[27]

The criticisms expressed by the extreme northern Whigs in the United States, who saw everything from the angle of the slavery question, confirmed Chile in its belief that the northern republic had officially connived at Walker's exploits.[28] The direct result was a Congress held at Santiago in 1856. All Latin-American states were invited to it, but long distances and poor transportation cut down the attendance to delegates from Peru, Chile, and Ecuador only. These signed a treaty for the union of the Spanish-American republics providing among other things that all persons who conducted filibustering expeditions from any country were to be treated as pirates. Each signatory was to go to the aid of another in repelling filibusters from its shores.[29] The Spanish-American union did not materialize, but the treaty registered the dread of American expansion that so many republics in South America felt.

[27] William O. Scroggs, *Filibusters and Financiers,* pp. 270-276. Vicuña Mackenna claimed in a speech at Cooper Union in New York City in 1866 that Walker was captured on a Chilean warship.

[28] Scroggs, *op. cit.,* pp. 49-51. The biographer of Walker shows clearly that Walker's aim was not the extension of slavery, but mere adventure.

[29] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Enclosure in letter of Astaburuaga to Seward, November 6, 1861.

Meanwhile the *Macedonian* dispute was shifted to Washington, where Manuel Carvallo went to arrange for its settlement. All efforts were futile; no suggestions that he made could be found suitable to the Boston merchants who had inherited the claim. Then Carvallo married Miss Elizabeth Causten, of Ohio, whose father was engaged as an attorney for some of the American claimants, and through this kinsman the Chilean agent obtained the confidential letters of Prevost condemning the American case.[30] When he presented these in triumph at the State Department, a wrangle followed that closed the door to friendly settlement. Carvallo left the United States in 1853 denouncing the American attitude.

Discussions were now resumed in Santiago, where finally the Bigler-Urmeneta protocol was signed, submitting the claim to arbitration by the King of the Belgians. His decision, given in 1858, was distinctly a compromise and satisfied both parties. Three-fifths of the money in the Sitana seizure was adjudged to belong to American citizens; the rest, the property of the Peruvian merchants. The seizure of three-fifths was unlawful and Chile should pay this amount to the American claimants. As the claim was not advanced until 1841, interest at six per cent, the legal rate in Massachusetts, was due also from that date, but not before.

It was well that one large claim was settled, for the following year saw the making of many new ones. Young Chileans were by no means satisfied

[30] *Ibid.*, Carvallo to Clayton, August 8, 1849.

with the de la Cruz agreement of 1851, whereby the elder statesmen stayed at the helm. With smothered discontent they saw Manuel Montt reëlected in 1856, but his evident plan to make his favorite minister, Antonio Varas, succeed him was too much. If every president chose his successor, elections would become a farce. Rebellion broke out in 1859 with more intensity than ever.

Again Americans welcomed the revolutionary cause and enlisted in the armies against Montt. John Bigler, the minister at the time, could scarcely maintain his own neutrality. "If it had not been for the direct interference of British warships in 1851, Montt would have been overthrown," he wrote to his government. "They may do it again, for Montt has favored British interests consistently, giving the South Pacific Steamship Company a favorable mail contract without previous notification to other diplomats. He has negotiated recently for a seven million dollar loan in London. The present revolution is to liberalize the government and prevent monarchy. I believe that English and French navies are planning to interfere directly. We should not stand for this."[31]

The conservatives were shaken this time. The revolution was quelled, but only after Varas had renounced all ambitions for the presidency and the government had shown its favor to Joaquín Pérez, a colorless candidate who was not feared by any group. The revolutionaries had won a compromise, but Montt was not overthrown and reprisals on Amer-

[31] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Bigler to Cass, April 15, 1859.

icans who fought against him began at once. Houses were entered forcibly; property was confiscated; Americans were thrown into prison. Claims for damages from these incidents lasted for half a century and threw into confusion a claims convention forty years later.

In this connection, the case of George Cotton was typical. He came to Chile just as the revolt of 1851 started. From all conversations in Talcahuano where he stayed, the Cruz movement seemed a fight for democracy. The adventurer needed no further excuse than this to enter the war and was made paymaster for the rebel army. The money he used came from the Talcahuano customs house, and after the rebellion was put down Montt demanded that he make a refund. He refused, however, and made the matter a subject for diplomatic protest. The American legation was ignored in the case, and Cotton was finally forced to pay. In 1859 it was not known how active he was in fomenting more trouble. But he was seized and thrown into prison on suspicion. Drastic measures failed to wring any confession from him, but only the strongest complaint from Minister Bigler prevented his execution. He was finally released, a broken man.[32]

Additional trouble at Valparaiso occurred when the American Consul, Trevitt, gave shelter to fugitives of the revolutionary army. He was instructed from his home government to release them, but his house was entered by the local police before he acted.

[32] *Ibid.*, Bigler to Cass, January 31, 1860.

Trevitt gave personal resistance and repelled the invaders. Later the fugitives were surrendered to the city authorities. Secretary Cass readily admitted that consulates were not asylums for political refugees. But he considered that Trevitt's rights had not been regarded and insisted that his *exequatur,* which the Chilean government had withdrawn, be restored. A flat refusal met every demand he made, however, and a new consul was finally sent from the northern republic.

The decade of the fifties marked the most bitter period, save one, in Chilean-American relations. Every claim produced strenuous argument; every diplomatic action of the United States in Latin America caused alarm at Santiago; every internal discord in Chile was marked by American enthusiasm for the losing cause. Anything like American ascendancy no longer existed. If only the usual diplomatic amenities could be observed, American ministers had reason to feel happy.

Chapter VII

European Menaces and American Sentiment

For forty years or more Chile had been secure from external perils. The threat of the Holy Alliance in 1823 had been dissipated by the hostility of England and the United States. The fancied fears of American aggression had come no nearer to material menace than a project to buy islands off the coast of Ecuador. The only possible threat from South America itself had been the vaulting ambition of General Santa Cruz, whose confederation had been broken by the power of the Chilean army.

But by the middle of the century, a new Napoleon had come to preside over the destinies of France. With the advent of the 'sixties, this nephew of the man who first caused Chile to rebel against European rule began to look greedily at the domain Spain had lost. The incessant revolutions in the republic of Mexico had plunged that unlucky land into a morass of debts impossible to pay. Its largest creditors were in England, France, and Spain, and in 1862 these nations sent warships to enforce collection. With the fleet, Napoleon dispatched an army that was destined to found another European monarchy in the New World. In a short time, Maximilian of Austria was declared Emperor of Mexico.

This unexpected act of France had been preceded by a return of the Spanish monarchy to a Caribbean island. The petty Dominican Republic had been in

constant revolution since it became independent of Spain. These conditions were followed by even unhappier ones when the Negro state of Haiti on the western end of the island extended its sway over the inhabitants to the eastward. After many years of African domination, the Dominican Republic had again freed itself and now voted to be taken under Spanish protection. Its invitation was promptly accepted at Madrid and another European country had regained territory in the new world.

The fear of American aggression was suddenly forgotten in Chile in face of these renewed menaces from overseas. The claim that all republican nations of the New World were bound by kindred aims and ideals had heretofore fallen on deaf ears when diplomats from the United States had proclaimed them. When Pollard asked in 1835 why his country could not be taken into the family of American nations with reference to dispensing commercial favors, he was told that a common heritage and a common poverty brought the Latin countries on the western continent together in a kinship that the United States could not share.[1]

But an entirely new note was now to be heard in the parliament and press of Chile. "This paper has always pointed out the difference between despotic and monarchical Europe and republican America," wrote Manuel Matta in the *Voz de Chile*. "Yankee diplomacy, which we today salute by that name,

[1] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Pollard to Forsythe, May 12, 1835.

should preside over and preponderate in the councils of American governments and people."[2] "Europe offers Austria a slice of the New World for Venice," said Ambrosio Montt in the Chamber of Deputies in 1862. "We are weak and can only protest this, but we can never applaud it. Republicanism in America is difficult but monarchy is impossible. Were this giant [the United States] not compelled to suffocate its internal rebellion, I feel certain that Napoleon would not be near Mexico."[3]

For the southern states of the northern republic had just begun at that time their own struggle for independence. It was believed confidently in Chile that the United States would have shown active opposition to all of these European movements, had it been unoccupied at home. An ingenuous theory was soon adopted that only the men south of Mason and Dixon's line had ever desired to gain territory at the expense of their Latin neighbors. "A reaction has come in favor of the United States," wrote the semi-official *Ferrocarril* in 1862, a paper that had led in condemning the northern republic a few years before. "What has caused this reaction? There were two heterogeneous elements fighting for control in the United States and all of the absorbing tendencies were to be found in the south. We now see that if this nation did not possess a large enough army to quell a rebellion, or a strong enough navy to blockade

[2] *Voz de Chile,* May 20, 1863.

[3] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Enclosure in Nelson to Seward, June 26, 1862.

the southern coast, it must not have been planning the war we thought it was on South America."[4]

It was easy enough for Chileans to believe this, for most of the Americans who had come to their country in the past years had been New England traders. Their idea of the big republic had been gained almost entirely from men of the northern states. Likewise, such a theory allowed all those who formerly feared the colossus to be consistent, now that their dislike had changed to enthusiasm. Thomas Nelson, the minister of the Lincoln administration, became quickly popular; Chile applauded when Russia sent a warship to New York City, presumably to defy French intervention in favor of the South; it celebrated the fall of South Carolina before the army of Sherman and the surrender of Lee at Appomattox.

But the practical test of the new theory was soon to come. The European menace moved nearer and Chile itself was involved in war. In 1864, as the War for Southern Independence was drawing to a close in the United States, a small fleet sailed from Spain to the eastern Pacific supposedly on a scientific expedition. It had no sooner reached Peruvian waters than it abandoned its guise of explorer and seized in the name of the Queen of Spain the Chincha Islands with their valuable guano deposits. Two reasons were given for the action, that Peru still owed the citizens of Her Majesty for damages incurred in its war for freedom, and that Spain had never recog-

[4] *El Ferrocarril*, April 30, 1862.

nized the Peruvian republic anyway.[5] Commissioners then came from Madrid to Lima to settle the dispute and claimed that they had to leave the country hurriedly to escape assassination. This determined Spain to retain the islands, and more ships were sent to hold them.

The anomalous part of the situation was that no declaration of war had been made by either nation. Peru rejected an offer of Spain that the islands be abandoned if the government at Lima consented to pay three million dollars. It followed this by passing in the Chamber of Deputies a resolution that all Spanish aggression would be resisted by force. But no attack was made on the Spanish fleet since a Congress of South American states then in session at Lima was hoping to avert hostilities.

Chile assumed at once an attitude of official neutrality but made no attempt to restrain its masses from popular demonstrations against Spain. A body of volunteers sailed from Valparaiso in the steamer *Dart* and landed at Peru to help fight the European monarchy. Chile claimed that it had no reason to stop them as no state of war actually existed. It refused to muzzle the anti-Spanish papers, because freedom of the press was guaranteed in the constitution. It placed a contraband on Chilean coal for the use of warships when Spain tried to obtain fuel at Valparaiso because a state of war did exist *de facto,* if not *de jure;* yet it permitted horses to be sent to

[5] The second reason was later repudiated at Madrid.

Peru in large droves because it was only a maritime conflict.[6]

A vigorous Spanish protest was made at Santiago and explanations were given for all charges preferred by the Spanish minister. He said that he was fully satisfied and it seemed no trouble would arise. Suddenly a fleet appeared in the harbor of Valparaiso, bringing an admiral of the Spanish navy to replace Minister Taveira in all negotiations. The latter was at once repudiated and Spain soon declared war on Chile.

It was an unusual sort of war. Peru did not enter until the next year, although its troubles had been the origin of the struggle. Ecuador and Bolivia then joined and Spain was faced by a hostile alliance. It seemed that a bloody combat was sure to follow, but though the war dragged on for six years, there were few encounters and the loss of life was negligible.

The European monarchy had concentrated its naval strength in the war area and promptly declared the whole Chilean coast under blockade. This was not possible to sustain and finally was reduced to Valparaiso alone. Meanwhile, Chile's small navy had scored when the *Esmeralda* captured the Spanish *Covadonga* and brought it triumphantly home to be turned into a Chilean warship. This victory was followed by the entrance of the other allies and soon afterwards the unhappy Spanish Admiral Pareja

[6] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Nelson to Seward, March 31, 1865; *Counter-manifest of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile on the Present War between that Republic and Spain,* 1866.

committed suicide when he saw his whole campaign failing. He was succeeded by the fiery Méndez Núñez, who moved at once to bombard Valparaiso.

The war was now passing into its third year as Méndez Núñez threatened the first serious action that had been taken. In the beginning it was expected by most Chileans that active aid would be obtained in the United States as soon as the southern states of that republic had been disarmed. But the enthusiastic ideas of the early 'sixties in regard to the attitude of the northern states were due to undergo revision.

Disillusionment had first come in the matter of claims before the Spanish war began. Chile had been led to believe that the Lincoln government would cancel all the outstanding ones and had rejected every effort of the Buchanan administration to reach a solution of any of them.[7] When the popular Mr. Nelson presented them in the midst of all the acclamations of sympathy for Lincoln's cause, there was occasion for some pause in the wave of enthusiasm that had been sweeping the country.

The next rebuff was the refusal of the northern republic to attend the Congress held at Lima, in 1864, to discuss the new European dangers. There had been no reason, in fact, to expect that the United States would depart from its traditional policy of joining in no foreign wars; but the idea that the northern states had always had political views en-

[7] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Bigler to Cass, April 30, 1860.

tirely opposed to those that had governed the nation before 1860 had taken possession of the Chilean mind in a way that was difficult to fathom. With utter astonishment and dismay the Chileans heard the Johnson administration proclaim a neutrality as complete as that uttered by Madison and Monroe.

Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna was sent to the northern republic to arouse sentiment in favor of Chile. An added duty fell to him after his arrival, that of buying warships. His first surprise came when he failed to sway the American press. "I wrote them," he reported, "to request that they make some statement urging their country to join Chile in this common struggle against European monarchy. In nearly ever paper there appeared editorials next morning on the subject of 'no entangling alliances'. They do not seem to go deeply into any political matter. Generally there is a partiality for Chile because it is another republic, but there is no conception of the real issues involved in the war."[8]

Further disappointment awaited him when the purchase of warships was attempted. Negotiations had been opened between the United States and England in regard to the *Alabama* affair. It would not have been seemly for the complainants to permit their own citizens to fit out Chilean *Alabamas* to fight Spain. Vicuña Mackenna was rebuked sharply for recruiting members of the former Confederate army for his country and for employing southerners

[8] Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna, *Diez meses de misión á los Estados Unidos de Norte América,* p. 249.

to guard the ships which he planned to send from New York harbor. At one time he was arrested for violating the neutrality laws. That the Chilean emissary returned home in bitterness of spirit is not surprising.

His book describing his adventures in the United States gives the first detailed Chilean account of American life taken from actual observation. He was impressed by the fact that all the people smoked and put their feet up on the table when they talked to him. To be arrested in the United States, he remarked, was as common as eating breakfast. The most constant word that the Americans used was *humbug.* Sunday observance was acclaimed everywhere but was nothing but *humbug.* So likewise was the Monroe Doctrine. "It is simply used in times of election," he wrote. "As an international question, it is only a strategem . . . to acquire prestige among weak nations of America. . . . All Chile expected help from its big brother, but as a neutral, it really helped Spain who needed no aid, where Chile needed all."[9]

The last vain hope was dispelled when the bombardment of Valparaiso was put into effect. A short time prior to this incident, another change of American ministers took place at Santiago which brought some confusion. Thomas Nelson had taken such a partisan attitude on behalf of Chile that he had kept its people in high hope of American intervention. The Spaniards felt that his influence had done more than any other thing to cause Chile to reject all com-

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 211.

promises. His attitude seems to have met with full approval at Washington, if it were indeed understood. But a resolution of the United States Congress had asked that former generals in the war against the southern states be rewarded for their services. General Judson Kilpatrick was accordingly sent to Santiago and the unwilling Mr. Nelson had to leave.

Kilpatrick preserved a much more correct position of neutrality for his country, but made valiant efforts to stop the bombardment when Méndez Núñez gave notice of his intention to carry it into effect. Through him the Spanish admiral submitted his terms to Chile, demanding that his flag be saluted first by the warships of the republic. Chile declined to consider such a proposal and suggested in return a naval duel to be held in the open seas between an equal number of ships, with the American Commodore Rodgers as umpire.[10] Its result would determine the outcome of the war. So relatively minor were the matters in dispute between the two nations that it seems surprising that no agreement could be reached; but the sensitive pride of each prevented any yielding.

With the knowledge that he could effect no direct settlement, Kilpatrick then called together the diplomatic corps. Again he failed because the British and French refused to coöperate in averting the bombardment. The American minister did not believe that it would be wise to take upon himself the

[10] Pedro de Novo i Colson, *Historia de la guerra de España en el Pacífico,* quoting a letter from Vicente Villalón to Admiral Méndez Núnez, p. 304, note.

whole responsibility of checking the Spaniard, and accordingly the naval vessels of the United States left the harbor on the morning that the firing began.[11]

The bombardment of Valparaiso was the only serious incident in a war that soon stopped from sheer inertia. Toward the end of 1866 the Spanish fleet sailed back to Europe after a repulse at Callao by the Peruvian squadron. The Chilean government was interpellated in Congress as to whether a state of war still existed,[12] yet four years more were to pass before even an armistice could be signed. The contest was now shifted to the arena of diplomacy, and the interest, to the rivalry between England and France on one side and the United States on the other.

In January, 1867, the two European nations brought forward a project for an indefinite truce. After all it was these neutrals who had suffered most in the war. Their trade had been stopped by the Spanish blockade regulations; their houses along the Valparaiso wharves had been damaged by the Spanish guns; the uncertainty for four years more was to keep their commerce from its legitimate growth. More than that, the prestige of settling a war in South America would redound to their credit and work against the influence of the United States which the close of its internal struggle had enhanced.

[11] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Kilpatrick to Seward, April 16, 1866.

[12] *El Ferrocarril,* October 25, 1867.

The northern republic, on its part, soon followed suit with a suggestion that an armistice be signed that would immediately precede a conference at Washington. This offer, Chile soon saw, was not as satisfactory as the European. For in it one of the two sensitive belligerents would have to suggest the armistice and no one guaranteed that it would be kept. Bolivia and Ecuador agreed that these were valid objections and that the Franco-British proposition was distinctly the better of the two.[13]

All attempts at mediation of any sort were held up until the close of 1868 because of the war spirit in the belligerent countries. Chile demanded revenge for Valparaiso and President Pérez was roundly condemned for lack of vigor in prosecuting the war. Trade with Spain was banned on all the wast coast. But Ecuador was determined to bring the whole matter to some conclusion. Unlike its allies, it depended chiefly on Spanish commerce for its prosperity. Its insistence won and all countries were persuaded to come to an agreement whereby trade with Spain might be reopened.

The two offers were still pending, with the American the less satisfactory. But the remembrance of recent menaces from all of western Europe was yet deep in South American minds. It was agreed at Lima in 1869 to accept the American offer, provided that a guarantee of the armistice be given by the United States.[14] This was a triumph for the di-

[13] *Memoria del ministerio de relaciones exteriores de Chile*, 1869, p. 9.
[14] *Ibid.*, 1870, p. 5.

plomacy of the northern republic and showed that it held a prestige which its consistent neutrality had not destroyed. The Franco-British offer was not considered seriously at any time; the American proposal was simply amended to meet South American desires. This was a far cry from the times of Santa Cruz when England was the only country that could force Chile to listen to offers of peace.[15]

"We have no desire to be a regulator nor to enter into alliances with any power," Seward wrote Kilpatrick in 1866. "Peace is the unwavering policy of the United States. On the other hand, we maintain and insist with all the decision that is compatible with our existing neutrality that the republican system which is accepted by the people in any of the South American states shall not be subverted by European powers. We concede to every nation the right to make peace or war for other than political ambitions as it thinks right or wise."[16]

Such was the policy of the United States in the beginning of its history as a mediator. The Washington conference, held up again by a Bolivian revolution, sat in the spring of 1871 and signed an indefinite armistice. Chile still asked for reparations and no definite treaty of peace could be concluded. American suggestions brought an agreement to the effect that peace be made separately by each of the Allied powers. Chile did not ratify its treaty with Spain until 1884.

[15] See chapter v.

[16] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Seward to Kilpatrick, June 2, 1866.

The prestige thus gained by the United States was increased even more through the heroism of Dr. Thomas Root, who followed General Kilpatrick in the American legation at Santiago. As a physician he acted promptly in the smallpox scourge that struck the city in 1872. The sanitary measures that he recommended were generally adopted in the municipal hospitals. He also gave free treatment to numbers who did not like those institutions. Others were in charge of young Chilean doctors who acted under his direction. He was finally stricken with the disease, himself, but from his bedside still instructed his protégés in their work.[17]

When the United States replaced him with another war hero who needed a position, Chileans regretted his departure as they never before had regretted that of any American diplomat. A street was named in his honor and ovations were given him as he left. The northern colossus had reached the summit of its prestige in the hearts and minds of the Chilean people at the time when the war clouds of their greatest international struggle were beginning to gather.

[17] *Ibid.*, Root to Fish, September 9, 1872.

Chapter VIII

THE EMERGENCE OF TACNA-ARICA

The war with Spain had been useless and foolish, for sensitive pride alone stood in the way of a solution. The War of the Pacific that raged ten years later along the west coast of South America belonged in quite another category. Three countries sacrificed the lives of thousands of their citizens in order to possess the rich nitrate fields that lay on their common borders. The victor would gain a source of revenue that insured a steady income to its government, and thus taxes would be reduced; the loser would be forced to seek other measures for raising money and would remain a poor country. This, and this only, was the basis of a four year war, one of the bloodiest in South American history.

It had been agreed by the nations that had freed themselves from Spain in the early part of the century that the colonial frontiers of 1810 should remain the boundaries of the new countries. Since Spain had drawn many of those loosely, the agreement paved the way for many international quarrels, but none of them became serious until the disputed provinces proved to hold riches concealed in their soil. No better example of this could be found than in the province of Antofagasta claimed by both Bolivia and Chile.

The southern boundary of Antofagasta touched Chile at the 25th parallel and the disputed region

extended northward to the 23rd. This was Bolivia's only outlet to the sea. Further north, extending for two more parallels, was the Peruvian district of Tarapacá. In these territories were to be found most of the nitrate fields that are yet known to the world. Arica and Tacna, two other provinces of Peru, were directly north of Tarapacá. It was along this coast of six parallel lengths that the War of the Pacific raged.

Bolivia had had the ill luck to be ruled by a number of buffoon presidents who had entered into arrangements that the people did not understand. In 1866, when it joined Chile to fight Spain, the two countries agreed to hold Antofagasta under a sort of dual ownership whereby they would divide equally the export taxes of the province. Bolivia administered the upper half, and Chile the lower. Chilean business men, backed by British capital, then pushed into the nitrate fields of the entire region and established oficinas (plants)[1] throughout the Bolivian sphere. An additional treaty was therefore signed in 1874, providing that duties on the export of nitrates would never be raised.[2]

Meanwhile the enterprising Chileans had pushed even further and were working the nitrates of Tarapacá. Revolutions had plunged Peru so deeply into debt that in 1873 all of the products of its rich nitrate province were made a state monopoly. Later all

[1] This term applies either to the mines themselves or to the offices and buildings connected with the business.

[2] *The Case of Peru in the Matter of the Controversy Arising out of the Question of the Pacific,* Appendix, p. 6.

mineral deposits in that region were mortgaged to European purchasers of Peruvian government bonds. Foreseeing trouble with Chile, whose nationals in Tarapacá had received scant consideration in these manoeuvers, Peru made a secret alliance with Bolivia in 1873 that provided for military assistance on the part of either country if the other were attacked by a third.[3]

The fire that was thus laid broke into flames in 1878, when the Bolivian Congress ratified a concession given four years before to a Chilean nitrate company. For the ratification was made on condition that the concern pay an additional tax, based on its exports, to the Bolivian treasury. When it refused, its property was confiscated.[4] At once Chile declared war. Its armies had hardly left for the disputed area when Peru attempted mediation. This was answered by an inquiry into the pact of 1873. When the envoys from Lima failed to explain the treaty satisfactorily, Chile also declared war on Peru.

From a military standpoint the allies were seemingly at a great advantage. The Peruvian army alone was double the size of the force that Chile could muster. But French officers had trained the soldiers of the latter to an efficiency not known in the other

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 34. Peru claims that another reason for the secret treaty was that Chile was trying to induce Bolivia to join in an attack on Tarapacá. Then Antofagasta would go to Chile and the captured province to Bolivia. The treaty of 1873 prevented this agreement.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 45. Bolivia contended that this was a private arrangement with one company and did not break the treaty of 1874.

two countries. Chile struck quickly before the allies could unite, and in two months its armies were at the frontiers of Peru.

Again foreign interests were injured, especially in the mining region, and trade with the entire west coast was also thrown into confusion. American commerce had not advanced with the years; it was chiefly the European that suffered. Consequently the efforts to close the war would logically emanate from Europe, unless American diplomacy opposed foreign intervention as it had done a decade before. England, France, and Germany began almost immediately to seek a solution and invitations were sent to the United States to join, but the Hayes administration refused all overtures from abroad and set itself rigidly against European interference.[5] In this way the northern republic assumed the whole burden of bringing the struggle to a close. If it failed, the combatants must fight on until one side or the other sued for peace. Mediation in the Spanish war had been difficult but always possible, since the actual suffering was slight. But hatreds had been aroused in the War of the Pacific that made a peace-maker's lot unenviable. The settlement of a war of this sort was as delicate a situation as American diplomacy had ever handled. Everything depended on the character of its ministers, who should have been men trained and skilled in international law.

[5] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Acting Secretary Seward to Pettis, August 18, 1879.

Yet even if the Department of State had been disposed to send representatives of this type, its hands were practically tied. The southern republics of the New World had always been regarded as places whither American politicians of small caliber might be sent when they deserved reward for party services.[6] Consequently to the war area where American prestige was at stake as it had never been before in this continent, went incompetent men who had no experience in the delicate matters which they would be forced to handle. Desirous of obtaining personal reputation that would assure them permanent berths in diplomatic work, they each became jealous of any progress another minister might luckily make. Instead of coöperating to obtain the prestige that their country desired, they quarrelled with one another until their rivalries became notorious. American mediation was doomed from the start, on account of the type of men that the United States employed.

The first serious trial of mediation was made at Arica in 1880 by the appointees of Rutherford B. Hayes. It had been preceded by an abortive mission of Judge Newton Pettis, the minister to Bolivia, who had gone to Santiago, though not instructed to do so, and had found that Chile was unwilling to give up any part of its conquests. This self-imposed mission was characterized by Secretary Evarts as "un-

[6] *Ibid.*, Logan to Frelinghuysen, September 13, 1883, in which is contained a good description of some of the trials that meet the American diplomat and now he tries to secure enough money to last him for some time. This is partly quoted in Chapter xi, below.

authorized and rash," but Pettis was congratulated for sounding out the terms of a possible peace.[7]

The Arica conferences were initiated by Judge Isaac Christiancy, accredited to Peru. He claimed to have read an official dispatch from Chile that had been intercepted by Peruvian soldiers, to the effect that the victorious southern nation was ready for peace. Fearing that Europe might forestall him, he followed the footsteps of Pettis and visited Santiago in August of 1880. Under instructions from home, his colleague there, Thomas Osborn, had been carefully working his way toward preparing Chile for peace. He was now reluctantly forced to introduce another visitor to the foreign office when he knew that the time was not ripe.[8]

War spirit was then at its height in the country. All Antofagasta had been cleared of the Bolivians and Peru had been driven from Tarapacá. Chile held the richest nitrate fields of the world in military occupation, and the demand that conquests be kept was made by all parties in the nation. On the other hand, the allies had not yet been demoralized. There was still determination at Lima and La Paz to recover the lost provinces.

At Santiago Judge Christiancy was informed that the cession of these rich territories would have to be made the basis of peace; but for unexplained reasons the American envoy seemed to understand that Chile

[7] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Evarts to Pettis, September 19, 1879.

[8] *Ibid.*, Osborn to Evarts, September 2, 1880. Osborn writes: "Mr. Christiancy has come and gone. What he could have expected to accomplished here passes my comprehension."

would not insist upon this. Excitement ran high in the nation in regard to the Christiancy mission, and to quiet the war party who had complained more than once that the government was too ready for peace, Foreign Minister Huneeus publicly denied that any mediation had been accepted. This was true, inasmuch as all the conversations had been unofficial. Christiancy, however, wrote to the commander of the Chilean army that was marching toward Lima and asked him to suspend operations since his government had consented to talk peace. His letter found its way to the press and a cabinet crisis at Santiago resulted.[9] Chile nevertheless accepted mediation in October, but entered the conference disgusted at the way negotiations had been conducted.

As Christiancy did not expect Chile to insist upon cession of territory, he obtained the acceptance of Peru without any mention of this demand by its enemy, a body of whose troops had landed meanwhile in northern Peru and made a destructive raid. "We accept the American offer," wrote Foreign Minister Barinaga to Christiancy, "out of deference to the United States, but we feel that the Chilean invasion would justify our refusal."[10] Thus a second belligerent unwillingly agreed to talk peace.

Charles Adams, who succeeded Judge Pettis at La Paz, was questioned as to the steps that would be taken if the negotiators could not reach an agreement. He assured the Bolivians that the United

[9] *Ibid.*, Barinaga to Christiancy, November 22, 1880.
[10] *Ibid.*, Barinaga to Christiancy, September 14, 1880.

States would urge arbitration in that case, and wrote Osborn that he had made such a promise. When he received no answer from Santiago, he assumed that Chile understood this and permitted Bolivia to enter with an expectation that its enemy would be persuaded to arbitrate.

In this atmosphere of distrust and misunderstanding the conferences opened on board an American warship in the port of Arica. Osborn, as chairman, disappointed his colleagues by taking the position that the United States was there merely to act in the rôle of presiding officer and would take no part in the discussions, not even consenting to be arbiter if asked to do so. Chile at once presented the demands for cession of conquered territory; otherwise it refused to consider peace. But the allies would not listen to this, and negotiations proceeded no further. Thus the Arica conference failed because there had been no careful preparation in advance by the representatives of the mediating power. Each one had acted for himself and distrusted his colleague.[11]

Chile had never ceased military operations. In the summer before the futile peace conference was held, Peruvians had been disastrously routed at Tacna, and the port of Arica after long resistance surrendered to

[11] Even after the conference was over, the ministers quarreled about the message to be sent to Washington announcing failure. Osborn refused to wire that Chile had rejected American arbitration. Christiancy hesitated for a time about sending his own cablegram including this statement, and did so only when the Peruvian government agreed to pay for dispatching it.

Chilean armies.[12] The navy of Chile now held undisputed control of the coast and after a six months' blockade, Callao fell on December 6. An expeditionary force under Patricio Lynch then entered Lima early in 1881, Piérola, the president of Peru, having fled to Arequipa. With the conquered nation on the brink of anarchy, Chile turned its attention to establishing a government there which would agree to ceding Tarapacá. Soon one was formed under Francisco García Calderón, who was thought to be in complete understanding with the invaders, and a Congress was allowed to meet at a village near Lima to represent the will of the Peruvian voters.

It was difficult to believe that the new leader was the spontaneous choice of his countrymen, and Christiancy was instructed to determine this before he extended recognition. European countries were waiting for him to take the initiative, but he decided that there was nothing to show that such a step should be made. In the meantime President Garfield had been inaugurated in Washington and a new minister was waiting to come. As Judge Christiancy did not wish the incoming administration to feel that he was reluctant to leave, he suddenly changed his mind. Before even Chile had recognized the new government, he presented his credentials to García Calderón.[13] This act, prompted by such an unusual reason, was

[12] This caused a protest from the Peruvian delegation as to meeting in Arica; but they consented when Chile insisted.

[13] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Christiancy to Blaine, June 28, 1881.

due to involve the United States in the gravest difficulties.

Garfield brought to the Department of State his close friend, James G. Blaine, a man deeply interested in South American affairs. Blaine was concerned with the growth of American trade in the New World and determined to build it up in a way that would rival that of the European powers. As an aid in attaining his goal, he adopted the plan of a sort of union of American republics, which was to be headed by the United States and would preserve peace in all the western hemisphere.[14] Since the problems created by the War of the Pacific stood in his way, his first energies were bent toward their definite solution.

Blaine believed firmly that the New World republics should renounce from the start the European idea of gaining territory by conquest. His instructions to the new ministers who were now sent from Washington to the warring countries in the south were, that all persuasions and influence possible should be brought to bear upon Chile to take money instead of land. He was not certain that Peru could pay an indemnity, in which case he was willing that Chile should retain the nitrate areas, but he was opposed to its attitude as shown at Arica. He also instructed his envoys to let it be known that the United States would not permit intervention from Europe.

The task that a new minister to the South American west coast would have to face was that of per-

[14] James G. Blaine, *The Foreign Policy of the Garfield Administration*, p. 1.

suading a conqueror to abandon his spoils without protest. But if Hayes and Evarts had been unfortunate in their choice of personnel, the situation forced on Blaine was far worse. The last troops of the American army of occupation that had been controlling the conquered southern states of the Union were withdrawn in 1877. This meant that renewed pressure was brought to bear on all Republican executives to take care of the generals now out of employment. Whatever Blaine may have thought of sending military men to handle as intricate a situation as that which now faced him in Peru and Chile, he had little choice in the matter.

Accordingly, Judson Kilpatrick returned to Santiago. He had not handled affairs badly before, but unfortunately he became violently ill as soon as he arrived the second time. For short periods he was able to conduct business, but most of the time, he lay at the point of death. As appropriations for a secretary of the legation had been cancelled by Congress a few years before, his wife was the only one who could help him. He was finally compelled to trust to his close friends in Chile, among whom were members of the Cabinet, to aid him in writing his official correspondence.[15] Kilpatrick died within less than half a year after his arrival, leaving matters in the utmost confusion.

The minister to Peru was General S. A. Hurlbut, who had been with the Federal army in New Orleans.

[15] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Kilpatrick to Blaine, August 30, 1881; Kilpatrick mentions Luís Aldunate as one of the friends.

The conditions at Lima when he arrived were somewhat similar to those he had left in Louisiana, but his position was entirely different. He became a violent partisan of the Peruvian cause and was indignant at the military measures adopted by Patricio Lynch.

García Calderón did not reach an understanding with Chile as he had been expected to do. A secret agreement that he had made when he assumed his high office bound him to assent to the cession of Tarapacá. But the new president was also head of the Compañía Salitrera, which had been given valuable concessions in the nitrate fields by a former government in Peru.[16] He had of course never agreed to permit Chile to cancel contracts made by its conquered enemy and on this point he stood firm.

As soon as he arrived, Hurlbut began a lively correspondence with Patricio Lynch. Interpreting Blaine's instructions according to his pleasure, he informed the Chilean general that his country would not tolerate any cession of territory until Peru was allowed to attempt a payment in money instead. "Such a course would meet with decided disfavor on the part of the United States."[17] He then assured García Calderón that he would never permit Peru to

[16] Department of State Bureau of Archives, Logan to Frelinghuysen, March 8, 1883. Logan writes that Chile understood all of this before Blaine began to be so indignant about the imprisonment of García Calderón. According to Logan, the Peruvian promised his business associates that he would compel Chile to buy them out at a high price.

[17] *Ibid.*, Hurlbut to Blaine, October 26, 1881.

be dismembered and urged him to resist the Chilean demands. The Peruvian needed little urging and negotiations stopped. Lynch seized the treasury of the new government and commanded its president to resign. When García Calderón refused and issued paper money made in the United States, he was arrested and taken to Santiago.

The situation required the finesse and suavity of a Talleyrand, but General Hurlbut pursued his own course regardless of consequences. He wired the government of Buenos Aires to urge it to recognize the new Peruvian executive. He assumed at his personal risk the receivership of a Peruvian railway then under Chilean control, with a view of handing it over eventually to a group of American capitalists. He wrote to Piérola to urge him to combine with García Calderón "against the common enemy." The fugitive complained that his rival should never have been recognized. "García Calderón will not consent to the cession of Tarapacá," Hurlburt replied. "It remains to be seen if Piérola will do likewise."[18]

This convinced all parties that the Garfield administration would fight the Chilean terms. Both Peru and Bolivia were now in extremities and the glittering hope of American intervention suggested so clearly by Hurlbut was their only reason for resisting further the demands of their enemy. In Santiago Kilpatrick assured the government of Chile that Hurlbut was not instructed to act as he did and

[18] *Ibid.*, enclosure in Martinez to Blaine, October 24, 1881.

showed the written directions from Blaine. Hurlbut retorted by charging that Chilean officials censored all of Kilpatrick's dispatches. Again United States ministers were at loggerheads, while Peru remained in chaos clinging to the delusion of active American aid.

Money-making schemes by American and European capitalists added to Blaine's problems. Bolivia suggested an American protectorate, in exchange for which it would turn over all of its industries and revenues to business men from the United States.[19] Old claims whose validity had been denied by all of the governments of Peru were now revived. For example, Jean Cochet, a Frenchman, had discovered the commercial qualities of guano forty odd years before, and one of the ephemeral legislatures of Peru voted him a third share in all of the proceeds from any sales of the product that came to the government. American capitalists, however, had now bought the claim and had computed its interest in a way that would give them financial control of the whole country. Another claim, by Théophile Landreau, also of France, based on the discovery of new guano beds, had mounted likewise to fantastic proportions, and was pressed at this time by Americans. Blaine paid no attention to the Cochet heirs, though their attorney insisted that he had been promised help from both the Secretary and Minister Hurlbut. But instructions were sent to the American representative

[19] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Cabrera to Evarts, February 18, 1881.

to insist on the inclusion of the Landreau claim in any negotiations for peace.[20]

The most serious difficulty was offered by French owners of Peruvian government bonds to whom the nitrates of Tarapacá had been mortgaged. They formed a company, the Crédit Industriel, which had an agreement with Piérola to handle the exclusive sale of all the nitrates and guano mined in any province of Peru. As Blaine stood so firmly against European intervention, they now appealed to him for an American protectorate. He rejected their plan, but was embarrassed by the fact that Levi P. Morton, his minister at Paris, headed a concern that was to act as selling agent for the Crédit Industriel in the United States.[21]

Such were the complications that Blaine faced with the impulsive Hurlbut and the dying Kilpatrick to help him. He determined now to take the aggressive step of sending a special mission to undertake the task of mediation, and chose as its head William Henry Trescot. This envoy was to insist that cession of territory was not to be made the basis of a treaty.

[20] *House Reports,* 47th Congress, 1st session, VI. xii. Blaine said that the reason he pressed his claim was that the House of Representatives had adopted a resolution instructing him to do so. But the Senate reported adversely on the same resolution on the ground that it lay in the executive sphere. France had always refused to make it a diplomatic matter.

[21] *Ibid.,* p. xxi. At the congressional investigation of these acts, Blaine and Hurlbut were completely exonerated of any participation in the schemes of American capitalists, but a doubt was expressed as to the wisdom of Hurlbut's enthusiasm for the Peruvian cause. Morton was cleared of blame for any unlawful acts, but reproved for having connections with the firm while he was a minister to France.

He was also to threaten a rupture of diplomatic relations with Chile if it did not give satisfactory reasons for the arrest of García Calderón, which Blaine considered an affront to his country. Trescot's third duty was to issue invitations for a meeting at Washington that would found the union of American republics. Each one of these items was to meet strenuous resistance from Chile.

But an unforseen and unhappy incident in Washington saved the victorious southern republic. Garfield was assassinated and Chester A. Arthur succeeded him in the White House. Blaine's retirement followed shortly. To the Department of State came Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, who saw no reason for involving the United States in a dispute that did not directly concern it. Trescot was at Panama when the cablegram reached him announcing the retirement of Blaine. When he arrived at Santiago, he received letters directing him to defer any invitation to an international conference and to omit from the list of his duties the protest about García Calderón. Trescot had to deal with a new administration in Chile also. It followed the general policy of its predecessor, but brought to the foreign office José M. Balmaceda, one of Chile's most gifted statesmen.

Two unfortunate occurrences prevented the American commissioner from fulfilling even his limited duty of persuading Chile to make peace without annexations. In the first place Kilpatrick had died, as noted above. His last dispatches stated that he had been given assurances by both the outgoing and the

new administration that Chile would no longer insist on a cession of Tarapacá. Balmaceda and members of the former cabinet now denied that any such promise had been made. They told Trescot that Kilpatrick's physical condition must have led him into delusions. These dispatches had been the chief reason why Trescot hoped for success. Chile was as resolute as ever and now demanded Tacna and Arica also.

Trescot was further embarrassed by happenings in Washington. The United States Congress had demanded all of the correspondence to date that dealt with the War of the Pacific. It was then made a matter of public record at Washington. It gave the written testimony of Hurlbut's indiscretions; it showed the confidential letters from American ministers to Peru and Bolivia under both Evarts and Blaine, in which annexation to the United States was recommended for both countries; it laid bare the schemes of American capitalists and the instructions to press the Landreau claim; it showed how Blaine had adopted a policy of aggressive action which Frelinghuysen had abandoned.

All of this was duly cabled to Balmaceda from the Chilean legation in Washington, and he knew more about the new American policy than Trescot did himself. The unfortunate American commissioner was at the mercy of the clever Chilean, who revealed his knowledge of the published records as suited his convenience. Trescot worked for five months against all these odds, and left for home in the spring of 1882 without accomplishing anything.

It was Frelinghuysen's turn now to make peace. The general attitude of the new administration was expressed in Arthur's message to Congress of December 1882:

"A special mission was sent to express the hope that Chile would accept a money indemnity and relinquish her demand for territory. This recommendation, which Chile declined to follow, this government has not assumed to enforce; nor can it be enforced without resort to measures which would be in keeping neither with the temper of our people nor with the spirit of our institutions. The power of Peru no longer extends over its whole territory, and in the event of our interference to dictate peace would need to be supplemented by the armies and navies of the United States."[22]

The Peruvians saw that American intervention was not to be expected. Now that it was evident that Arthur would not use force, they suggested to Chile that France be invited to mediate, an offer that Chile flatly rejected.[23] "The passing of Blaine means the dawning of a new era," wrote Chilean minister Martínez from Washington.

Frelinghuysen thereupon sent Major Logan to Santiago, a man who had been there before and had been in Latin-American diplomacy for several years. His military envoy to Peru, however, General Partridge, was as inexperienced as Hurlbut. The latter

[22] *Congressional Record,* 47th Congress, 2nd session, p. 7.

[23] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Logan to Frelinghuysen, February 1, 1883. Dreyfus Brothers, of Paris, had taken over a greater part of the Peruvian bonds for which mineral wealth was mortgaged. Their attorney, Jules Grévy, had become president of France, and Chile was afraid that he was planning forcible intervention. Piérola was in France at the time also and was plotting a return to Peru.

had died suddenly of heart-failure as he was leaving for home to attend a Congressional investigation of his acts. His last blunder was a public proclamation to "The Notables of Lima" declaring that the United States opposed any dismemberment of Peru. "Union, under whomsoever may be elected, will destroy the pretext of Chile that she cannot make peace because of disorder in Peru; and it will give to the United States an advantage which they require and of which they will know how to take advantage."[24]

Partridge soon had to be recalled. The García Calderón government, which was still recognized by the United States as the legitimate one in Peru, was being conducted by Lizardo Montero, its vice-president. As the health of the new minister was uncertain, he refused to follow Montero to the village of Huaráz and remained at Lima where no government existed. While Logan was trying to make García Calderón himself agree to the Chilean terms of peace, Partridge wrote to the Peruvian captive to reject all mediation and deal directly with Chile. At last he recognized Montero and astonished Frelinghuysen by calling a meeting of the diplomatic corps, at which a proclamation was issued demanding an immediate peace.

Chile was well content to let matters rest as they were. Its military expenses were being paid by customs receipts and by levies on the wealthy citizens of Lima; the cessation of Peruvian trade had stopped

[24] *Ibid.*, enclosure in Trescot to Blaine, December 12, 1881.

all competition with Chilean flour, which had reached higher prices than it had ever known before.[25]

All of this made Logan's work difficult. The United States was reconciled to the cession of Tarapacá by this time, and was trying to persuade Chile to buy Tacna and Arica, instead of seizing the territory outright. An arrangement to this effect was made at one time, but García Calderón's Congress in session at odd intervals rejected it. Logan wrote to Montero begging him to accept. "The United States paid Mexico fifteen million dollars for an area far more profitable than this for which Chile offers ten," he argued.[26] The analogy thus given to a former action of the United States was a shock to Peru. "Logan acts as an agent of Chile," its minister complained at Washington.

Chile was persuaded to deal once more with the captive García Calderón. Logan was allowed to take him outside the country on parole so that he might confer with his Peruvian associates. Ten different propositions suggested by the American minister were rejected by one or the other of the parties involved. García Galderón insisted that Chile should assume all Peruvian debts in Tarapacá. As he grew less amenable, Chile turned to the idea of seizing Tacna and Arica without any payment at all.

Bolivia was ready to make a separate peace and give up Antofagasta. But Adams and Massey, the

[25] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Logan to Frelinghuysen, November 6, 1882.

[26] *Ibid.*, enclosure in Logan to Frelinghuysen, December 12, 1883.

American ministers, had persuaded it not to do this while a hope of intervention from their country lasted. Then Montero visited La Paz and the old alliance with Peru was confirmed. It was understood that Bolivia's price was the cession to it of Tacna and Arica.[27] Peace seemed far away during the spring of 1883.

Then in the autumn of the same year a new government in chaotic Peru suddenly gathered momentum when General Iglesias marched into Lima. It was quickly seen that his campaign was backed by Chilean soldiers and that the conquerors had at last found a man who would agree to all their terms. On October 20, 1883, he signed the treaty of Ancón with representatives of Chile. In it Bolivia was ignored entirely. Tarapacá was ceded outright. Tacna and Arica were to be held by Chile for ten years. Upon the expiration of this period a vote should be taken by the inhabitants to decide which should possess the provinces permanently; and it was stipulated also that the victor should pay ten million pesos to the loser for the territory thus acquired. This is the clause that has yet to be fulfilled, because the plebiscite was not held in 1893 as specified. The first official suggestion of a vote by the inhabitants came from Logan, who had tried to induce García Calderón to consent to a similar arrangement. According to the American envoy, he had been prompted to offer it by Luís Aldunate, the foreign minister who succeeded Balmaceda.[28] Aldunate did not deny this

[27] *Ibid.*, Logan to Frelinghuysen, December 27, 1882.
[28] *Ibid.*, enclosure in Logan to Frelinghuysen, Sept. 29, 1882.

and the troublesome clause possibly originated with the Chilean statesman. The United States, however, played its important share in the part of the treaty that kept one phase of South American politics in a turmoil for so many years. Beyond this, however, the United States did not participate in the treaty of peace, for the northern republic still upheld García Calderón. Logan even induced Chile to permit the captive to sign the pact, but the stubborn Peruvian refused.[29] Peace had come without any American participation.

The clause dealing with European bondholders was ratified in the face of objections from the United States. It provided that Chile should distribute to these creditors fifty per cent of the proceeds that would accrue from the sale of a million tons of guano. Some of them were satisfied but others objected. Frelinghuysen feared it might mean European intervention. But his earnest protests were of no avail. "The treaty was eventually concluded," he wrote to Roustan, the French minister to Washington, "in terms at variance with those which the United States had amicably counselled."[30]

So ended a period of blundering and meddling on the part of American diplomacy. The United States

[29] This was in the summer of 1883, when Chile first made attempts at peace with Iglesias and a protocol was reported to have been drafted. Logan tried from then on to persuade his government to recognize Iglesias and leave García Calderón. In the final peace treaty, Chile would not even consider García Calderón.

[30] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Frelinghuysen to Roustan, April 17, 1884.

had prevented any European mediation, but had been unable to bring about peace during four years of misery for Bolivia and Peru. Chile defied the wishes of the northern republic at every turn, while Peru had been induced to hold out until Tacna and Arica as well as Tarapacá were probably lost. The United States shouldered a responsibility in the War of the Pacific which it seemed unable to handle. This was a poor beginning for a Pan-American understanding wherein headship would be conceded to the powerful republic of the north.

Chapter IX

LIBERALISM TO THE FORE

While Chile was fighting its way into the ranks of the stronger South American nations, a change was slowly taking place in its internal politics that ended in the triumph of the Liberal parties by the time that the Treaty of Ancón was signed. This did not mean any radical transformation in the government. Though it involved a certain extension of the suffrage, the wealthy landed gentry still directed the policies of the country; even the same families continued to hold high positions. Liberalism was as vague a word in the political history of Chile as it is in that of most countries. But one definite sign of its victory was the growth of religious toleration. This was particularly important for the Protestants in the country, and in that way the domestic political contest was closely associated with the interests of British and American residents.

The Conservative party that won the battle of Lircai in 1830 inaugurated a policy of repression that in ten years put an end to all political opposition. The strong position of the Catholic clergy in its councils was to be seen in Article 5 of the Constitution of 1833, that declared Roman Catholicism the state religion and forbade the public worship of any other.[1] Clerical influence in the government re-

[1] *Constitución política de la República de Chile*, p. 9.

mained undisputed through the administrations of Prieto and Bulnes, a period of twenty years.

This did not mean an oppression of Protestants, however. A certain measure of toleration was always allowed. It was never understood that the religious clauses of the constitution forbade private chapels, and one was established by the Anglican church in Valparaiso in 1837. "It was not allowed to have a steeple," writes one American observer of a later date, "but it could easily be recognized as a church."[2] Protestant schools were also unmolested and a few existed in the chief cities. By a law of 1834 non-Catholics were permitted to bequeath property to their heirs. Ten years later another measure was passed by Congress making marriages legitimate between parties that did not belong to the state church. This assured Protestant children all civil rights, provided that their birth was registered with the parish priest.

One great source of injustice that remained was the consecrated cemetery. Protestant burial grounds, it will be remembered, had been provided for by O'Higgins, and a right to have them upheld in the commercial treaties with England and the United States. But only in Valparaiso were there enough dissenters from the Catholic faith to support such private cemeteries. No person who died outside the Catholic church in Santiago could be interred there, as the few Protestants in the city could not muster enough funds for a burying-ground of their own.

[2] Mrs. G. B. Merwin, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

The hardship that such situations imposed on British and American residents was brought to public attention in 1853 when a baby two months old, child of Captain Nat Burgess, of the United States Navy, died in Talcahuano. Because it had not been baptized, it had to be buried at sea. The curate of the township declared that the body could have been disinterred at any time if the parents had insisted on a burial on land, as it was no better than the carcass of a dog.[3]

Another source of vexation was the attitude taken by state as well as church toward the intermarriage of Protestants and Catholics. Children of such unions were regarded as illegitimate, even if the marriage took place in foreign legations belonging to Protestant countries. American ministers had often protested at the inclusion of their own homes in this ban and had tried in vain to reach an agreement with the Chilean government about it. The matter did not become a serious bone of contention, however, until Seth Barton was sent to Santiago by the administration of James K. Polk.

Barton became infatuated with Isabel Astaburuaga, who belonged to one of the richest and oldest families of the Santiago aristocracy. A chance meeting one morning in one of the parks of the Chilean capital was soon followed by a formal introduction arranged through the young friends of the señorita, who were delighted by such an unexpected romance. Soon the couple announced their engagement over

[3] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Peyton to Clayton, August 30, 1853.

the strong protest of the Astaburuaga family.[4] At first it seemed that a dispensation might be granted by the Catholic church since Barton, though a Protestant, expressed his willingness to permit all children born to them to be confirmed in the Catholic faith. But the archbishop of Santiago doubted the sincerity of such promises and hesitated to give his consent.

While prospects for the wedding were thus placed in doubt, reports reached Chile from the United States that the American minister had been divorced shortly before his departure from his home. Señorita Astaburuaga had been told of this by Barton at the time of the engagement and one morning related the story of the divorce while confessing her sins to the archbishop. As society circles began to discuss this new development, Barton's temper, which he had controlled so far, overcame him, and he accused the archbishop publicly of violating the secrets of the confessional.[5] His language became more extravagant and intemperate when that prelate insisted that three witnesses would have to testify that Barton was legally free to marry according to the laws of the United States. The American took this to be an insult to his honesty and also a slur on his country; his credentials from the Department of State, he held, were sufficient evidence that he would tell the truth.[6]

[4] Antonio Iñíquez Vicuña, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-242.

[5] Rumors of the divorce were already abroad, so that it is doubtful whether Barton's charges were well founded.

[6] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Barton to Clayton, April 18, 1849.

This introduced an international feature to the case that was now becoming a scandal. Abusive letters were interchanged between the archbishop and the American minister. Coming at the time that the *Macedonian* dispute was at its worst, the situation was too much for Foreign Minister Manuel Vial to handle. Failing to receive any dispensation, the couple were finally married in the American legation by a chaplain of the United States Navy, whose warship was stationed at Valparaiso. Vial was further embarrassed by receiving an invitation to the wedding which included the entire cabinet. He tried to compromise by declining for the cabinet but making an informal call with his wife during the reception.[7] This only made matters worse and Barton foolishly demanded a public explanation of his conduct.

Mrs. Barton now moved to the American legation with her younger sister and defied all protests of her relatives. A month and a half after the wedding, she received a letter from the archbishop beseeching her to leave a man to whom she was not wedded according to the rites of the Catholic church, and to return to her faith and repent. She handed this letter to her husband, who became more excited than ever and again gave the matter an international aspect by demanding that "Rafael Valentin, so-called archbishop of Santiago," be brought to trial for insulting the wife of an American minister. He was told that the government of Chile had no authority over a church dignitary in the exercise of his spiritual func-

[7] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Barton to Clayton, April 18, 1849.

tions. Barton particularly resented the fact that the government's reply took occasion to praise the moderation of the churchman. "He wrote my wife that he who worships God under a belief he knows to be false sacrilegiously scoffs at divinity," he replied to Vial. "He thus accuses the whole American nation of hypocrisy, this Jesuitical reprobate. Sir, commendations such as you write of this man are offensive to me; and in the future I shall expect that they be not repeated."[8]

Chile instantly demanded Barton's recall at Washington, declaring that he had violated all the courtesies of diplomatic usage. "There is as great a distance between noble energy and insolence as there is between vulgarity and circumspect dignity," Minister Carvallo wrote to Secretary Clayton in conveying this request of his government. "As in all Catholic countries," he continued, "the holy institution of matrimony has not been degraded in Chile to the extreme of allowing it to be easier to obtain a divorce and ruin a family than to effect the abrogation of a contract for rent."[9]

Clayton was disposed to uphold his excitable countryman. "The very difference in national customs to which you refer," he replied to Carvallo, "makes Mr. Barton's behavior accountable. The Archbishop

[8] *Ibid.*, Barton to Clayton, April 26, 1849.

[9] *Ibid.*, Carvallo to Clayton, July 20, 1849; Barros Arana claims that James Buchanan had told Carvallo confidentially in 1848 that Barton was too close to President Polk for anything to be done in the matter. Clayton was Secretary of State under Zachary Taylor, who succeeded Polk. Cf. Barros Arana, *Un decenio de la historia de la República de Chile,* II. 564.

may have acted from conscientious motives but so did Barton, viewed from his antecedents." The State Department expressed regret, however, at any violation of diplomatic courtesy. It was spared making a recall by the decision of the American minister to close the legation on his own account. He had failed to arrange for a visit from Captain Shubrick of the United States Navy with his crew, which he had counted on to overawe the Chileans. Fearing that the church planned to kidnap his wife, he left for the United States.[10]

The Barton affair occurred in the last years of the Bulnes administration and did not help the position of Americans in Chile. Manuel Montt, who became president in 1851, was quite favorable to the British, who were also Protestants. Though he was elected by the party that still included clerical factions, he believed in the extension of foreign investments such as the British could supply. He ran counter to the Catholic church when he asked all Jesuit teachers to resign from the National Institute. Shortly afterwards the Supreme Court upheld the appeal of two canons who were suspended from their offices by the Archbishop of Santiago. The prelate refused to recognize the decision and left the country in order to escape banishment. Thus Montt lost the support of the Catholic hierarchy, and for the first time the powerful Conservative party was split.[11]

[10] Isabel Astaburuaga Barton died of cholera in New Orleans in less than a year after she came to the United States. Her younger sister was then cared for by the Chilean legation and sent home in a short while.

[11] Barros Arana, *op. cit.*, I. 318.

The effects of the rupture were seen in the withdrawal of the Varas candidacy after the revolution of 1859. Montt had formed a personal following called the "National Party" and was still strong enough to push to success the candidacy of Joaquín Pérez in 1861. But the clericals united with their old Liberal opponents who returned to the country when Pérez showed that he was more tolerant than Montt. The new coalition won the congressional elections of 1864, and the Liberals controlled the national legislature for the first time. At once the whole question of religious toleration was raised.

The church party found that its withdrawal from the ranks of its former political associates had so weakened it that it would never be able to control Chile again. It retained the name Conservative, but, had to unite with the factions that would promise it the most favors. Finding that it was impossible to retain Article 5 of the constitution without some modification, it skilfully arranged a compromise. The Liberals wanted to erase the whole clause; the Nationals, to leave only the first part that guaranteed a state religion. The clericals succeeded in passing merely an interpretation to the effect that the clause did not forbid private chapels and schools for dissenters. This was simply confirming a condition that already existed. It was a signal victory for Manuel Tocornal, the able Conservative leader.[12] Burial laws and bans on intermarriage remained intact.

[12] In his speech in the Chamber of Deputies on August 1, Manuel Tocornal admitted that Protestants might be annoyed by existing laws. "All I have to say," he concluded, "is that Chile does not need teachers that teach her how to doubt."

But the fight had only started. The Pope became involved when the government of Chile awoke to the fact that one of its penal laws was being violated consistently by high church dignitaries. They had been forbidden to proclaim any bull or decree of the Vatican before it was first sanctioned by the government. They had done so with impunity for years, though the law provided for heavy fines and imprisonment. When it was found that the Liberals intended to enforce such a code, the clericals introduced an amendment that would exempt decrees dealing only with spiritual matters.

The question involved was fairly trivial but it was taken as a test of strength. For the more important laws that would remedy burial and marriage conditions were soon to be brought up, and according to Chilean law either house could reject a measure of the other by a two-thirds vote.[13] The position of the new president, Federico Errázuriz, was also in doubt. He had been elected by a Conservative combination with some of the Liberal factions and was also a relative of the Archbishop of Santiago. Before the question was brought to a vote, a decree of the archbishop excommunicated all who by word or act worked against the Holy Catholic Church. The wives of the legislators took alarm and brought all manner of pressure to bear in favor of the clerical amendment. The archbishop in his robes waited outside the legislative building to hear the results. The amendment was twice passed in the Senate and voted

[13] *Constitución política de la República de Chile*, p. 28.

down in the Chamber; the houses were deadlocked on all further religious questions.[14] Errázuriz nevertheless favored even more toleration. Both he and Aníbal Pinto, the minister whom he wished to succeed him, were excommunicated for their political views.

Another result of the new Liberal success had been a constitutional amendment that no president could hold office for more than one term. Beginning with Joaquín Pérez, no president had been reëlected, as had been the case heretofore with all the former Conservatives who had held the office. Yet the patronage power of the executive gave him control over coming elections.[15] Errázuriz followed in the footsteps of Prieto, Bulnes, and Montt.

The president became an avowed Liberal before his term expired and his influence established beyond dispute the ascendancy of the party of that name. It now split into several factions, however, and Chilean politics drifted from the two-party system of England and the United States to the confusion that characterized Italy and France. Every candidate for the election of 1876 was tagged "Liberal," but rivalry was as bitter as it had ever been. Finding much opposition to Pinto, Errázuriz originated the party nominating convention. Chile had never had one before and Errázuriz organized it after the American model,

[14] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Logan to Fish, November 2, 1874.

[15] The president appointed the municipal officers who in turn prepared the list for qualified voters.

as outlined to him by Minister Logan.[16] The convention succeeded in eliminating one of Pinto's opponents, Miguel Luís Amunátegui, but Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna refused to attend. The clericals attached themselves to the latter, and once more two candidates held the field.

Errázuriz won and Pinto accordingly became president during the strenuous years of the War of the Pacific. The opposition, still actively supported by the Conservatives, became the extreme war party that refused to consent to giving up any conquests and criticized Pinto for wishing to make peace at Arica in 1880. When the time came in 1881 for another presidential election, it turned to General Baquedano, hero of the campaigns in Antofagasta, Tarapacá, and Tacna. But again the government Liberals won. Domingo Santa María, the most radical man yet to be president, was inaugurated shortly after the Chilean army entered Lima.

The new executive soon showed after peace came again to his country that he was heartily in favor of religious reform. When the Pope opposed the appointee of the government for the archbishopric of Santiago, Santa María expelled the apostolic delegate. He next demanded that cemetery and marriage laws be considered by the Congress. Errázuriz in 1871 had by executive decree set aside parts of every public cemetery for Protestants. Under the urging of Santa María, Congress now declared all Catholic

[16] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Logan to Fish, September 9, 1875.

cemeteries state property. When many rich parishioners reclaimed in their own name the land which they had given their church for interring its dead, all private burial grounds were closed.[17] Turning next to marriage laws, the Congress decreed that the civil ceremony would be required to make any union legitimate, while couples might dispense with the religious function if they so desired.

At each new development the clericals grew more frantic. Presbyterians in 1873 and Methodists in 1879 had started mission work and were growing in numbers, particularly among the poor in the cities. The Catholic church now excommunicated all who might submit to the civil marriage laws and forbade its members to bury their dead in any of the state cemeteries. During the latter part of the Santa María administration, many scandals resulted from police interference with secret burials by night in the closed private grounds.[18]

Santa María was a stronger executive than Chile had possessed for twenty years. The bitterness that he aroused among devout Catholics was serious enough, but he added fuel to the flames when he openly advocated the candidacy of his minister, José M. Balmaceda, to succeed him. According to Walker Martínez, the Conservative leader, liberalism in Chile had come to mean only skepticism in religion and Caesarism in politics.[19] The election of

[17] Carlos Walker Martínez, *Historia de la administración Santa María*, p. 197.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 197-225.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

1886 was close and the rivalry so keen that it looked as if revolution might again follow in its wake. But the victory of Balmaceda was accepted by his opponents and Chile once more showed its ability for peaceful self-government.

The new president had begun his political career as an ardent advocate of the rights of the Church, opposing the first movements for toleration in 1865.[20] But by the time he entered the Santa María cabinet, he had changed radically. As Minister of the Interior he was responsible for the odious cemetery laws. In his first message to the Congress he asked for complete separation of church and state. Cabinet crises caused him to withdraw this measure, however, and in return the Church reconsecrated the cemeteries and recognized the civil marriage laws.[21]

Thus, although Balmaceda had been hated by the churchmen more than any of the Santa María ministry, his presidency seemed for a while to have brought about a better feeling in the country. But taxes on exports of the newly acquired northern provinces were making the government wealthy. All of the Liberal politicians felt that they should have a share in the new prosperity. Balmaceda found himself at the head of an unwieldy party that was clamoring for spoils. He spent money lavishly on public improvements and worked consistently for more

[20] Carlos Walker Martínez, *Historia de la administración Santa María,* p. 238.

[21] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Roberts to Bayard, May 3, 1888.

primary and secondary schools through the country. But he could not hold the Liberals together.

Toward the close of his administration the president showed that he was as firm a believer in the power of the executive as Santa María had been. He wished to have his cabinet independent of the approval of the Congress; he stood for an extensive broadening of the suffrage by lowering the property qualifications for voters; and he urged the increase of local self-government. According to the view of leaders in the Congress who did not belong to his particular branch of the Liberal party, the president was trying to found a federal union with the national legislature reduced to impotence.

As usual the crucial test was the next presidential election. True to custom, Balmaceda backed an official candidate, Enrique Sanfuentes, whom he made head of a cabinet chosen while Congress was not in session. The legislature that met in June, 1890 censured this ministry and forced Balmaceda to choose a candidate more non-partisan in character. The president then declared publicly that he had withdrawn from all participation in the coming election. But his opponents did not believe him and withheld the appropriations for the coming year. The special session called in October to consider money matters proceeded immediately to impeach the old ministry. In disgust Balmaceda adjourned the session and raised taxes by executive decree.

He had tried to compromise by working with ministries that were taken from all the Liberal factions;

he had called conventions to unite the party behind him;[22] but the congressional majority would have nothing to do with him. He now chose a cabinet exclusively from his friends, and the leaders in the Congress resorted to revolution in January, 1891. It was the first serious outbreak since 1859, and was to develop into a civil warfare such as the country had not known since Lircai. Balmaceda had gone too far, and Chile again rebelled against efforts of a president to determine the choice of a successor.

[22] Proclamation of Balmaceda, January 1, 1891, in letter of Egan to Blaine, February 3, 1891.

Chapter X

AT LOGGERHEADS WITH THE COLOSSUS

The Chile that was in the throes of revolution again after thirty years of internal peace differed materially from the nation that had become restive in 1859 under the iron hand of Manuel Montt. A tremendous change had taken place in the north where the mining region lay. Chilean wealth no longer depended on a dubious market for wheat and other products of the soil in the central section. Export taxes on the abundant nitrates seized from Bolivia and Peru filled the coffers of the nation. Its rich men, even though they retained their estates around Santiago, were investors in the northern mines. The center of wealth in the nation had shifted to the north.

England still dominated the Chilean market. The promise of better business conditions in the nitrate fields when the progressive Chileans extended their administration there was not lost on the British investor, and as usual he was first in the field after the War of the Pacific. He was now compelled to watch a new competitor, however. Germans were forming colonies in southern Chile, were receiving strong backing from their government for banking and trading enterprises, and were threatening the monopolies that Great Britain had held.

American business had made no further progress in the country. All of Blaine's plans for increasing

the export trade of the United States had gone awry with the failure of his mediation in 1881. Now, in 1889, this same American statesman who was so anxious to make his country a rival of the European nations on the west coast of South America was brought back to the head of the State Department, and once more he was faced by a condition of war in the region where he wanted to push American commerce. The choice of a minister was again an important factor in his chances for success.

Blaine was no longer hampered by war veterans seeking diplomatic posts, but the Irish vote in doubtful eastern states was being courted assiduously by his party, and it may well have been a deciding factor in his choice of Patrick Egan for the Santiago post. Egan had only recently arrived in the United States and had brought with him the traditional Irish hatred of all things British.[1] This he carried with him to Chile, where he made many enemies among the English residents. He also committed the fatal mistake of so many of his predecessors by becoming a partisan in Chile's internal quarrels.

He was attracted by Balmaceda's proclamation on New Year's Day of 1891, which asserted that the parliamentary system was incompatible with republican ideas. This seemed to him a contest between American and British ideas of government and he became interested forthwith in the president's cause.

[1] E. L. Godkin, "Our Treatment of Chile," in *The Nation* (October 29, 1891). In many of Egan's dispatches he complained of the abuse heaped upon him by English residents.

Balmaceda quickly caught this sympathy from an American minister and took especial care to show his favor for the United States. "From references to the archives," Egan wrote to Blaine in the winter of 1891, "I perceive that the present good feeling on the part of the government toward United States citizens and United States interests presents a very agreeable contrast to that shown in 1851 and 1859."[2]

It did seem at that time that the attitude of Egan was precisely the proper one to turn Chile away from European influence and toward the United States. Balmaceda had the situation well in hand. The navy went over to the revolutionary cause, but the army remained loyal to the president. In March a naval bombardment of Iquique in Tarapacá was followed by its occupation by the Congressional forces, who made the port their government headquarters and then confiscated the revenues of the nitrate regions.

But central and southern Chile remained under the control of Balmaceda throughout the spring. Although a revolutionary junta stayed the whole time in Santiago, and so many of the prominent families sympathized with its cause that it was never unearthed by the police, it accomplished little. In March the national convention of the Liberal party, now purged of all opponents to the chief executive, nominated Claudio Vicuña for president. The congressional leaders in Iquique could make no progress and the cause of the revolution seemed a lost one.

[2] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Egan to Blaine, February 13, 1891.

The Germans and the English were openly against Balmaceda. His decrees closing the ports of northern Chile aroused loud protests from these two groups of foreigners, and they definantly disobeyed his orders. A German squadron of four cruisers and one ironclad left China for Chile in January to uphold the rights of its merchants to leave the closed ports with their goods. And England threatened to take the same procedure. Managers of British nitrate plants in Tarapacá promised workingmen two dollars a day as long as they served in the Congressional army, and threatened to discharge them if they did not. British firms also contributed liberally to the congressional cause. John Thomas North, the "nitrate king," was reported to have given a hundred thousand pounds.[3] "The hostile spirit of England and Germany must show every Chilean patriot that he should cultivate close commercial relations with the United States," exultantly wrote Egan.

As the months passed, Balmaceda was cleverly drawing American prestige to his cause, until the whole country accepted it as a fact that the United States was siding with the executive. Any complaints from Egan were satisfied promptly at the foreign office. The American consul at Valparaiso reported in amazement the uniform courtesy of all local officials in fulfilling his requests.

In April offers of mediation by England and Germany were accepted by the Congressional party and the same proposal from the American, French, and

[3] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Egan to Blaine, March 17, 1891.

Brazilian ministers was made to Balmaceda. The president refused to consider the British and German offer, but agreed to the other if the United States took the lead. A deputation of nine men came from Iquique under guarantee of safe-conduct to Santiago and parleys were opened under American auspices. But Balmaceda blocked negotiations from the beginning by refusing to submit terms. His position could not allow him, he said, to do more than listen to proposals from the other side. The revolutionists demanded the repeal of all decrees issued since New Year's Day and a general amnesty that would include the restoration of civil service positions to all who rebelled. If this were acceded to, the Congressional leaders would lay down their arms and return to continue the session adjourned in the autumn. These stipulations the president declared impossible of acceptance, and mediation failed.

Still Egan hoped for a truce, and through Rear Admiral McCann, then stationed in Iquique harbor, he tried to sound the Congressional government as to its ideas on the matter. Unfortunately he wrote McCann that the Balmaceda régime could not be disturbed and intimated that the cause of the revolution was hopeless. "Unused to diplomacy," as McCann confessed later, the admiral showed the letter when talking to Isidoro Errázuriz at Iquique headquarters.[4] Egan's attempt went for naught, but the revolutionists were further convinced that the American minister was hostile because he expected them to lose.

[4] *Ibid.*, Egan to Blaine, June 27, 1891.

Being sadly in need of munitions, the Congressional party sent Ricardo Trumbull to the United States to buy rifles. To a protest from Balmaceda's minister in Washington against this mission, Blaine replied that shipment of munitions was not contrary to the neutrality laws of the United States. But since there was uncertainty as to the status of the Congressional emissary, Trumbull shipped his purchases secretly across the continent to San Francisco from New York. The guns were then loaded on an American ship, the *Robert and Minnie,* which had been chartered by him, and which at once set sail for the Catalina Islands.

The steamer *Itata* was at that time in San Diego, gathering provisions before it started back to Chile in the service of the Congressional forces. It had come to the United States to receive the rifles and had on board a number of Chilean soldiers. But at San Diego it had removed its cannon and handed to customs officials a false manifest. Suspicious of its intent, the Federal authorities placed a United States marshal on board to detain it.[5] Then it suddenly departed for the Catalina Islands, taking along the American official, whom it dropped at a point on the coast. In due time, having received the arms, it set out for Chile.

Whether its action in loading the rifles from the other ship constituted a violation of the neutrality laws was a debatable question, but two warships

[5] *Minutes of the United States and Chilean Claims Commission,* 1901, p. 214.

from the United States were detailed to follow the *Itata*. They were told to avoid trouble if the boat were met by a vessel from the Chilean navy. The *Itata* reached Iquique without trouble, where a protest from Washington had preceded it. The Congressional leaders were not minded to make an open break with the northern republic, and Errázuriz promised that the ship would at once be put in the custody of the United States navy. It could not be asserted, however, that the *Itata* had broken any law until a trial had been held in California. Errázuriz agreed without contest that the vessel and its officers be taken back there, but urgently requested that the five thousand rifles so badly needed might be left with Admiral McCann until the case was decided.[6] The decision of Blaine that the guns must be returned with the ship confirmed the opinion in Congressionalist circles that the United States favored Balmaceda.

Other incidents heightened the resentment of the revolutionary party. The cable line of the Central and South American Telegraph Company, an American concern, extended from Galveston to Valparaiso. Its operation on the southern end below Iquique was now stopped by the authorities in control there. Balmaceda was supplied with all news from the outside world by a British line running across the Andes. The American company was prevented from laying a rival telegraph connection to Buenos Aires because

[6] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Errázuriz to Blaine, June 5, 1891.

so many Chileans owned stock in the British line. Through Egan's efforts, however, Balmaceda consented to pay for a connection between Callao and Valparaiso made in the open seas that would avoid touching at Iquique. When this was done, it was taken as another open effort to further the success of the president.

Finally, news was brought to Valparaiso early one August morning by Rear Admiral George Brown on the American warship *San Francisco,* that the Congressionalists had effected a landing at Quinteros. It was the beginning of a new campaign conducted by the revolutionaries after they had received munitions from Germany. The news was important for Balmaceda's army, since they did not know whether the landing was actually to be made or if the movement was a feint. Valparaiso newsboys sold papers that day calling, "News of the fleet brought by the *San Francisco.*" *La Gaceta Comercial,* the Balmaceda organ in the city, stated that all knowledge of the new naval movements had come from Admiral Brown. This officer protested that his visit had been one for his own information and that the news of the landing reached the city before he returned.[7] But whatever his share in the matter had been, he was accused from that time of being a Balmaceda spy. Though Admiral Brown's account of the incident may be accepted without reservation, the Balmacedists do not appear to have been specially desirous to preserve the reputation of the United States as a neutral.

[7] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Brown to Egan, enclosed in Egan to Blaine, September 17, 1891.

This was eight days before the war unexpectedly closed. The new rifles from Germany were superior to any guns that the president's army possessed, and they quickly decided the issue. Officers and their brigades deserted Balmaceda daily. Finally, at Placillas, on the 28th of August, a decisive victory was won by the Congressional forces. The way to the capital was opened to them. Rioting and looting reigned all afternoon there as the victorious army approached. Balmaceda took refuge in the Argentine legation, for he knew that further resistance was useless. Believing that it would be a confession of guilt to flee or to submit to a trial by his foes, he committed suicide in his place of refuge on the 19th of September. Thus the most serious civil strife that Chile had known came to a close in less than nine months.

It was an unhappy turn of affairs for the American minister. The United States had again chosen the losing side. A provisional government established under Jorge Montt took the position that there was no quarrel with the northern republic over past incidents; but the masses who seemed to be heartily in favor of the victors recalled the *Itata* and Quinteros incidents with bitterness. In addition, Egan was embarrassed by the presence of some eighty Balmacedist refugees in the legation.

Claudio Vicuña, who was to have been inaugurated in September, escaped the country on an American warship with other high officials among the Balmacedist ranks. The demand that they be put off

the vessel and given over to the police was refused by Egan. He now took the same position in regard to the men who were still in his home at Santiago. At great expense, he housed and fed them all, and worked to obtain safe-conducts for them from the new government of their enemies.

Egan was not backed by precedent in his contentions, for in the revolutions against Manuel Montt American officials had twice been ordered from Washington to release refugees who had come to them. Secretary Lewis Cass had written on one occasion, however, that the attitude taken by Chile toward other nations in the same matter would determine his own decision. Blaine assumed the same view, and received the information from Egan that all the legations had welcomed refugees except the British. Even the British minister had found two hiding in his home without his knowledge. But only Egan and the Spanish minister retained any refugees long. In a few days the other legations were emptied, some of the unfortunates surrendering themselves for trial and others hiding elsewhere.

Egan was confronted in the foreign office by M. A. Matta, a man as excitable and quick-tempered as himself. Blaine backed his representative in insisting on the right of asylum when he heard that other legations had been tacitly granted it; but Matta contended that a different situation existed when the refugees were submitted to the courts for criminal prosecution, and refused to discuss permission for them to leave the country under safe-conduct before they were brought to trial.

There was no open trouble over this until the 22nd of September, when only fifteen men remained in the American legation. Then rumors of a Balmacedist plot filled Santiago, and it was widely reported that the chief conspirators were the refugees in Egan's home. Police and plain-clothes men were stationed at all approaches and visitors were often arrested and taken to the police station. Two of Egan's servants were imprisoned over night. "We expect prompt action on Chile's part against disrespect to the American legation," Egan was wired from Washington. "Free access to it must be granted."[8]

Charges flew back and forth. Egan complained that the lowest class of peons were stationed to watch his house and that they constantly were insulting its inmates; that visitors and men who had business with him were molested by the police. Matta denied the truth of all such statements, charging in return that refugees cursed and pelted the agents of the police in discharge of their duties. A mass-meeting in the city condemned Egan for sheltering men who conspired to overthrow the government, and the legation had to be protected by a special cavalry guard that night. The American minister denied the existence of any plots and demanded that his servants be left alone. The Chilean government replied that cards issued by him to his employees were used by dozens of people.

In the midst of the quarrel, which was growing more intense every day, news came of an attack on

[8] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Acting Secretary Wharton to Egan, September 26, 1891.

American sailors in the streets of Valparaiso. One hundred and fifty seamen on the warship *Baltimore,* stationed in the port, had been kept in their quarters for some time. But leave was granted to them on the 16th of October and most of them wandered into town that afternoon. Trouble started about six o'clock in the evening in the *True Blue* saloon, where one of the crew of the *Baltimore* had an altercation with a Chilean sailor. A fight ensued as the American and a companion went out on the street. Surrounded by a Chilean mob, they fled for shelter, and during the riot that resulted, even after the police arrived, one of the Americans was killed and the other seriously wounded. During the evening four more of them were wounded and one Chilean citizen. Thirty-six of the crew of the *Baltimore* were detained by the police, but were discharged later in the night when no evidence against them was found.[9]

Captain Schley, commanding officer of the *Baltimore,* held an investigation the next morning. His report stated that the attack was brutal and unprovoked. It included the serious charge that the Valparaiso police were implicated. According to the testimony given Schley by the crew, Charles Riggin was killed by the police who were supposed to disperse the mob. Other sailors deposed that they had been "nippered" by cat-gut cords after being arrested and were dragged to the police station. Schley himself bore witness to the fact that up to 5:30 he had been

[9] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Report of Captain Schley, enclosed in Egan to Blaine, October 28, 1891.

on shore and had found all of his men sober and well-behaved. Blaine accepted this investigation as fully accurate and demanded through Egan a prompt and full reparation.[10]

The United States was itself involved at this time in explanations to Italy for the Mafia incident in New Orleans and to China for an attack on coolies in Colorado. But the difference in the Valparaiso affair, it pointed out, was that the Chilean attack was clearly on the American uniform. The northern republic took the view that as the riot had occurred in various parts of the city so nearly simultaneously, it was evidently planned beforehand and so must have been due to enmity toward the country instead of to individual seamen.

Matta resisted the demand from Washington for reparation as firmly as he did the appeals for safe-conduct. He could not recognize boards of investigation other than the Chilean courts, where a trial of the case was now being held. The proceedings to which he referred were being conducted by Judge E. Foster Recabarren in Valparaiso and were secret. They were similar to the actions of a grand jury in the United States and slowness was as characteristic of one as of the other. But the American government complained constantly of the delay.

At first the sailors from the *Baltimore* who were brought before Foster's court were not allowed to have officers with them who might act as counsel. Lawyers were given them by the court, and they were

[10] *Ibid.*, Wharton to Egan, October 23, 1891.

required to sign certain written statements in Spanish which they did not understand. Captain Schley finally obtained the consent of the judge to the admittance of an American officer who could speak Spanish and who might act as an interpreter for his men. But Foster refused to consider publishing the testimony until he was ready to hand down a complete report.

The court inquiry dragged on into December. The police intendant at Valparaiso was indignant in his denial that his men shared in the attack on the Americans. He informed Matta that the whole disturbance had been in the nature of a drunken sailors' brawl. His contention was given weight by the appearance of two tipsy members of the crew from the *Baltimore* one afternoon in Foster's court. They were returned to the ship for punishment with the comment that Americans might now understand how possible it was that the sailors could have been under the influence of liquor on the fatal evening of October 16th.[11]

With no solution in sight for either the refugee situation in Santiago or the *Baltimore* affair at Valparaiso, Benjamin Harrison devoted most of his message to Congress in December of 1891 to the Chilean situation. He upheld Egan's position entirely as to the demand for safe-conduct for Balmacedists under his protection, though he reported at the same time that police restrictions had been relaxed. "I have not been willing to direct the surrender of such persons as are still in the American legation," he said.

[11] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Egan to Blaine, December 4, 1891.

In regard to the *Baltimore* case, Harrison declared that the American sailors had been peaceable and orderly; that they were attacked without cause; that a few of the police had tried to protect them while others joined in the assault; that American sailors were treated brutally while detained at the police stations; and that the only explanation for the whole attack was hostility to the American uniform. He promised to call a special session to consider what should be done if Chile did not give prompt and ample apology and reparation.

The message clearly suggested the possibility of war and Congressman McCreary, a Republican from Kentucky, told newspaper men that war-talk was frequent throughout the country; that a million men would respond to the call to arms.[12] Matta wired Pedro Montt, the Chilean minister to Washington, that both the message of President Harrison and the accompanying report of Secretary Tracy of the Navy Department were either erroneous or deliberately incorrect; he told Montt to deny everything that did not agree with letters received from the foreign office in Santiago. "Chile will maintain its dignity," he added, "notwithstanding the intrigues which proceed from so low a source and threats which come from so high a source."[13]

The telegram was not submitted by Montt to the Department of State but was given to the press.

[12] Interview in the *New York Herald,* quoted in *The Nation* (January 14, 1892).

[13] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, enclosure in Egan to Blaine, December 12, 1891.

About the same time, the preliminary report on the *Baltimore* case was issued by Foster. It upheld the contention that drunken sailors of both navies had begun the affray. It found that three Americans had attacked one Chilean in the beginning; that no evidence was brought to light to support the idea that the police killed Charles Riggin. It recommended imprisonment for one American and three Chileans. At Washington it was stated that Harrison had not changed his view of the case at all after studying the report.

Shortly before Christmas, Jorge Montt was inaugurated president, duly elected under the auspices of the temporary government set up after the fall of Balmaceda. This brought about a change in the cabinet and Matta left the foreign office. He was succeeded by Luís Pereira, who was inclined to be more friendly towards Egan, and the diplomatic situation assumed a brighter aspect. Though no written safe-conduct was given the refugees, they were allowed to board an American warship and the legation was submitted to no further annoyance.

But when Pereira turned to the Matta telegram, he offered to withdraw it only on the ground that a president's message could not be made the basis of a diplomatic action. This was considered by Blaine as an evasion and not at all acceptable. Another investigation of the *Baltimore* affair, taken at Mare Island when the warship returned to the California coast, revived the American charges that an unwarranted attack, assisted by the police, had been made on the

United States Navy. Pedro Montt began a lively correspondence with Blaine to uphold the court report from Valparaiso. On the 20th of January came a demand from Santiago for the withdrawal of Egan. Evidently the new cabinet was not planning a complete reversal of Chile's position.

Blaine dispatched at once to his minister, now *persona non grata,* a peremptory demand that the Matta telegram be withdrawn with full apology; otherwise diplomatic relations would be suspended. Harrison then sent to Congress on January 25th the special message which he had promised and submitted the entire correspondence for the past year relating to Chilean affairs. He again approved Egan's actions and called attention to Blaine's ultimatum. "We do not covet their territory [the Chileans]," he said. "We desire their peace and prosperity."[14] But he recommended that Congress now authorize him to use force to obtain the fulfillment of the American demands.

It was, of course, ridiculous for Chile to consider a war with the powerful northern republic. Its fleet might do some immediate damage and the California coast was alarmed for a time. But the outcome of a struggle between two nations so unevenly matched could never be in doubt. It was time for the Montt administration to retire from its position as gracefully as possible. Pereira agreed to withdraw all portions of the Matta telegram that were offensive to

[14] *Message of Presilent Harrison, respecting Relations with Chile,* p. 4.

the United States; the request for Egan's departure was cancelled; and the Chilean foreign office suggested that the *Baltimore* case be referred to the United States Supreme Court for final decision. Harrison immediately expressed his full satisfaction and before the end of January the war clouds had dissipated.

The decision of the Chilean court appeared next month. Sentences of imprisonment on the three nationals condemned in the original report were confirmed. Charges against the police were dismissed, since no individual officer had been accused. In July the Chilean government offered to pay $75,000 for a settlement of the claims arising from the incident. This was accepted by the United States, and the most trying episode in the relations between the two countries was brought to an end. But excitement reached such a height in the United States that the body of Riggin, the murdered sailor, lay in state a short while in Independence Hall at Philadelphia. Such an honor had been given before only to the remains of Abraham Lincoln and Henry Clay![15]

It seemed the next winter that the same unpleasantness would occur again. A Balmacedist plot was unearthed and quickly suppressed. Once more leaders involved in it fled to the American legation. And

[15] *The Nation*, August 18, 1892; Captain John Codman, who had had thirty-three years' experience in the navy, wrote to the *Salt Lake City Herald* on November 4, 1891, that he had read the report of Captain Schley to the effect that all the 150 sailors on the *Baltimore* were well-behaved after being long pent up in narrow quarters. "Well, mebbe so, mebbe," commented Captain Codman.

again Egan held that it would mean their death if he released them to the authorities. But the November elections in the United States had brought victory to the Democratic candidate, Grover Cleveland. His inauguration in March 1893 meant the retirement of James G. Blaine. Hardly had Secretary Gresham taken control of the State Department than he wrote Egan to surrender the refugees. The fiery Irishman argued in vain; Gresham insisted that asylum was not to be granted. The American minister then absented himself from the house while his two visitors made their escape. One was successful, but the other was caught by the police.[16]

The first message of Cleveland to Congress sent the following December denounced Egan for ever receiving the fugitives. "Under no circumstances can the representatives of this government be permitted under the ill-defined fiction of extraterritoriality," he said, "to interrupt the administration of criminal justice in the countries to which they are accredited." Shortly before this message was read to Congress, the *Itata* was declared by the United States Supreme Court not to have violated the neutrality laws and was returned to Chile.[17]

So ended the nearest approach to a war that the United States has ever had with a South American nation. The powerful northern republic had won all of its contentions, but it was a debatable question whether the victory was worth the cost. For Chile

[16] John Bassett Moore, *International Law Digest*, p. 800.
[17] *Congressional Record*, 53rd Congress, 2nd session.

was one of the strongest and most progressive republics south of Panama. If the United States were to succeed in the new Pan-American movement on which it was now centering its diplomatic efforts, the friendship of leading Latin American nations was indispensable. The northern colossus aspired to a headship in all American affairs; Chilean hostility might easily be a stumbling-block to such an ambition.

Chapter XI

INTERNATIONAL MAKEWEIGHTS

The greatest handicap with which the United States was forced to contend in its aim to be the recognized leader of American republics was its lack of material business interests in so many of the larger countries. Nowhere was this more evident than in Chile.

"Foreign commerce is represented in Valparaiso by England first and then by France and Germany," wrote William Roberts in 1885. "In Santiago the French come first; they own nearly all of the jewelry, drygoods and furniture stores. The French language is taught in the schools along with the Spanish and is spoken in fashionable circles. Literature is largely French and men study the views and actions of French statesmen. No American publication of any kind is found in a store or club. The people of the United States are greatly deceived as to the influence which they command in this section of the world."[1]

England had been compelled by this time to share its monopoly of the carrying trade from Panama to Valparaiso with a subsidized Chilean company, and the Pacific Steam Navigation Company had entered into a partnership with the new line. Another competitor was the Kosmos, a German line. British, French, and German steamers also ran to Chile

[1] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Roberts to Bayard, September 24, 1885.

through the Straits. "But the flag of the Great Republic can only be seen on a few old whalers," Roberts reported in 1886.

These conditions still held in the early years of the twentieth century. "Americans are extremely scarce in this country today," was the comment of Alberto Willson, in 1907, when he described conditions to Secretary Elihu Root. "Americans managing an American company are not to be found."[2] Even W. R. Grace and Company, through whom the United States representatives in Chile drew their pay drafts, was managed entirely by British agents at Valparaiso. It was the only concern of any size in the later nineteenth century that could even be considered partly American, and its head office was in London. By 1907 it was running a steamship line from New York to Valparaiso, as was Wessel, Duval, and Company, also of New York. But both lines flew British flags and ran monthly steamers, while ships sailed weekly from Liverpool for Chile.[3]

Five reasons were suggested by Minister John Hicks in 1908 for the difficulty of increasing American business in the southern republics. First, so few American firms in the United States had men who spoke Spanish. In the second place, business houses in Chile had long credit and large orders from Europe. Americans could not accommodate themselves easily to the requirements of foreign trade.

[2] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Alberto Willson to Root, May 17, 1907; Willson was a native of the United States who had held office under various Chilean governments after becoming a citizen there.

[3] *Ibid.*

Then, too, the European firms had salesmen in all large Chilean towns who spoke fluent Spanish. He mentioned the conditions in the carrying trade as a fourth reason. His last observation was, that the banks, being either English, German, or Spanish, were not interested in furthering American commerce.[4]

To this paucity of business connections was added the blundering of American diplomacy, as evidenced in the War of the Pacific and the Balmaceda Revolution. The description given by Major Logan in 1883 explained much of the unfortunate bungling that seemingly might have been avoided:

> The American diplomat in Spanish America has to save for his return to the United States; his European colleagues can spend their salary as their position is fixed. They speak three or four living languages and can mingle with all kinds of people, while the American is always looking for someone who can speak English and he gets all of his news secondhand. The watchword of the American is economy; he has no such staff as the European and even pays a translator out of his own funds. The American diplomat takes a cheap house in the suburbs and furnishes it in the plainest way, while his whole style of living is commensurate with his establishment. He receives hospitality out of deference to his position, but is not situated suitably to return it. He cannot mingle in general society because of his inability to speak the language; he can have no direct intercourse with the heads of the government to which he is accredited unless they happen to speak English, which is rarely the case; while every fact which he reports to his own government comes to him secondhand and is less liable to be correct.[5]

[4] *Ibid.*, Hicks to Root, May 16, 1908.

[5] *Ibid.*, Logan to Frelinghuysen, September 13, 1883.

Logan's report was confirmed by Roberts, who wrote two years later that "the seating accommodation belonging to the legation consists of one chair. There are three bookcases, a desk and a table, all very old, and the two shields would make attractive ornaments on a Chinese pagoda."

With these conditions prevailing, it is surprising that the diplomacy of the United States succeeded as well as it did in its initial trials of the Pan-American idea. The first Conference was held in 1889 at Washington and was attended by every one of the Latin-American countries. The invitation to it included a discussion of arbitration in the agenda. As the absorbing question for Chile was the retention of Arica and Tacna, its acceptance was not given at once. A special messenger had to be sent to Santiago by Grover Cleveland to allay fears that the treaty of Ancón might be revised. The suspicious government was at last induced to join, but with the plain understanding that only commercial and economic matters would be discussed.[6]

Balmaceda and other Chilean leaders were interested then in a bimetallic union for American countries to fight the British gold standard. A union of this sort among the Latin countries of Europe had been broken recently on the rock of opposition from London. Chile wanted a fight to be started now from the New World. In addition to the benefits that would accrue to its silver mines, it was making strenuous efforts to retire the paper money flood that

[6] *El Diario Oficial de la República de Chile,* March 27, 1889.

had come with the War of the Pacific. Thus from some angles, a Pan-American conference would prove attractive to Chile if political questions could be omitted.[7]

But the meeting proved a disappointment. In the first place, the success of the Republican party in the fall elections of 1888 in the United States had been followed by the return of Blaine to the Department of State just as the conference opened. Though he was not a delegate, he was chosen president "against the open opposition of representatives from the Chilean and Argentine republics," according to the *Ferrocarril* of Santiago.[8] His attempt to obtain a general agreement for the mutual lowering of tariff rates among American nations was not accepted by the Chilean delegation. They informed the conference that their country would act in such matters as best served its own interests. At the same time the internal political situation in the United States prevented any agreement's being reached on bimetallism.

Moreover, a resolution was passed that recommended obligatory arbitration in all American disputes. It specified boundaries and indemnities as subjects that would be included. Chilean delegates absented themselves from the session in which this was adopted, saying that the law of nations in regard to the subject was sufficient for their govern-

[7] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Roberts to Bayard, December 29, 1886, with enclosure of speeches in the Chilean Senate by Senators Ibáñez and Concha i Toro.

[8] *El Ferrocarril,* October 8, 1889.

ment.[9] "We are obtaining a full confirmation of the fears shown by the Santiago press as to the purport and views of that Congress," commented the editor of *El Comercio* of Valparaiso. The only definite accomplishment was the formation of a Bureau of American Republics whose chief function was to gather statistics. Its governing board was composed of the Latin-American ministers in Washington, with the Secretary of State as chairman.

Chile did not feel as much resentment toward the United States as it did toward its sister republics of South America for the action on arbitration. In fact, William Henry Trescot, who was the American member of the subcommittee, opposed the resolution finally reported to the general meeting. Much favorable comment was made of this in the Santiago press, although it was pointed out that Blaine did not state his own position.

On the other hand, the expansion of Chile had produced alarm all through the South American continent. Diplomats from Peru and Bolivia were quick to seize the advantage that came their way on account of the attitude on arbitration taken by their recent enemy. By 1901, when the second conference convened at Mexico City, they had paved the way for a diplomatic isolation of Chile in South America. Again Chilean delegates attended a meeting of American states, with the particular object in mind of resisting any political commitments.

[9] *International American Conferences; Reports of Committees and Discussions Thereon,* II. 1122.

As the result of a compromise offered by a representative from the United States, the treaty that provided for compulsory arbitration was signed by several Latin-American delegations at a meeting outside the conference itself. Chile was thus relieved from the embarrassment of another withdrawal from plenary sessions. This fight for outside consideration of arbitration was made by the American delegation against the opposition of Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, and several of the smaller countries.[10] The incident served to show Chile that the United States was not particularly interested in regaining territory for Peru or in revising the Treaty of Ancón.

Pan-Americanism was now beginning to develop into special conferences on commercial and scientific subjects. As doubts of the purposes of the founder were gradually removed, Chile became actively interested in these non-political movements. The project of an intercontinental railway to run from New York to Buenos Aires with branches to cities west of the Andes was heartily favored at Santiago. The Chilean capital was the meeting place for the first Pan-American Scientific Congress in 1908, where scholars from the two Americas came together to study and discuss such diverse subjects as astronomy, conservation of resources, education, engineering, law, mining, hygiene, commerce, and taxation.

The increased interest in Pan-Americanism was accompanied by a growing cordiality toward the

[10] John Vavasour Noel, *History of the Second Pan-American Congress* [*sic*], p. 119.

United States among Chilean statesmen. But when the province of Panama seceded from Colombia and was recognized as an independent state so promptly by Theodore Roosevelt, the bogey of American expansion toward the south was raised again. Colombia at once tried to interest other nations in an active protest against the colossus. But it had just been playing a double game in signing secret treaties with Peru and Chile,[11] and the Chilean reply was politely cold. Agustín Edwards, the foreign minister, answered that he regretted the incidents mentioned, but made no further comment.

Though some of the Chilean newspapers were critical of Roosevelt's action, the press was about equally divided. A protest in the Chamber of Deputies brought by an opposition member made no change in the government policy of neutrality.[12] The *Ferrocarril* was most impressed by the fact that when the Panama Canal was opened, "Chile could lessen by at least one third the time necessary for commercial communication with Europe and the eastern part of the United States." Even though Chilean opinion was divided, it represented a change from 1897, when an American minister "regretted to write that in the Spanish-American War, the sympathies of the Chilean people were overwhelmingly for Spain"; when a projected treaty between Peru and

[11] *Chilean Times*, of Valparaiso, June 5, 1901.

[12] *Cámara de diputados: boletines de sesiones extraordinarias*, November 25, 1903, p. 438.

Chile left all matters of dispute to the arbitration of the Spanish queen.[13]

Theodore Roosevelt took another step soon afterwards that frightened many Latin Americans, when he announced his policy of the "Big Stick." According to this, the United States would exercise a species of international police power in the regions of the New World where nations could not abstain from frequent revolutions or from piling up debts that their revenues might be unable to meet. But, it was added, the stable, progressive countries would not be subject to such control. In explaining this doctrine, the American president used the illustration of Colombia and Chile as two types of nations he had in mind. Chile was a country that could help enforce the Monroe Doctrine, he said later on his visit to Santiago, where he was cordially received. Chileans felt little fear of the "Big Stick."

Elihu Root also stopped in Chile on his South American tour and made speeches denying any ideas of political aggression by his country. On another occasion a visit was made by the American fleet, which was received with great enthusiasm. Much care was taken to avoid any disturbances, and the conduct of the American officers evoked favorable comment.

Agustín Edwards, who owned a number of important Chilean newspapers and magazines, began a campaign of interesting his countrymen in the United

[13] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Wilson to Sherman, May 20, 1898; for further details of the treaty see chapter xiii.

States. His leading daily, *El Mercurio,* ran Sunday letters from New York. He took pains to express constantly his approval of American diplomacy in the New World, and admitted that he was trying to allay the feelings of distrust that had been so long rooted in the Chilean mind.[14] "The sole promise of the realization of such works as the Pan-American railway is sufficient to dispel the specter of the Yankee danger," he wrote in 1903. "Europe is very far away, disconnected from us, forming in fact another world."[15] Of the Panama Canal he declared that, in making the United States a commercial rival of Europe, it would prove a blessing for all South America. To his mind, furthermore, the policy of Roosevelt could not be considered a menace towards well-organized countries.

Edwards was a prime mover in the campaign for using American educational methods. It was logical to do so, he contended, since the United States achieved its greatness under a democratic system. In consequence of his writings, the government sent four educators to the northern republic to study its system of public instruction. American methods became very popular, especially in certain types of private institutions. A number of teachers from the United States were engaged, and arrangements adopted for an interchange of professors between the University of Chile and American universities. Furthermore, American business was beginning to

[14] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Ames to Hay, August 12, 1905.

[15] *El Mercurio,* March 15, 1903.

take a real interest in Chile as a field of enterprise. The efforts of statesmen in both countries to increase friendly relations and forget the quarrels of the past held out the promise of a change for the better. In the first decade of the twentieth century, American influence was growing.

Then in 1909 came another dispute that brought a threat from the northern republic to break off diplomatic relations. It arose out of one more vexatious claim of an American company against the Chilean government. As had been the case so often before, the company had ceased to operate in Chile, and the money was demanded by heirs of the original claimants, all of whom lived in the United States. In the middle of the nineteenth century, one of the largest American business houses in Valparaiso was that of Alsop and Company.[16] It was one of the earliest concerns to take an interest in Antofagasta nitrates, and as far back as 1862 became involved in the Chilean-Bolivian quarrel. By 1872 the firm had gone out of business and one John Wheelwright became its liquidator. At the same time, it had become a creditor of the Bolivian government, which was unable to pay the company its debt. Accordingly, rich guano deposits were assigned to the liquidator as well as a share in the customs receipts. This brought the heirs of the company into conflict with Chile when Antofagasta passed under the control of the latter.[17]

[16] At that time American ministers drew their pay drafts through Alsop, turning to Grace and Company when Alsop went out of business.

[17] *Alsop Claim; the Case for the United States,* p. 4.

In an unratified treaty of 1895 Chile had promised Bolivia to assume the Alsop debt. All other claims of American citizens were settled by an arbitral commission at Washington in 1902, but this one item was thrown out by the vote of the Chilean and neutral members because it was held to be a private matter between Alsop and Company and the Chilean government. Negotiations with Bolivia dragged on, and the assumption of this claim was being used by Chile as a bargaining device. In 1903, when the American minister at Santiago again brought up the matter, he was offered a lump sum that Secretary Root declared to be less than half that which Bolivia agreed to pay Wheelwright in 1876. Difficulties of adjustment, moreover, were enhanced by the violent fluctuations in exchange, due to the paper-money standards of both South American countries.

In the treaty signed with Bolivia in 1905 the claim was mentioned by name, but the sum Chile agreed to pay was little more than half the amount proposed two years before. Root at once declared flatly that the offer was entirely inadequate. Chile promised in further correspondence with Bolivia that not a centavo would be paid any claimants unless they renounced all rights against the latter country. An allowance of two million pesos was set aside to satisfy all claims, although the United States contended that the Alsop share alone amounted to more than that. Federico Puga Borne, the Chilean foreign minister, announced in 1907 that the fund provided for that item in the Bolivian correspondence was his final offer. It was rejected by the Alsop heirs.

All other claimants included in the treaty of 1905 were satisfied, and Chile now threatened to review the whole Alsop case and scale down the debt even further if the company did not accept immediately. The point was made that, as the firm had a Chilean charter, it was entitled to no diplomatic protection from the United States and that this had been recognized by the commission in 1902. The American reply was that Chile's action amounted to a confiscation of property, and that its position, if maintained, would mean that the United States could not defend the rights of its citizens abroad.

For two years more notes were exchanged between Washington and Santiago to no effect. Repeatedly the government of the United States requested an opportunity to examine documents that would show why the claim should be so much reduced. Chile insisted that its own courts were the sole authorities competent to decide the matter. A special mission was sent from Washington by the State Department to Santiago to demand that the question be arbitrated at once, or that not less than one million dollars in American gold be paid by the Chilean government. The latter replied that it would accept an arbiter, but would refer to him the question whether the United States should have intervened at all. Thereupon the northern republic gave notice that diplomatic relations would be severed at once if Chile did not abandon this point.[18]

[18] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Knox to Pierrepont, November 17, 1909.

But the risk of international rupture did not last long. It was agreed that the two countries had misunderstood each other. They consented to submit the question to the King of England, and in the protocol they signed did not mention the disputed point that had brought them so close to a breach of relations.

The decision of Great Britain was on the whole favorable to the United States. The entire claim as first admitted by Bolivia was allowed and reckoned in bolivianos according to the rate of exchange at the time the award was made.[19] Minor points were decided against the United States, such as certain items in its brief demanding payment for damages done to the company at Chilean hands in its mining rights. The interest was set at the Bolivian rate of five, instead of the Chilean rate of six per cent as the American lawyers had asked. Chile's contention with respect to the jurisdiction of its courts was rejected, since the submission of the case to an arbiter was considered an answer in itself.[20]

As the Alsop dispute proved an effective makeweight over against all of the careful strengthening of friendly relations which had preceded it, so did the influence that the United States had been gaining in Pan-American conferences find a counterpoise in an alliance among South American nations. These were the three republics that had made the most rapid progress in the arts of both peace and war, namely Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. A definite union among

[19] *Alsop Claim: The Decision of Award by Great Britain*, p. 31.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

these three—the A. B. C. powers—might well bring down in a measure the international balance in the New World.

Argentina and Brazil, the two largest South American states, had long been rivals. Chile's complete victory in the War of the Pacific had been viewed with complacency by Brazil for two reasons. The Brazilian boundary with Bolivia had never been determined with accuracy, and the mountain republic was much weakened through its crushing defeat. Then too Argentina was forced to divert its whole attention to this growing power on its western border.

When William Roberts arrived as American minister at Santiago, two years after the Treaty of Ancón, President Santa María intimated that it might not be long before the United States and his own country met at Panama. The embarrassed envoy turned this aside with a laugh in which all of the members of the cabinet joined who were present at the private interview.[21] But whether Santa María was serious or not, most of the other countries of South America feared that Chile had just such an aim. A competitive armament race on land and sea with Argentina followed the war and, as has been seen, by 1900 diplomatic isolation was threatening the late victor. Chilean statesmen worked quietly and patiently to offset this danger. All disputes with Argentina were settled by British arbitration in

[21] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Knox to Bayard, July 8, 1885.

1902; a treaty was signed with Bolivia in 1905; no further expansion seemed planned other than the definite acquisition of Tacna and Arica.

Then in 1907 the rumor was heard that an understanding among Argentina, Brazil, and Chile was being reached on all phases of international politics. Peru became alarmed immediately, and complained to the United States that American and Peruvian interests were both being menaced, but the northern republic saw no reason to protest. Not long afterwards it was reported that a defensive alliance between the two southernmost republics had been rejected at Buenos Aires because Brazil was to be invited to join. An unpleasant quarrel followed between Baron Rio Branco, the foreign minister of Brazil, and Dr. Estanislao S. Zeballos, his official counterpart in Argentina. A telegram from the foreign office at Rio de Janeiro instructing its ministers to agree to no treaty as long as Zeballos was in office was read in the Argentine Senate. Rio Branco immediately declared it a forgery Before the year of 1909 had come to a close, the tripartite alliance seemed impossible.[22]

But reports of a secret understanding persisted. In 1915 the three South American powers offered mediation between the United States and Mexico at the time that marines from the northern republic were landed at Vera Cruz. President Wilson promptly accepted the offer, and though the dispute was brought to an end by the overthrow of Huerta

[22] *O Jornal de Commercio,* Rio de Janiero, November 3, 1908; *El Mercurio,* Santiago, October 7, 1908.

at Mexico City, the very fact that mediation had been permitted seemed to give the final impulse needed to bring an A. B. C. alliance into concrete form. It was officially ratified soon afterwards, and represented three leading ideas: unlimited extension of the arbitration compromises that had been made by them in past years; an agreement to submit all international disputes to an investigation before resorting to war; an understanding that any one of the countries would permit the other to intervene in international difficulties that it might have with outside parties.[23]

How far the alliance was determined by a spirit of opposition to the increasing influence of the United States has never been established. It has even been said that the idea was first suggested by Elihu Root when during the course of his journey through South America he spoke of the ways in which the southern countries could help the aims of his own.[24] But it was something of a potential check nevertheless to any undue expansion on the part of the northern republic.

[23] Carlos Becu, *El A. B. C.; su concepto político y jurídico*, p. 44.

[24] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Hicks to Root, December 11, 1907.

Chapter XII

NEUTRALITY ABROAD AND DIFFERENCES AT HOME

The entry of the United States into the Great War applied the "acid test" to the effectiveness of Pan-Americanism in political coöperation. Instead of all the Latin-American republics joining their northern neighbor in a common effort on behalf of "liberty, civilization, democracy, and humanity" to make the world safe for all concerned, most of the important nations adhered to the neutrality that they had declared at the outset of the struggle. Among them was Chile.

Here, more actively by far than the government at Washington, that of Germany had sought to advance the interests of its nationals in many a field of endeavor. German communities were established at Valdivia and Punta Arenas. Banks that were nominally private concerns, but in reality branches of large German houses in Europe, were started in Santiago. Schools in southern Chile were subsidized by the government of the Kaiser and wealthy Germans contributed books and supplies to them.[1] As early as 1902 American locomotives were being displaced by importations from Germany, and a few years later the traffic manager for the Chilean gov-

[1] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Consul Bowen to Secretary of State, May 10, 1910.

ernment railways was a German.[2] Loans were sought by Chile in the Berlin Bourse instead of at London.

But this was only a beginning. As in other neutral countries, the influence of Germany in Chile was exaggerated when the war threw all Europe into rival camps. True, the military system had been changed from French to German, and even the Boy Scouts of Chile were learning the goose-step. German influence was particularly strong also in scientific pursuits. But the Allied countries had by no means been displaced in most of the fields that they had dominated. England and France had as much hold on Chilean interests as their enemy could possibly have. Moreover, the intellectuals, in great majority, were altogether Francophile in their sympathies and not averse either to the British.

Through the early years of the war Chile had had its own peculiar problems in maintaining a position of neutrality. On account of the nitrate deposits as sources of supply for the manufacture of explosives, both the British and the German navies during 1914 and 1915 chose the waters near the Chilean coast as a field for their operations. A few island groups under the jurisdiction of the South American nation were far enough away from the mainland to make it difficult to enforce its neutrality laws in the insular harbors. The coastal configuration at the southern end of the continent, with the numerous small islands clustered there, presented another difficulty.

[2] *Ibid.*, President W. H. Marshall of the American Locomotive Company to Secretary Root, November 9, 1906.

Many merchant vessels of both belligerents were converted into auxiliary cruisers soon after the outbreak of the war and often defied the Chilean port-laws.[3]

There was indeed more reason in 1917 for Chile to hold grievances against the Entente than there was cause for its declaring war against the government of the Kaiser. It was the British navy with its enforcement of a blockade that had caused a short business depression in 1914. The northern nitrate market almost became closed as England requisitioned a large part of its own merchant marine for war purposes, while its blacklists stopped most of the Chilean trade with Germany. Nitrate plants shut down one after another. The agricultural districts around Santiago were consequently depressed, because the northern section could not buy its foodstuffs. Lulled into security by the prospect of continued incomes from the northern mines, Chile had deferred since 1894 a return to specie payment that had been scheduled four or five times. Now deposits were withdrawn from the banks, and the paper-money basis had to be continued indefinitely.

The business depression did not last long after the government took effective measures to fight these dangers. An advance of money to nitrate producers kept the industry up to a forty per cent level. A loan to the banks, which had united under the leadership of the Banco de Chile to cope with the situation,

[3] Alejandro Alvarez, *La grande guerre européenne et la neutralité du Chile,* pp. 152-153.

enabled them to meet the demands of their depositors. The number of public employees was reduced. Taxes on liquor and tobacco, as well as stamp taxes, were sharply increased. And within a year the United States began to buy nitrates and the market revived. But Chileans did not feel kindly toward the Entente nations for the part that their blockading operations had played in bringing the business of the nation nearly to ruin.

Moreover, great resentment had been felt through the country over the capture by a British squadron of the German cruiser *Dresden* in a harbor of the island of Juan Fernández. The German ship had not obeyed Chilean laws, but had overstayed its time in port and was subject to internment. Without waiting, however, to see what action the Chilean government would take, a British squadron had sunk the vessel in the harbor. Notes of protest were sent to both Berlin and London, but the action of England aroused far more criticism than the mere fact that a cruiser had overstayed its time in Chilean waters.[4]

According to the view of most of the Chilean statesmen, the entrance of the United States into the war because of its own grievances against Germany did not alter the position of their country. It was pointed out that the time when the United States should have asked for joint American action had passed. President Wilson had protested against British blockade decrees in the name of his country alone. It was even intimated that the northern republic was

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 227.

quite complacent over the workings of English blacklists in South American commerce, because thereby its own traders were enabled to take possession of the German field.[5]

Arturo Alessandri, who as president after the war became such a pronounced friend of the United States, made a strong fight in the Chilean Senate against abandoning a neutral position. "We must not forget," he wrote in *La Nación,* "that when James G. Blaine began an aggressive conduct against us in the '80's which even his own country later condemned, he tried to provoke a joint action with European countries against the annexation of Tarapacá to Chile. It was Germany through the mouth of Chancellor Bismarck who said, 'Let these people receive the fruit of their sacrifices, efforts, and victories.' "

"What did the United States do," asked Robert Huneeus in *El Diario Ilustrado,* "when Chile, like the Don Quixote of South America, tried to prevent Spain from reconquering territories near her own in 1865?" He then traced the course of Chilean-American relations since the time of Blaine's intervention in the War of the Pacific. He stressed particularly the affair at Quinteros and the *Baltimore* affair during the revolution of 1891, and next described the Alsop Claim. "We admire the United States," he

[5] *El Mercurio,* April 22, 1917, containing interview with Victor Robles, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Chamber of Deputies; G. Gallardo Nieto, *Neutralidad de Chile ante la guerra,* p. xlvii.

concluded, "but while admiring her, we also know her."[6]

The accusation advanced later against Chile that it was in close sympathy with Germany can hardly be sustained. In the Entente press the country was repeatedly called "pro-German." But as early as 1914 the British Foreign Office, in order to deny any feeling of this on its part, made public announcement that it was satisfied with the attitude of the South American nation. As a Chilean publicist later expressed it, "Chile remained neutral in the war because it saw no profit in a parasitic rôle similar to that of the theatre 'supers' who swell the personnel of the chorus without singing a single note."[7] The republic maintained its neutrality for the simple and excellent reason that the procedure conduced most to its national interest.

European business men were prompt to enter the South American market again at the close of the war. Even Germany tried to renew its former profitable connections. By 1920 the Krupps were negotiating for a site in Chile on which they planned to build a factory that would dwarf the Essen plants.[8] England retained its hold on the nitrate fields. To this end the Nitrate Producers Association was formed, with headquarters in London, representing ninety-eight per cent of the output from Chilean mines. Through a committee of twenty members, four of

[6] *El Diario Ilustrado,* April 30, 1917.

[7] Joaquín Walker Martínez, *Clamores de intervención diplomática,* p. 16.

[8] *New York Times Current History,* June 1921.

whom were designated by the Chilean government, it fixed nitrate prices for the world. But in reality, a smaller committee, resident in London and dominated by Anthony Gibbs and Sons, made all of the recommendations that the larger group adopted.[9] American interests have complained continuously of the British monopoly in this respect. It was even charged in the United States Senate in 1924 that British firms were behind the opposition to Henry Ford's plan for developing Muscle Shoals.[10]

But much of the trade of Europe with Chile, particularly that of Germany, had been diverted to the United States. Not only was this retained by the northern republic, but its commerce continued to grow. In 1910 the United States trailed both England and Germany in imports to and exports from Chile. Great Britain was far in the lead and Germany was gaining every year. In 1920 figures for German trade showed a sharp decline for the decade, while England was hardly holding its own. On the other hand, the United States had passed both of its rivals, and its imports from Chile were double those of the British.[11]

[9] Department of Agriculture: *Report of C. J. Brand, consulting specialist in marketing,* "Position of Great Britain in the Chilean Nitrate of Soda trade."

[10] *Congressional Record,* 68th Congress, 1st session, Vol. 65, pp. 3665-3797.

[11] By comparison of the report of the Second Pan-American Commercial Conference, pp. 400-401, with the *Bulletin of the Pan-American Union,* LIV. 48-49 (January 1922), the changes may be seen. In 1910 Chile sent exports to the United States valued at thirty million dollars. Slightly more was sent to Germany and five times as much to England. Imports to

The United States now regained the market in agricultural machinery, principally through the efforts of W. R. Grace and Company, who were very active in selling to Chilean farmers. The same company also increased its steamship service, so that its freight and passenger vessels from Valparaiso now come into New York harbor every other Monday.

Although American business men made no appreciable effort to challenge the British monopoly of the nitrates, their activities in other mining fields grew tremendously. In 1913 the Bethlehem Steel Corporation acquired through a subsidiary the Tofo iron mines in Coquimbo, which had formerly belonged to a French company. About the same time, the Braden Copper Mines Company began to exploit the mines near Rancagua. Connected with the latter were the Guggenheim interests which formed in 1912 the Chile Exploration Company. In May, 1915, its huge metallurgical plant started operation in northern Chile, and the corporation began to exploit at Chuquicamata the largest deposit of copper ore known in the world. A rival plant in the same region was soon afterwards erected by the Anaconda Copper

Chile from England amounted that year to thirty-six million dollars, from Germany to twenty-nine and a half million, and from the United States to twenty million. In 1920 the exports to England had fallen to less than half the amount in 1910, while those to Germany had dwindled to less than three million dollars. On the other hand, exports to the United States had quadrupled and were now more than twice the value of those sent to England. Imports into Chile from Germany had fallen off tremendously also; those from Great Britain showed a slight increase; those from the United States had more than doubled.

Company. All of these American concerns now began to erect villages for their workers according to the American models, with hospitals, schools, and club-houses owned by the company.[12]

But it was in the field of Chilean finance that the entrance of the United States was most marked during and after the World War. Part of the accumulated Chilean gold reserve that had been deposited in German banks and then moved to London was now shifted to New York banking-houses. The first payment of any size for Chilean nitrates, made in exchange on New York instead of London, was accepted by the South American producers when an American firm bought four thousand tons.[13] In accordance with a section of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, moreover, the National City Bank of New York obtained permission to establish branch banks in various South American cities and soon opened one in Santiago. Thus a great disadvantage to American business in Chile was removed.[14]

Shortly after the close of the war, a financial mission headed by Eliodoro Yáñez left Santiago for the United States to study business methods and arrange for a large government loan. No satisfactory terms could be obtained at that time; but two years later through a group of six American banking-

[12] William Spence Robertson, *Hispanic American Relations with the United States,* pp. 265-268; George E. Montandon, "An American Enterprise in Chile," in *Overland Monthly,* December 1909.

[13] *New York Times Current History,* November 1915.

[14] Cf. *supra,* chapter xi.

houses a loan of twenty-four million dollars was floated. One stipulation made by the bankers was that most of the money be spent in the United States, as it was understood that the loan was primarily for railway equipment and construction.[15]

In the summer of 1925 Professor Edwin W. Kemmerer, of Princeton University, was engaged by Chile to study its national finances, which had been unsettled for half a century. He had been head of an American financial commission to Colombia only two years before. As a result of his recommendations a Federal Reserve Bank was created at Santiago which had the exclusive right to issue paper money for the nation, convertible into gold at the rate of exchange then prevailing. The new bank was also to be the fiscal agent for the central government and likewise for municipalities, railways, and other large business concerns. A new banking law outlined by the Kemmerer Commission became effective on March 26, 1926.[16]

The problems of sanitation as well as those of finance in Chile received attention from American experts. In October 1925, James Stalbird, a sanitary engineer of Washington, was engaged for one year as expert chemist and bacteriologist in the Chilean Ministry of Hygiene. In August of the same year Dr. John D. Long, Assistant Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service, was loaned to Chile by the United States and became technical

[15] *New York Times,* February 2, 1915.
[16] *New York Times Current History,* March 1926.

adviser to the government in the matter of public health.

The purchase of a palatial mansion at Santiago for the American embassy in 1922 was a visible token of the increased importance of the northern republic in Chilean affairs. Eight years before, the United State had raised the rank of its minister to that of ambassador, and Chile had done the same for its representative in Washington. The complaints of Logan and Roberts in days past with regard to inadequate housing conditions that impaired their position and influence with the Chilean government held good no longer.[17]

This story of peaceful penetration in Chile was duplicated in so many other South American countries that chances were bright for a more vigorous Pan-Americanism, when the Fifth International Conference of American States met at Santiago in 1923. On its agenda were arbitration, disarmament, international agreements to restrict the sale of alcoholic liquor in accordance with the new prohibition laws in the United States, and many of the old commercial problems that had not been solved in former meetings. Not only because of interest and importance alone, but because of the lapse of thirteen years since the holding of the Fourth Conference, a period during which a world war had been fought, there might have been reason to hope that a new international gathering of the Americas around a council-board at the Chilean capital for the discussion and

[17] Cf. *supra,* chapter xi.

determination of matters presumably of common concern would render Pan-Americanism in spirit and action more of a reality than had been its lot heretofore. But difficulties apeared before the conference had even opened. Between 1910 and 1921 the northern Colossus had greatly extended its influence toward the south. It controlled Cuban finances, and Haiti was held by United States marines. The Dominican Republic and Nicaragua were under American tutelage. Preponderant influence of the United States was also evident in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru through the semi-official loans recently contracted by these nations. Further, Mexico refused to attend the sessions because the Obregón government had not been recognized by the United States. Peru declined the invitation because of its hostility toward Chile. A proposal to include Canada, since it had sent a delegation to the Naval Limitation Conference at Washington in 1921, and the suggestion that a representative from the League of Nations be invited to the Conference, were vetoed by the United States on the ground that the meetings were to be devoted to affairs exclusively American.

The Conference did not accomplish a great deal. An agreement was reached for the registration of trade-marks, which was acceptable both to the Latin Americans as producers of raw material and to the United States as a manufacturing country. This had been a stumbling-block at two previous gatherings in 1906 and 1910. A maritime code was adopted that

would make the lot of shipping far easier. Perhaps the most encouraging feature of the session was the request for other special conferences similar to those on commerce, finance, and scientific subjects that had been held before. Delegates from many nations asked that provisions be made for conferences on hygiene, education, geography, the press, eugenics, international law, transportation, and engineering.

The Conference indeed was more marked for its disagreements than for its harmony. The chief interest of Chile lay in its proposal for naval disarmament. This plan really concerned only Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, the powers which had joined in the A. B. C. alliance of 1915. But the United States felt that its work on disarmament was already set by the Washington Conference of 1921, and the smaller countries had no navies. If any scrapping of battleships were agreed upon at Santiago for the A. B. C. powers, it would have meant a virtual abandonment of their navies, since Argentina and Brazil each had two dreadnoughts and Chile only one. Accordingly Argentina asked for a mere maintenance of the status quo, whereas Brazil contended that its unsettled international relations and its vast coast line required an increase in its navy. Secret conferences among the three powers produced no agreement, and the proposal was dropped at the last public session.

The failure to adopt the Chilean plan or to work out any compromise at all on the subject showed finally that the A. B. C. alliance had been disrupted.

The entrance of Brazil into the World War in the wake of the United States, while Argentina and Chile stayed neutral, was the beginning of the disintegration of the entente among the three South American powers. The Santiago Conference left no doubt as to its dissolution.

For the first time in a Pan-American Conference, Latin-American nations represented at the gathering in the Chilean capital showed openly their opposition to domination by the United States. The fact that Mexico did not attend emphasized the need of revising the organization of the Pan-American Union. As it was composed of representatives from Latin-American countries in Washington, no nation refused recognition by the United States could belong to it. A motion was made at Santiago by the Costa Rican delegation that each country appoint its representative to the Union hereafter whether it was officially recognized by the government at Washington or not. The proposal was fought by the American delegation, but a compromise was made retaining the provision that heads of diplomatic missions at Washington be members of the Union but allowing non-recognized countries to appoint special delegates. The practice of having the United States Secretary of State as permanent president of the Union was also discontinued and the office made elective.

The most embarrassing proposal encountered by the American delegation was that of Uruguay: to create an American League of Nations that would include a Pan-American Monroe Doctrine. This was

finally abandoned when Ambassador Henry P. Fletcher, speaking under instructions from Secretary Hughes, declared that this doctrine was the "unilateral national policy of the United States" and his country could not regard with favor its conversion into a Pan-American policy.

The press of nearly every nation in attendance rated the Conference as more or less of a failure. This was resented by many of the delegates. Agustín Edwards, of Chile, scored both the papers of his own country and those of the United States for their attitude. Mr. Fletcher, on his return home, reported that in social and economic matters the Conference was a great success, but that "we did not discuss state matters at all."[18]

While Chile was maintaining its thorough independence in international questions, it was confronted again with a crisis in domestic affairs that threatened to duplicate the Balmaceda incident. Fortunately, however, civil war was avoided.

Chilean politics since 1891 had tended more and more to resemble the French *bloc* system with numerous parties that differed little in their views. Followers of Balmaceda, who had established a new party as soon as liberal amnesty laws were passed in their favor, were not long in forming coalitions with other groups and securing prominent positions in some of the short-lived cabinets. In 1900 there were eight parties in the Chamber of Deputies, and by 1906 there had been sixty changes in the minis-

[18] *New York Times,* May 29, 1923.

tries since the overthrow of Balmaceda.[19] But none of this signified particular unrest. The revenue from the nitrate fields kept most of the Chileans content with the way their state was being run. Dispensing of personal political favors was the most vital question of the early twentieth century, since export taxes brought enough revenue to allow government bureaus to abound. Though a few labor troubles clouded the peaceful horizon, continued prosperity prevented any serious problems. It has been seen how the business depression of 1914 was checked. The exports from the nitrate mines reached a record height in 1917 and Chile actually reduced its debt during the war.

But with the return of peace, trouble started. The expanded nitrate market could remain so no longer. The desire of the producers to maintain high prices through a London pool still further reduced the buying field. Unemployment such as Chile had never known before now stalked through the north. Strikes among longshoremen and miners threatened to close the port of Antofagasta. A peculiar turn to the labor trouble was given by the demand of the unions for strict prohibition of the liquor traffic.[20] In a word, the wants of workingmen could no longer be ignored.

The old Liberal Alliance that had been so shaken by Balmaceda and had lasted in a loose form throughout the years, now showed signs of renewed

[19] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Hicks to Root, March 13, 1906.

[20] *New York Times Current History,* December 1920.

life when it placed Arturo Alessandri in the field as its candidate for president in 1921. The Democratic party that formed one of its branches attracted to it the bulk of the laborers and salaried men who were in the throes of political discontent. The men who still called themselves Liberals, though outside of the Alliance, united with the small but compact Conservative group to form the Unionist Coalition, and presented Luís Barros Borgoño as their candidate.

The election returns showed 179 electoral votes for Alessandri to 174 for his opponents, and it was understood that the Senate would not accept the count. A situation resembling the Hayes-Tilden contest of a former period in the United States had developed and was settled in a similar manner. A Court of Honor, chosen so as to be representative of both coalitions, decided by a vote of five to two that Barros Borgoño was entitled to receive two of the electoral votes recorded against him.[21] The peaceful character of the Chilean citizenry was shown by the acceptance of this decision, even though the minority members of the Court had refused to attend its sessions for a time.

Arturo Alessandri was inaugurated in December, 1921. He stood as the representative of a new middle class composed of small merchants and farmers and the increasing number of bureaucratic employees. The Radical party that formed the majority of his group of supporters desired to sever relations between church and state and to give the provincial

[21] *New York Times Current History,* November 1920.

governments more authority than the centralized Chilean system had ever allowed them. The new president stood for both of these ideas and thus his program bore a striking resemblance to that for which Balmaceda had fought.

In addition to such familiar demands was the platform of the Democratic party for labor reforms. Alessandri became sponsor for this legislation also, and added his own pet measure of a proportional income tax to meet the increasing deficit caused by the decline of the nitrate market. Longshoremen gave an impetus to the labor-union drive for prohibition by refusing to load alcoholic beverages at any port.

Once more live issues were agitating Chilean politics and the supremacy of the old order was threatened. The making of alcoholic liquors held fourth place among the industries of the nation; and the vineyards on the estates of central Chile were a source of considerable income to many of the families who had been ruling the nation since the days of Portales. The demand for prohibition thus entered the class struggle.

The issue of separation of church and state also had a significance not apparent on the surface. The financial depression caused many of the radicals to criticize the enormous wealth of the Roman Catholic Church. In Santiago alone its property was valued at more than a hundred million dollars. In anticipation of the possible attacks that might be made with the inauguration of Alessandri, it was alleged that church officials had sent a million and a quarter dol-

lars to Rome.[22] With such charges abroad, it was evident that a bitter religious struggle might develop quickly.

The new executive seemed at first to have plenty of energy and enough popular support to push through all of these changes to which he was dedicated. But he had entered office in a period of depression. The business revival that came to most countries between 1921 and 1923 did not reach Chile. As its government deficit increased, Alessandri was forced to unpopular measures in his frantic efforts to meet the yearly budgets. Besides this, a Unionist majority controlled the Senate and that body refused to consider his legislative program. His cabinets changed frequently, because of lack of confidence on the part of the upper chamber. Finally, the senators resorted to the old tactics of leaving unfinished the appropriation bills for the coming year. Alessandri then called a special session in December, 1923, which he adjourned the next month when the Congress would not follow his suggestions. The Senate, moreover, desired a guarantee that he would not interfere in the coming congressional elections.

It was the duplication of the winter of 1891, with a few important differences. The president's income-tax measure had been passed by both houses. It fell heaviest on real estate, which bore a nine per cent tax. Personal incomes were burdened with a levy of only two per cent. A small profits tax was also in-

[22] Samuel Guy Inman, *Problems in Pan-Americanism,* p. 90.

cluded. But Alessandri now wanted certain constitutional changes. He asked that his cabinets be required only to have a majority in the lower house; that budget legislation always be given prior consideration; and that whenever the Congress failed to pass the budget, the president might spend each month one twelfth of the total expended the preceding year.

Through the "Comision Conservadora,"[23] he at last reached a compromise. His measures were to be sustained by the opposition parties in the next Congress, and in return he guaranteed that elections would be unhampered. He likewise agreed to another constitutional amendment that would allow him to dissolve the Congress only once during his term of office and that in the first two years.[24]

It looked as if the peace-loving Chileans had once more avoided revolution through compromise. The spring elections gave Alessandri a working majority in both houses of the legislature, but the deficit was still to be faced. Civil service employees were due several months pay and pensions to soldiers had been deferred indefinitely. The income tax did not bring much added revenue, because collection agencies for it had not been well organized.

Hardly had the Congress opened in the summer of 1924 when army officers, some of whom had not been receiving more than 200 pesos ($20 to $40) a

[23] Cf. *supra*, chapter iv; this is the commission from the two houses that is in session whenever congress is adjourned.

[24] *New York Times Current History*, April 1924.

month,[25] began to demand higher salaries. The refusal of the government to meet their requests added another powerful element of discontent. Unemployment still raged in the mining districts and wage earners talked revolution. When the labor group of the president's followers found him adamant against all suggestions of violence, they lost interest in his cause. A large section of the Liberal Alliance thus became passive in the political struggle that grew more intense every day.

In the midst of valiant efforts to balance the budget, with prices rising as Chilean exchange fell, the Radical majority in the Congress pushed through a bill that provided for payment of salaries to congressmen. Heretofore they had been unpaid, and the new measure showed that poor men had now entered the political arena so long monopolized by a relatively small number of wealthy families. It was not an unexpected step in the course of political success by the new middle class, but coming at the time that it did, it served to arouse antagonisms as no other law could have done. Charges were openly made that the guarantee given in the spring for a free election of this Congress had not been kept.

In September the army officers acted. Excluded from the galleries when the salary bill was being discussed, at their headquarters at the Club Militar they planned a *coup d'état*. It was executed on the fifth,

[25] The peso was then fluctuating between the value of ten and twenty cents in American money.

and Alessandri had to appoint a new cabinet headed by General Luís Altamirano. The president then handed in his resignation on the ninth, took a brief refuge in the American embassy, and left the country for Argentina. Altamirano was disposed to reject the resignation, but when the voluntary exile insisted, he acquiesced and became head of a provisional government.[26]

The new junta issued a proclamation immediately, promising that no military dictatorship would be installed. To retain the passive support of the labor party that had allowed Alessandri to fall, it also made a stand for protective labor legislation. An attempt by some of the old Radical majority to secure the support of the navy failed, and that arm of the military forces was brought into the government.

As in the days of Manuel Montt, and later of Balmaceda, the conservative groups appeared to be favored by the European powers. Great Britain recognized the new régime six days after Alessandri resigned. Foreign banks in Santiago loaned it money, and Rothschild of London agreed to sponsor a large sum whenever Chile so desired. It seemed for a while as if the American representative would follow the footsteps of Patrick Egan and back the losing faction. On a special train chartered from Santiago, Ambassador William M. Collier accompanied Alessandri to the Argentine frontier. But no further step

[26] Earle K. James, "Chile's Bloodless Revolution," in *New York Times Current History,* December 1924.

than this was taken and the United States remained on friendly terms with the new administration.[27]

The coup appeared to be a success. A sale of government nitrate-lands, coupled with the loans from foreign banks, netted enough funds to balance the budget. But younger military officers were soon complaining of Altamirano. The army had tasted political power and was breaking up into cliques. In December the new civilian cabinet appointed by the chief of the provisional government discharged Colonel Ewing, head of the mounted police, for alleged interference in the coming elections for a constitutional president. A group of young officers, drawn mainly from the new middle class, thereupon charged that Altamirano was plotting to deliver the government to Luís Barros Borgoño. In this stand they were backed by the young intellectuals and the anticlerical Masons. Altamirano retorted by dissolving all of the military juntas. A second coup was then carried out on the 23rd of January, 1925, by that part of the army opposed to the president, and an invitation was sent to Alessandri to return.

Again a revolution seemed imminent. The old order, as represented in the Unionist party, was not at all disposed to accept the change. But the Chilean Federation of Labor, which had so long remained passive, returned to the ranks of Alessandri's sup-

[27] As the Archives of the State Department for 1924 are not yet open to the public, it is not possible to know what was written to Mr. Collier from Washington in regard to this incident. One can imagine, however, the consternation at the State Department when news came of this astounding breach of diplomatic decorum.

porters, with a declaration approving the return of the exiled president. Since the latter quickly reached an agreement with the newest junta, his opponents abandoned their opposition. He consented to resume his executive functions, whenever he received a promise that the military leaders would return to their proper duties and that a constitutional convention for the nation would be held promptly. Alessandri came back to Chile in March, shortly before the Coolidge Award was made that held out a prospect for the settlement of the Tacna-Arica tangle.

Chapter XIII

THE GREAT QUESTION OF SOUTH AMERICA FOR ALL AMERICA

The treaty of Ancón provided that a vote of the inhabitants should determine the ownership of Tacna and Arica. But forty-two years later, when Arturo Alessandri returned to Chile from his enforced exile, the plebiscite had not yet been held. These provinces, though devoid of mineral wealth, were an ever-present menace to the peace of the New World. With the great powers proclaiming the new era of peace, with even eastern Europe solving its petty territorial disputes, Peru and Chile were unable to resume diplomatic relations of ordinary friendship. As long as they disagreed, South American intrigue would continue, business investments on the west coast could not be safe, the Pan-American program was effectively blocked. Tacna and Arica had become the great question of South America for all America.

Clause 3 of the treaty of Ancón provided for a Chilean occupation of ten years. "That term having expired, a plebiscite will decide," it continued. The use of the participial phrase led to a difference in interpreting the clause, which started the extended quarrel. When the year 1893 arrived and Peru asked that arrangements for voting be made, Chile answered that no date had been set in the treaty. The only stipulation was, it maintained, that ten years

must elapse before any decision was reached.[1] According to the government at Santiago, the times were not then propitious for a vote, since both countries were in an unsettled condition. Another revolution held Peru in its grip, while the overthrow of Balmaceda had only recently occurred in Chile. Neither nation was in a condition to pay readily the ten million pesos required of it, in case that it won the plebiscite.

By 1898 the financial outlook was brighter, and again a settlement of Tacna and Arica was undertaken. Guillermo Billinghurst, vice-president of Peru, went to Santiago on a special mission for this. He signed there the Latorre-Billinghurst protocol, whereby all disagreements as to plebiscite arrangements would be referred to the Queen of Spain for decision. The Peruvian Congress ratified promptly

[1] The original Spanish text reads: "Espirado este plazo, un plebiscito decidirá." The translation of the participial phrase, found in the Peruvian case laid before President Coolidge in 1923, reads: "At the expiration of that term." On the other hand, the Chilean text in English gave: "After the expiration of the term." According to the latter version, holding of the plebiscite might be deferred indefinitely, while the Peruvian case contended that the treaty provided for the vote to be taken no later than 1894. The Chilean translation is based on the English copy of the treaty sent by Minister S. C. Phelps to his home government in Washington in 1883, while he was serving at Lima. On the other hand, the text of the same treaty in the British and Foreign State Papers of 1890 is in accordance with the Peruvian version. Cf. *The Case of Peru in the Matter of the Controversy Arising Out of the Question of the Pacific,* p. 22; *Tacna-Arica Arbitration: the Case of the Republic of Chile Submitted to the President of the United States as Arbitrator,* I, p. 9; Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Phelps to Frelinghuysen, December 23, 1883; Sir Edward Hertslet, ed., *British and Foreign State Papers,* 74, 350.

and the Chilean Senate did likewise. But the Chamber of Deputies in Santiago was uncertain. After three years of hesitation, the whole arrangement was rejected by the Chilean lower house.[2]

Meanwhile, Chile had been holding out to Bolivia the hope of acquiring these poor but much desired provinces. Neither Tacna nor Arica contained nitrate deposits of appreciable value, although some borax was mined in Arica. Chile wished to have them constitute a buffer region separating Tarapacá from its former owner; Peru of course desired to lose no more territory than had already been taken away. Tacna particularly had been the scene of several heroic deeds during the War of Pacific, and patriotic sentiment in Peru clamored for its retention. For Bolivia the practical value of the provinces was much greater; for without them, or some other coastal area, it was deprived of an outlet to the sea.

A truce had been agreed upon between Chile and Bolivia at the time of the Treaty of Ancón, whereby Chile had retained its hold on Antofagasta. All claims to this province were renounced by Bolivia in a pact signed in 1894; whereas Tacna and Arica were promised to it in return, if the ever-pending plebiscite gave them to Chile. Bolivian interest was in this way to be enlisted in the Chilean cause against Peru. But once more the Congress at Santiago failed to sanction the acts of the foreign office; and that because explanatory clauses added to the treaty to satisfy the Bolivian legislature were not pleasing to

[2] *Case of Chile*, p. 75.

the Chilean lawmakers. Thus nothing was settled on the west coast by 1900, and the former allies began a campaign to enlist the sympathies of the rest of the South American continent against their conqueror.[3]

Chile had its way with Bolivia in 1905, when a treaty was ratified by both parliaments that ceded Antofagasta to the former without any promise of other provinces in return. Bolivia was forced to be satisfied with a railroad to be built at Chilean expense, from Arica to La Paz. It was also to own the Bolivian part of the road in fifteen years. In another clause, Chile assumed all the debts of Antofagasta. By this treaty, the government at La Paz relinquished all claims to Tacna and Arica, which it had never owned but had hoped to receive as the quarrel over them dragged on.

For seven years after the failure of the Latorre-Billinghurst protocol, Chile and Peru made no official effort to agree, although a hope was arising that possibly one solution would be a division of the provinces between the two. Agustín Edwards favored this in 1904, and in his position of foreign minister, asked the American Minister, Dudley, who visited him from Lima, to find out the attitude of Peru on such a suggestion.[4] It would have been a most sensible solution; because possession of Arica gave Chile its buffer territory, while Tacna contained a large part of the sentimental value which still attached the provinces to Peru. But patriotic fervor had been

[3] *Supra,* chapter xi.

[4] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Wilson to Hay, January 1904.

aroused to such a pitch as the years passed that no government could stand in either country which would sanction such an arrangement. Tacna and Arica had become a question of prestige and of national honor.

This sensitive nationalism prevented all efforts to reach a settlement. The Chilean press began to discuss the cost of occupation and estimated them as mounting to forty million pesos, all of which would have to be paid if Peru bought back the provinces. Augusto B. Leguía, president of Peru in 1909, told Leslie Coombs, the United States minister there, that the only subject on which his people were united was Tacna and Arica. "A revolutionary tendency is natural to Peruvians," he said. "The agitation of this question always has the effect of nationalizing and solidifying opinion, and thus at times the trouble with Chile works for the real welfare of the country. No government could live a day that would surrender their ultimate destiny."[5]

When Peru sent Guillermo Seoane to Santiago in 1908 to renew negotiations, Chile presented proposals of a commercial nature which it now wished to put into treaty form before Tacna and Arica were further discussed. These were: first, a free trade convention between the two countries; second, a line of steamers to be subsidized by both governments; third, the joint financing of a railroad between Lima and Santiago; fourth, an increase to

[5] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Combs to Knox, November 17, 1909.

thirty million pesos as the amount of the indemnity to be paid by the nation winning the plebiscite.

As Chilean commerce with Peru was worth four times the value of Peruvian commerce with Chile, the first suggestion was not one of mutual benefit. The other three involved an expense that Peru could ill afford, whereas Chile was growing rich from the former Peruvian nitrates. More than that, it meant Chilean occupation would be continued until these measures could be put into effect, and every year the provinces tended to become more and more Chileanized. Seoane therefore refused to consider the proposals, and one more attempt had failed.[6]

Again, in 1910, rumors of a settlement were rife. A certain Señor Alfonso went on a private mission from Chile to Lima, and returned with the old plan of Agustín Edwards for a division of the provinces. According to the report of the American minister at the time, the Barros Luco administration favored the plan, but it was rejected in a secret session of the Chilean Congress. One of those who led the opposition was Arturo Alessandri.[7]

A realization was growing among statesmen on both sides that the nations would never agree to a plebiscite. Chile's reputation for stable government inclined foreigners who had investments in the provinces to prefer that Chile retain them. For that rea-

[6] *Rose Book of Chile,* pp. 51-53.

[7] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Fletcher to Knox, March 12, 1910. Neither Chile nor Peru makes any mention of the Alfonso mission in the cases presented in the Washington arbitration of 1923.

son, Peru was much less disposed to allow foreigners to vote than was its opponent. It also stood against a literacy test for voters, particularly for those who were born in Tacna and Arica. As more Chileans moved into the provinces every year to work on the new public improvements their country was inaugurating, Peru also held that a residence of several years should be made a qualification for voting, whereas Chile, in 1912, suggested six months as the proper time limit. Even more serious disagreement developed every time that a discussion was held about the character of the plebiscitary commission. Chile insisted that its position as occupant of the territories gave it the right to hold the chairmanship. In 1912 it suggested that the commission be composed of two persons from each country and a fifth appointed by the Chilean Supreme Court. Peru promptly declined the offer, standing by the protocol of 1898, which had provided that a neutral was to be chairman.[8]

Time undoubtedly was playing into Chile's hands. It extended its colonization laws to Arica in 1900, and to Tacna nine years later. Every new undertaking, such as the Arica-La Paz railway, brought more workmen from the south and more Chilean troops to protect them. "This railroad was provided for, not only to offer a commercial advantage to Bolivia," wrote *El Mercurio* in 1905, "but also that we might have effective means for Chileanizing Tacna and Arica, for carrying to that region population, influ-

[8] *Case of Peru*, p. 168.

ence, and Chilean elements of every kind."[9] But, according to the Peruvians, their rival was not content with these peaceful methods of fastening its clutches on the provinces. Peruvian schools were constantly being closed, they charged; Peruvian journalists were persecuted; priests were imprisoned or their churches closed; some of their countrymen were forbidden to engage in certain branches of commerce; their day laborers were not allowed to earn wages on docks and railways; Peruvian youths were forced into the military service of Chile.[10]

All of these charges were explained by Chileans to their own satisfaction. They were in charge of the provinces and could not allow subversive agitation in schools and pulpits which tended to stir up revolution. Any military service forced on Peruvian boys was simply in line with compulsory training that both countries required.

The question of the priests shows well the difficulty which any mediator might have in determining whether Peruvian complaints were justified. Though Chile ocupied Tacna and Arica in 1883, the Vatican continued the authority of the bishop of Arequipa over the provinces. His appointees were naturally Peruvians, who took office without regard to the wishes of the Chilean government. But Chilean laws required an official sanction from Santiago for all church appointments, and hence priests were not per-

[9] *El Mercurio,* July 28, 1905.

[10] *Circular of the Peruvian Foreign Minister to his Legations Abroad,* December 2, 1918.

mitted to function in provinces to which those laws extended.[11]

The policy of Chileanization was upheld mainly on grounds of the improvements that had been made in the provinces since they had passed out of Peruvian hands. Towns had been cleaned up and epidemics checked; roads had been built; postal and telegraph systems installed; high schools for boys and girls established; customs regulations had been simplified; and a much needed police protection had been extended to every citizen.[12] It was on bases such as these that the powers of the world were justifying their control over backward territories of doubtful political status. Similar signs of progress have been cited in recent years to justify the American occupation of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Porto Rico.[13]

The United States had carefully maintained a policy of absolute neutrality since the last fiasco of 1883; but Peru yet hoped that it could attract the active sympathy and help of the northern republic. Agustín Edwards complained in 1905 that he had difficulty in persuading his countrymen that the Washington government was not partial to Peru and

[11] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Cresson to Knox, January 29, 1910.

[12] Carlos Varas, *Tacna i Arica bajo la soberania chilena,* p. 82.

[13] "Recent Progress, Social and Economic, in Haiti," in *Bulletin of the Pan-American Union* (November, 1923), pp. 380-385; editorial in *World's Work* (September, 1922), "Achievements and Mistakes in Haiti"; Sylvester Baker, "Porto Rico under the Stars and Stripes," in *American Review of Reviews,* May, 1923.

probably in secret agreement; and that Peru was persistently spreading rumors that warships for its use were being built in the United States.[14] In that very year, a new Peruvian minister arrived in Santiago after having served his country in Washington, and a new American minister came to Lima. Connivance was immediately suspected by the Chileans and their doubts were not easily dispelled.

But the United States had little desire to undertake another mediation. The A. B. C. discussions in 1908 and 1909 indicated a possible intervention by Brazil and Argentina. The northern republic was quite willing to join with these two South American countries in an offer of good offices. Rio Branco, of Brazil, was trying earnestly to bring about a division of the provinces between Peru and Chile in 1910. But he could neither agree with Argentina nor present a plan that the Chileans would adopt.[15] This was as near as any outsiders approached to mediation before the World War.

The triumph of the Allies in Europe, Wilson's speeches concerning self-determination, and the dawn of a new era revived the hopes of Peru for a revision of the treaty of Ancón. Chile had now held Tacna for nearly forty years, and Peru was convinced that its best chance lay in making an entirely new arrangement. Ever alert to attract American sympathy, it saw a golden opportunity in the neutrality which Chile had adopted throughout the World War, in

[14] Department of State, Bureau of Archives, Ames to Root, August 12, 1905.

[15] *Ibid.*, Dudley to Knox, March 31, 1910.

contrast to the Peruvian action of severing diplomatic relations with Germany. Tacna and Arica were described by the Peruvians as the Alsace-Lorraine of South America, and Chile was held up to the world as the one South American country that really sympathized with the lost German cause.

In December 1918, on the eve of the departure of President Wilson from the United States for the Versailles conference, riots started in Iquique, the chief port of Tarapacá. Strained relations resulted at once between Peru and Chile; consuls were withdrawn and armies massed on the frontiers. Wilson immediately dispatched notes to both parties, that any disturbance now would be of harm to the whole world just as peace had come to Europe. He called the attention of the disputants to their obligation to settle all difficulties. "The United States is ready," he added, "to furnish all possible assistance for the purpose of arriving at an equitable solution of the affair."[16]

It was not the first time that Wilsonian idealism had created alarm. Suggestions he had made as early as 1913 regarding ways for settling inter-American differences had met with disfavor in Latin America. The foreign office at Santiago now assumed the position that good offices had not been tendered by the United States, but merely an expression of readiness to help if need arose. Chile took special care to emphasize that it was only interested in settling Clause

[16] *New York Times,* December 13, 1918.

3 of the treaty of Ancón; it would never consent to a complete revision of the treaty.

The Iquique disturbances did not last long, and Tacna and Arica were forgotten in the absorbing European problems that were being threshed out at Versailles. But Peru persisted in its hope of revising the whole arrangement of 1883 and possibly reopening a discussion of the ownership of Tarapacá. Leguía again became president in 1919, and the Congress then assembled at Lima declared the pact of Ancón null and void. The following year a revolution in Bolivia overthrew President Gutiérrez Guerra, who was favorable to Chile, and set up a pro-Peruvian government. Both the former allies in the War of the Pacific then turned to the League of Nations.

The first assembly at Geneva persuaded Peru to defer the question to a future session, but Bolivia was not so easily turned aside the next year. Its request for a revision of all treaties arising out of the War of the Pacific was placed on the agenda by Secretary General Drummond as being in keeping with the League Covenant. This was a dangerous subject, since a revision of these pacts might pave the way for reopening the Versailles treaty. Throughout one day a filibuster was conducted in the assembly by the leading statesmen of Europe in order to prevent a discussion of the Bolivian proposal;[17] then upon the receipt of new instructions from La Paz, the request was withdrawn.

[17] *Ibid.*, September 7, 1921.

Thus the door of the League of Nations was closed. When Agustín Edwards of Chile was chosen president of the second Assembly at Geneva, Peru even withdrew its delegation. But the United States renewed its interest in west coast affairs as the danger of European intervention appeared to revive, and the new Harding administration now moved to take a hand in the quarrel. The times were propitious. Business men in both Peru and Chile were growing impatient with the patriotic pride that had so long kept investments uncertain in and around the disputed area. An invitation from the American Secretary of State, in 1922, that both nations send delegates to Washington to discuss the "unfulfilled clauses of the treaty of Ancón"[18] met with a ready assent from Santiago and Lima. In the summer of that year the conferees came together in the Hall of the Americas at the Pan-American building in Washington. Once more the northern republic had undertaken a settlement of the War of the Pacific.

The conference opened in a better spirit than had been shown for some time. Bolivia's request to be included was disapproved by both Peruvian and Chilean delegates, and was not upheld by the United States. But though Peru had given up the idea of reopening the subject of Tarapacá, it insisted on referring to an arbiter the question as to whether a plebiscite should be held at all in Tacna and Arica. If not, any arbiter chosen should provide the mode of settlement. Chile still held out against revision of the

[18] *New York Times Current History,* March 1922.

treaty of Ancón, but favored arbitration of its unfulfilled clause. Within a month it seemed as if the conferences would be deadlocked and once more no solution reached.

Again Secretary Hughes brought the disputants together and Chile finally agreed to leave to arbitration the question of holding a plebiscite. But the American mediator did not admit the right of an arbiter to decide the fate of Tacna and Arica. If it were decreed that no vote would be taken, a new conference should be held between the disputing countries to determine what ought to be done. This compromise was signed as a protocol in September 1922, and two months were allowed for its ratification by the legislatures of both nations.[19]

As far as Peru was concerned, President Leguía easily silenced all opposition and ratification followed forthwith. The real fight was to be made in Santiago; for the Chilean delegation had abandoned a position that had been held by their country for forty years.[20] President Alessandri endorsed the agreement and at once prepared for the struggle. The returned delegates were given controlling positions in a new cabinet, while executive influence pushed the protocol through the lower house. The popularity of the fighting president was then at its height, and the Unionist majority in the Senate did not dare reject the entire agreement. It resorted to the familiar tactics of adding unwelcome reservations.

[19] *Ibid.*, August 1922.

[20] Namely, that it would not consent to any revision of the treaty of Ancón.

The battle was then resumed in the Chamber of Deputies, where the reservations were stricken out by a two-thirds vote. Though months had passed, chances for Chilean ratification were so bright that the time limit was extended. Again the senate convened to discuss the protocol. But the two-thirds majority it needed to override the Chamber was lacking. Alessandri won his fight and Chile ratified the protocol as it was signed.[21] In January 1923 the President of the United States accepted the position of arbiter. Two years were allowed for the countries to present their cases and reply to the arguments of the other. In March 1925 the Coolidge Award was made.

The plebiscite clause of the treaty of Ancón was upheld; a commission of one Peruvian, one Chilean, and one American—the last named serving as chairman—was to be appointed to fix the rules for voting and to superintend the process. All voters must pass a literacy test, excepting those who had owned real estate in the provinces since July 20, 1922. Natives of Tacna and Arica were given the right to take part in the plebiscite, and both Chileans and Peruvians who had lived in the provinces for three years and in their local districts for three months. Foreigners who were eligible for naturalization were also included. On the other hand, all persons were excluded who belonged to the army, navy, police, or civil service of either country. A dispute as to the

[21] According to the Chilean constitution, neither house can override a decision of the other except by a two-thirds vote; cf. *supra*, chapter ix.

drawing of the northern boundary of Tacna was decided in favor of Peru, which was thus given the Tarata section without further argument.[22]

Riots against Leguía had to be quelled with an iron hand when cabled reports of the award reached Peru. A general strike and parades of protest showed the excitement that prevailed. Leguía wrote President Coolidge that his decision had "undeservedly approved the moral position of the republic of Chile." For it was not only the declaration that a plebiscite should be held which made the award appear a victory for Chile. The residence qualifications of two and a half years gave a vote to all the citizens of that country who had moved into Tacna and Arica since July, 1922. The requirement that voters should be able to read and write excluded numbers of Peruvian Indians who were born in the provinces. At Santiago, on the other hand, the bells of all the cathedrals were tolled in celebration of the outcome of arbitration by the United States.

It was perhaps fortunate for the Washington government that this was the case, as Chile was a far stronger nation than Peru. The completion of its program of naval construction had added two dreadnoughts and several cruisers to the fleet. It might have resisted an adverse decision in a manner that Peru could never have done, thus placing the United States in a situation where it would be forced to use its military power or else back down from its position as an arbiter, should Chile oppose its decrees.

[22] *New York Times Current History,* October 1925.

On the other hand, New York bankers had bought seven million dollars' worth of Peruvian government bonds in October, 1924, which were guaranteed by certain national revenues that were to be collected by Americans.[23] Financially also Chile was more independent of the United States than Peru.

But a closer examination of the Coolidge Award showed not only that Chilean rejoicing was a bit premature but that the arbiter had merely begun a real solution of the question. The provision that all who were born in the provinces could vote meant a return of many natives who had fled from Chilean rule. On the other hand, all civil employees who were to be barred from the polls would be Chileans. The American who was to be chairman of the plebiscite commission might well expect trouble with the Chilean authorities when these rules for the registration of voters were put into effect.

At first it seemed as if the United States had chosen a more capable representative than it had sent to the west coast forty years before. Though it had turned once more to its army for a man, the new appointee was General John J. Pershing, hero of the World War. When local authorities interfered with the staff of the Peruvian commissioner, Pershing obtained from them a promise that hereafter the Peruvians would be allowed free passage through any part of the provinces. A secret society organized in Arica to protect Chilean interests was promptly sup-

[23] *New York Times Current History,* October 10, 1924; cf. Arthur's Message to Congress, *supra,* chapter viii.

pressed by the Chilean governor himself. When the provincial police suppressed a Peruvian newspaper, Agustín Edwards, the Chilean commissioner, joined Pershing in upholding the rights of the press.[24]

But complaints continued to come from Peru that Chile was blocking a fair enforcement of the plebiscite rules. Coolidge rejected a request from Leguía that American marines replace the local police. Pershing, however, was induced to make a tour of inspection through both Tacna and Arica during which he inquired minutely into the activities of the local administration. This caused tremendous protest from the Chileans. Edwards charged that the American commissioner was permitting Peru to defer the vote indefinitely when he listened to every trivial complaint.

Meanwhile, at Santiago domestic politics took another curious turn. Alessandri had come back the preceding March in the midst of tumultuous rejoicing. Some of the more active Unionists had even been deported on account of fear of a revolution. The restored president, realizing how much he owed to the labor factions, again promised favorable laws for workingmen, and a large number of social and labor reforms were inaugurated by executive decree. Some of these were modelled on the laws of Soviet Russia; others on recent legislation in Mexico. But while the right of labor to organize and the right to strike were both recognized, Alessandri had no intention of alienating the powerful foreign nitrate interests. When workingmen in Antofagasta attempted to or-

[24] *New York Times Current History,* October 1925.

ganize, the movement was stopped peremptorily by the nitrate companies. Soldiers had to be sent to quell the ensuing riots and two thousand persons were killed. Once more Chilean labor lost interest in Alessandri's cause.[25]

The president aroused further opposition by refusing to call a constitutional convention. Instead, he offered a new constitution of his own for the voters to accept or reject *in toto*. It was adopted in the late summer of 1925, but Alessandri's victory was short-lived. He had agreed to hold office only until December. As the presidential elections drew near, one of his cabinet was put forward as a candidate. Once more Alessandri was suspected of tampering with the choice of his successor. He was further embarrassed by the refusal of the candidate to quit the cabinet. The president then tendered his own resignation and turned over his duties to Luís Barros Borgoño, his Unionist opponent of 1921, who became vice-president. In November, 1925, the Liberal Alliance agreed to join the Unionist Coalition in backing Emiliano Figueroa Larrain for president. He was duly elected the next month, being opposed only by a labor candidate who made a very poor showing. The old order was in the saddle again.[26]

The probable effect of such changes on the result of the plebiscite was doubtful. Alessandri had been the champion of American arbitration from the beginning. He now joined Edwards in Arica, but his

[25] *The Nation*, October 14, 1925.

[26] *New York Times Current History*, November 1925.

withdrawal from the government left in power the Unionists who had never been enthusiastic over the Washington conference. As the breach between Pershing and the Chileans widened, even Alessandri grew cold.

By October, both Pershing and General Morrow, chairman of the boundary commission, were ready to return to the United States. The former claimed that Chilean officials obstructed him in all his efforts to prepare for a fair plebiscite. He based his statements on Peruvian complaints, and demanded eleven guarantees from Chile for the protection of those entitled to vote. One item was the right of the commission to interfere in all questions in Tacna and Arica where the plebiscite was involved. Another was that Chile should reduce its military garrison to the size of the Peruvian army on the other side of the boundary. Further, the commission should have the power to remove any civil authority, and all persons deported from the provinces should be returned at Chilean expense.

In the middle of November Edwards declared that the situation had become hopeless when Pershing refused to set an exact date for the voting. "General Pershing is involuntarily the best collaborator of Peruvian obstruction," he said.[27] He demanded registration by the 20th of December and a vote by the first of February. When the American commissioner continued to investigate every complaint from Peru, Chile informally submitted a memorandum of the

[27] *Ibid.*, January 1926.

doings of the commission to the Secretary General of the League of Nations. This was not an official protest, but the arraignment of Pershing was bitter and the step implied a new effort to involve the League in American affairs.

On December 9, 1925, Pershing offered a motion fixing the date for a plebiscite. But in his accompanying speech he again accused Chile of administering the territories unlawfully and of preventing a free vote. His motion included a request that the Chilean delegation agree to fulfil all past and future acts of the commission. Edwards consequently voted in the negative and the proposal was passed by a vote of 2 to 1. Chile thereupon appealed to Coolidge, who after a month's consideration overruled the objections which were brought to his attention. Meanwhile, Pershing resigned and returned home.

For a short time it was thought that perhaps the United States would decline to go further, but President Coolidge insisted that the arrangements for registration and voting continue. General William Lassiter was appointed to succeed Pershing, and the plebiscite was set definitely for April, 1926. The United States government could hardly have acted otherwise, as the reopening of the Tacna-Arica question made it impossible for the situation of the past forty years and more to continue. Then, too, the Chilean memorandum to the League of Naitons constituted a species of challenge to the headship of the northern republic in the New World. It even implied a menace to one of the multifarious interpretations

of the Monroe Doctrine. Hazardous as it might be for the United States to continue the attempt at mediation, even more danger was involved in abandoning it and thus paving the way for a possible intervention by the League of Nations.

The new American commissioner was soon involved in all of the difficulties that had checkmated Pershing. His decision that government teachers and employees in the postal and telegraph service should be excluded from voting was made over the protest of the Chilean delegation, who once more appealed to Coolidge. On the other hand, when he voted that railroad employees might take part in the plebiscite, the Peruvians sent a protest to Washington. Though President Coolidge backed his new appointee in both cases and Lassiter continued to arrange for the registration of voters, prospects for a real settlement of the dispute became gloomier each day.[28]

At Washington, Frank B. Kellogg had succeeded Charles E. Hughes in the State Department. Toward the end of March, proposals for the settlement of the dispute by direct negotiations were sent from Washington to the South American west coast. Both Peru and Chile agreed to another meeting in Washington; but whereas Peru claimed that the plebiscite was thus suspended automatically, the government at Santiago insisted on moving forward to the registration. On March 27, 1926, when Chilean voters began to register, all Peruvians stayed away from the booths in accordance with orders from their commis-

[28] Lassiter, over the protest of the Chilean commissioner, postponed the date of voting to May 15.

sioner. It had become evident that the fulfillment of the Coolidge Award was impossible.

The United States government now centered its hopes on the parleys at Washington. On April 18, Secretary Kellogg suggested two new solutions of the problem. He first proposed that Tacna and Arica be made a neutralized state, either independent or under the protection of another South American nation. If this did not meet the approval of the negotiators, the alternative suggestion was to transfer the provinces to "a South American state not a party to the negotiations," which would then make a suitable money payment to both Chile and Peru.

It was well understood that Bolivia was the nation to which the provinces might be transferred. Though it had been refused a share in the negotiations of 1922, there had been many suggestions in the press of the United States that this would be the most equitable solution of the quarrel over Tacna and Arica, since the mountain republic needed an outlet to the sea. Besides, a Bolivian government loan had lately been contracted with New York banking houses which gave the American lenders control of the entire revenues of the nation; and it was now reported that further money was available in the United States to enable Bolivia to buy the disputed district.

The idea of an independent neutralized state did not meet with any degree of favor in either Chile or Peru.[29] On the other hand, the action of Secretary

[29] The suggestion originated with Agustín Edwards, who resigned as Chilean minister in February, 1926. It was transmitted to the United States in December, 1925. Many Chileans

Kellogg in bringing back Bolivia into the wrangle served only to complicate matters further, for President Siles, the new executive in the mountain republic, at once wrote to Washington his enthusiastic appreciation of the suggestion and requested a seat at the conference. Though this was denied him by President Coolidge, the hopes of Bolivia were again high as it reëntered the lists.

The summer of 1926 saw the breakdown both of plebiscite and of direct negotiations. In May, President Figueroa Larrain, at the opening of the Chilean Congress, stated as to Tacna and Arica that "there remains only the execution of the award handed down by the arbiter, which conforms to our demands for a realization of the plebiscite." But the speech of General Lassiter on June 14 before the plebiscitary commission dashed all hope of a solution through the Coolidge Award. Citing definite cases of riots and disturbances wherein Peruvians suffered, he charged that so many of the latter had been or would be deterred from voting that no fair election could be held. "The conditions above outlined have been brought about, not only with the approval of Chilean authorities, but with their connivance," the American official declared. He thought this had been evidenced by Chile's "failure to restrain the criminal activities of certain patriotic or political organizations whose

and Peruvians feared that to neutralize the provinces and give them independence at the same time would involve the use of American marines who are now so frequently dispatched to trouble centers of the Caribbean.

operations have been accompanied by unmistakable evidence of official support and approval."[30]

The indignation of both Chilean government and people on receipt of this speech was unbounded, and four days afterwards Chile withdrew from the direct negotiations at Washington, declaring at the same time its intention of retaining the provinces until the Coolidge Award was fulfilled. In answer to Lassiter's charges, Agustín Edwards replied in an official report sent to all foreign governments that the riots cited by the American official were caused solely by the undue postponement of the plebiscite. The American commission, he charged, had played the part of a detective agency trying to fasten guilt on Chile for crimes allaged by Peru, rather than the part of mediator trying to settle a dispute with impartiality.

So ended the second effort of the United States to be a peacemaker in the quarrels of South America's west coast. Once more as in 1883 does Chile, the stronger of the disputants, accuse the northern republic of siding with its enemy, while at the same time it retains the provinces of Tacna and Arica in defiance of American opinion. Not only the prestige of the United States but the reputation of the whole arbitral method of settling international disputes has been impaired by the unfortunate failure of the United States in one of the most complicated and delicate tasks its diplomats have ever undertaken in the New World.

[30] Gen. William Lassiter, "American Official Account of the Anti-Peruvian Campaign," in *New York Times Current History,* August 1926.

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INDEX